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SUMMARY
Courts in the United Kingdom currently employ a conflict model of adjudicating 
maternal / foetal issues. This thesis aims to expose the inadequacy of the current 
model, to evaluate alternative approaches, and ultimately to propose a property- 
based model of adjudicating pregnancy.
I begin by surveying some of the case-law under the conflict model and 
discussing the model’s shortcomings. On the practical level, the conflict model 
leads to negative perceptions of pregnant women, fails to reflect the realities of 
pregnancy, and embodies legal and logical inconsistencies. On the theoretical 
level, problems arise from the model’s necessary characterisation of the foetus as 
a ‘sentient non-person’. This is problematic for two reasons, which are explored 
in chapters two and three respectively: first, because the sentience of the foetus is 
a matter of controversy; second, because the concept of personhood is deeply 
flawed and is anyway incapable of functioning as a determinant of moral status.
Later I review an alternative to the conflict model which has been 
proposed by Eileen L McDonagh: her ‘consent model’ of pregnancy which 
characterises pregnancy as an ‘intrusion’ by the foetus upon the body of the 
mother and views the right to terminate pregnancy as a right of ‘self-defence’ 
against this intrusion. I conclude that McDonagh’s thesis fails, ultimately, to 
provide a satisfactory alternative to the conflict model.
My own alternative to the conflict model, developed in chapter five, 
proposes a departure from the metaphysical language of personhood and moral 
status, and a focus on the legal framework of property as a method of 
adjudicating maternal / foetal issues.
my parents and grandparents
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Introduction: the need for a new legal paradigm of pregnancy
In the title of an article published in 1991, Celia Wells and Derek Morgan ask, 
provocatively, ‘ Whose Foetus Is It? ’} In this thesis, I claim that this question 
is both appropriate and answerable, however unaccustomed we may be to 
approaching matemal/foetal issues as issues of property. Almost without 
exception, those who claim that foetuses have rights, and that pregnant 
women and others have concomitant obligations not to harm or destroy 
foetuses, justify their claims by reference to the nature o f the foetus. 
Similarly, responses to such claims about foetal rights have ranged from 
outright denial that the foetus is anything of value at all to arguments focusing 
on the moral status of women and their rights, having regard to concepts such 
as choice, consent and autonomy. As such, what the vast majority of 
argumentation on both sides shares is its focus on the nature and moral status 
of the entities involved.
Here, I will explore the difficulties encountered by traditional 
comment on matemal/foetal issues, and offer my own suggestion for 
adjudicating pregnancy: a paradigm shift from personhood to property. I will 
argue that the existing legal framework of property is able to illuminate the 
complex dynamic at work in pregnancy, securing women’s autonomy and 
explaining what seem to be conflicting and incoherent legislative and judicial 
statements, while avoiding some of the pitfalls that have hampered other 
models.
First, it will be necessary to justify my recommendation that we shift 
the emphasis away from the concept of personhood, which seems to possess 
such intuitive appeal, and on which so many commentators continue to pin 
their hopes of a resolution to the moral and intellectual hand-wringing which 
invariably accompanies theorising matemal/foetal issues.
It is undoubtedly the case that the legal and moral issues arising from 
pregnancy, such as matemal/foetal conflicts, can plausibly be framed as 
questions of moral status. It is also probably true to say that questions 
concerning what may and may not be done to human life in its earliest stages
1 Journal o f Law and Society 18(4) ( 1991) 431
1
could be resolved by arriving at a satisfactory answer to such questions as, 
‘what is the moral status of the conceptus, embryo, or foetus?’. Similarly, 
questions about how we ought to understand the rights and obligations 
conferred and imposed by pregnancy can be cast in terms o f the personhood 
of women, their moral agency and personal autonomy. But the reducibility of 
all such questions to the ‘fundamental question’ of the moral status of the 
foetus is precisely the problem with issues surrounding pregnancy, since this 
fundamental question is one which is possibly unanswerable, and which 
certainly promises to remain controversial for the foreseeable future. Some of 
the finest legal and philosophical minds for generations past have submitted 
this area of enquiry to years of scrutiny, with considerable input from experts 
in other relevant disciplines, such as embryology and reproductive medicine, 
yet the ‘clash of absolutes’ remains. Moreover, the claims of ethical relativism 
and other strands of moral scepticism raise the possibility that the search for 
the kind of ‘moral truth’ necessary to put the matter beyond the current 
protracted and intractable discourse is a vain one.
Despite this possibility, and the fact of profound and ongoing moral 
disagreement, however, the law must respond coherently to questions arising 
from maternal foetal issues.2 As such, a rationale of some sort is required, and 
it cannot wait upon a substantial consensus as to the moral status of the foetus.
1 propose, therefore, to draw back from the heat and rhetoric of the moral- 
status debate for a time, and to concentrate instead upon the possibility of a 
legal solution.
As I will demonstrate, one clear advantage o f the property model is 
that it allows for analysis of the relationships at stake without presupposing 
any conclusions about the nature or moral status of the entities involved in 
these relationships. This feature makes the model particularly amenable to 
legal analysis and adjudication, since, arguably, the raison d ’etre of law is the 
regulation of relationships.
Recasting the issues in terms of property does not mean abandonment 
of the legal language of personhood and rights. Such concepts are, after all,
2 Contrast John Seymour, who regards coherence in the law o f  matemal/foetal issues to be an 
impossibility; it is submitted here that the very aims and nature o f  a legal system make 
coherence essential, so that Seymour’s is a defeatist claim and the property model, which 
satisfies the need for coherence, is preferable to alternatives which do not.
2
central to the very notion of property, as will be discussed later.3 Moreover, 
my emphasis on property is not intended as a denial o f the relevance of moral 
status; quite the reverse. If all questions about the moral status of human life 
in utero were to be settled uncontroversially tomorrow, then of course the 
answers would have to be the starting point for any further moral and / or 
legal debate. For example, were we able to answer the question, ‘Is a thirty- 
six-week-old foetus entitled to any moral consideration?’ in the negative, then 
much of our current legal regulation would appear to be unfounded, and an 
unjustifiable infringement of women’s liberty. Conversely, if  we were able to 
agree that an hour-old fertilised egg is morally-considerable (was even a 
‘person’), then our statute books may require to be thoroughly rewritten. The 
paradigm shift that I propose, then, is not based upon any claim that property 
is the ‘correct’ way of categorising the relationships at stake in pregnancy; 
merely a claim that it is one reasonable interpretation, and one which is 
supported by existing legal authority and academic discourse.
There is, however, another, stronger reason for emphasising property 
over personhood. Historically, through the institutions of slavery and 
possessive marriage, laws have treated as property entities that are now 
universally acknowledged to be persons. Yet the law has always maintained 
its distinction between persons on the one hand and property on the other; an 
entity cannot be both person and property simultaneously (this goes to the 
heart of the standard objections to notions of ‘self-ownership’ and ‘property- 
in-the-person’). On the basis of this logical separation, the legal systems 
which allowed slaves and women to be owned by men denied the personhood 
of slaves and women explicitly. Now that we recognise these entities as 
persons, we acknowledge that they cannot also be owned -  they cannot be 
property.
The upshot of all this is that, if we were able to arrive at a consensus 
that a ‘person’ exists at any stage of human development prior to birth, then at 
that stage o f development the issue of property and property relationships 
would disappear. For all other stages, in all circumstances where no person 
can be agreed to exist, the possibility of property remains, and issues of
3 See infra, chapter five.
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ownership may arise. Only in the unlikely event o f a positive determination of 
embryonic or foetal personhood, therefore, does property cease to be an issue. 
Otherwise, the concept of property has potential application to pregnancy, and 
I will argue that it is applied to pregnancy, though rarely explicitly. I propose 
that this property element be made explicit in order to facilitate theorising and 
adjudication about pregnancy issues in the absence o f moral consensus, or any 
reasonable prospect of such consensus.
I have already proposed that a property-based account of pregnancy 
provides us with one way (although not necessarily the only viable way) of 
describing legal reality accurately. It also affords the opportunity for the law 
to adopt a coherent approach to a range of reproduction-related issues by 
having reference to a familiar legal schema even while the meta-ethical debate 
on foetal status is ongoing. It offers a framework for transparent and 
reasonably predictable decision-making, and crucially, it does so without 
implying a conclusion to the interminable moral debate about foetal status 
versus women’s rights, or an endorsement of any of the claims being 
presented within that debate. It treats the legal and the meta-ethical debates as 
parallel lines of normative reasoning, with the potential for, but not the need 
for, cross-reference between the two.
As I will demonstrate, a property framework is able to clarify issues 
like stem-cell research, the ownership and use of frozen embryos, and 
surrogacy. It also takes account of our intuitive sense of the significance of 
birth. Some of the questions surrounding surrogacy, for example, look like 
tangled and conflicting rules without any real unifying principle. What are the 
relationships involved in surrogacy? Are they determined by the individual 
surrogacy contract, or are the issues so fundamental that they cannot be 
contracted out of? Ought the legal response to matemal/foetal conflict be 
different for surrogate as opposed to non-surrogate pregnancies? What is the 
legal relationship of the ‘commissioning parents’ to the surrogated foetus 
during pregnancy? Do they have any legal rights? Can a father ever have 
rights over a foetus during pregnancy, even in surrogate pregnancies? All of 
these questions resolve themselves into a much more appreciable pattern 
when filtered through the prism of property rather than by referring to the
4
nature of a foetus and the rights of the woman in an attempt to resolve such 
issues.
In chapter one of this thesis I will examine the orthodox ‘conflict 
model’ of pregnancy through a survey of its case-law, discussing its 
shortcomings and the potential solutions offered by various academic 
commentators. In chapters two and three I will explore the question of the 
moral status of the foetus in detail, demonstrating that neither a sentience- 
based nor a personhood-based account of moral status is capable of resolving 
the ‘conflict’ inherent in the orthodox model. In chapter four I will analyse an 
alternative model of pregnancy, the ‘consent model’ proposed by Professor 
Eileen McDonagh. Having concluded that this model fails, ultimately, to 
break the deadlock of the conflict model, I will proceed in chapter five to 
present my own property-based model for adjudicating matemal/foetal issues.
5
1. The Conflict Model of Pregnancy
‘The matemal/foetal rights debate seems confounded 
by the notion that a woman may, in addition to 
determining whether her pregnancy is terminated, have 
an equally compelling interest in the preservation of 
her foetus.’4
1.1. Introduction
Consider the following scenario: Alison, a thirty-year-old woman living in 
London, is 18 weeks pregnant. Her relationship with the father of her child 
has recently ended and, after much agonising, Alison has decided to terminate 
her pregnancy, despite the facts that the pregnancy is in a relatively advanced 
stage and the foetus is healthy. Alison sets out to drive to the clinic where the 
termination will be performed. While waiting at a set of traffic lights, another 
car ploughs into the back of her stationary car. The driver, Ben, had been 
momentarily distracted and failed to brake in time. Fortunately, although she 
is somewhat shaken, Alison herself escapes with a bump on the head and 
minor bmising. However, the force of the impact causes the death of the 
foetus she is carrying, and Alison later miscarries, at exactly the same time 
that the termination was due to be carried out.
Ben is charged with, and convicted of, a road traffic offence (driving 
without due care and attention). Alison also sues him in the civil courts, 
seeking compensation both for the shock and minor injuries she has sustained 
and for the loss of what is described in the complaint as ‘her unborn child’. 
She is awarded a five figure sum in damages for the latter head of claim.
Predictably, the decision is greeted with public outcry. Ben gives an 
interview to a tabloid newspaper in which he accepts responsibility for his 
driving conviction and accepts the (minor) damages awarded in respect of 
Alison’s own injuries, but claims that it is ‘outrageous’ that he should be
4 Wells and Morgan, op. cit. at 431
6
penalised for causing the death of a foetus ‘which was about to be destroyed 
anyway’. ‘Why should the law punish me for doing what she is allowed to do 
anyway?’, he fumes (misapplying the criminal law concept of punishment to 
civil damages). He also claims that it is ‘ridiculous’ for the law to suggest that 
the loss of Alison’s foetus is a ‘harm’ for which she ought to be compensated, 
given that she was positively seeking the end of her pregnancy at the time of 
the accident.
Alison defends her decision to sue, saying that the decision to 
terminate the pregnancy had been ‘my choice and mine alone’, and that ‘he 
had no right to take that choice away from me’. When asked what exactly the 
‘loss’ to her has been in losing the foetus, she answers feebly that she may 
have changed her mind at the last minute, although she acknowledges that this 
is unlikely in the extreme.
The foregoing is, of course, merely a hypothesis, but one which could very 
well arise under the current law of the United Kingdom. In the hypothesis, 
neither Alison nor Ben seem able to articulate their strong feelings of 
injustice: Alison feels, intuitively, that the decision to terminate her pregnancy 
ought to be ‘her choice’, and that Ben’s wrongful intervention has deprived 
her of something; similarly, Ben feels that there is some kind of injustice in 
the idea of a woman who clearly does not want to be pregnant (and who is in 
fact taking steps to have her pregnancy terminated) seeking damages for the 
loss of a foetus she did not want and had every intention of destroying on her 
own initiative.
In this chapter, I claim that the way the law currently adjudicates 
matemal/foetal issues is often conflicted and agonistic, and that this leads to 
incoherence. I explore some real examples of ways in which the law seeks 
simultaneously to ascribe value of some sort to the foetus, sometimes 
appearing to try to ‘protect’ foetal life, and yet consistently refuses to ascribe 
personhood at any point before birth, allowing experimentation on embryos, 
abortion until the second (and in rare cases, the third) trimester of pregnancy. 
Drawing on the work of prominent commentators on matemal/foetal issues, I
7
will trace these inconsistencies to the orthodox ‘conflict’ model of 
adjudicating pregnancy, which purports to balance the interests of the foetus 
against the rights and interests of the pregnant woman, examining the 
shortcomings of the orthodoxy and citing growing calls for a new paradigm. 
Finally, I will assess the viability of some o f the alternatives proposed, and 
introduce some arguments for abandoning, rather than refining, the conflict 
model.
First, a clarification. An important premise of my general thesis is that 
legal intervention in pregnancy appears inconsistent when viewed through the 
prism of the conflict model and its philosophical foundations, the concepts of 
rights, moral status and personhood. As such, my purpose in this introductory 
chapter is to identify and discuss the apparent inconsistencies in the law. The 
refusal of the law to ascribe the status of ‘person’ to the foetus or embryo is, 
by contrast, a consistent feature of the United Kingdom case-law on 
matemal/foetal issues, and as such it is not scrutinised at this stage. This is not 
to say that the more fundamental questions of foetal status will not be 
addressed at all, however; in the following two chapters I will examine issues 
of moral status (and in particular, the concept of personhood) in order to 
demonstrate that a mere refinement or reworking of the conflict model will 
not satisfy the need for a clearer paradigm for adjudication, and that 
accordingly, the law must refocus away from the metaphysics of intrinsic 
moral value and adopt a completely new approach to adjudicating 
matemal/foetal issues.
1.2. Case law under the conflict model
1.2.1. Civil Proceedings
1.2.1.1. Wrongful death actions
In actions for damages, the ‘bom alive rule’ operates. Under this rule, live 
birth is a prerequisite, since rights crystallize at birth with onset of legal 
‘personhood’. Even if a child is bom alive, but dies moments after birth, ‘no
8
violence is done to the “bom alive” rule by allowing the action.’5 However, 
‘when a stillbirth occurs...it is clear that the application of this mle would 
preclude a wrongful death action.’6
The operation of the mle is illustrated in the United States case of Puhl 
v Milwaukee Automobile Ins Co1, in which it was stated that ‘injuries suffered 
before birth impose a conditional liability on the tort-feasor. This liability 
becomes unconditional, or complete, upon the birth of the injured separate 
entity as a legal person. If such personality is not achieved, there would be no 
liability because of no damage to a legal person.’8 This is an accurate 
reflection of the common law mle. However, as John Seymour tells us, ‘some 
courts have allowed wrongful death actions to be brought following 
stillbirths.’9
In Presley v Newport Hospital10, for example, the court concluded that
there was no sound reason to distinguish between a child who dies just prior
to birth and one who dies just afterwards. This was thought to be in line with
the emphasis, in the early case of Bonbrest v Kotzu on the significance of 
• • • 12viability. The court also approved of the following statement from the case
1of Verkennes v Corniea : ‘It seems too plain for argument that where 
independent existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act 
a cause of action arises.. ,’14 The Presley court didn’t stop at rejecting birth as 
a demarcation line, however; it went on to reject the distinction between 
viable and non-viable foetuses too.15 ‘As a result,’ Seymour says, ‘the court 
had no hesitation in mling that the stillborn child who was the subject o f the 
proceedings, “whether viable or nonviable”, was a “person” within the 
meaning of the Rhode Island Wrongful Death Act.’16
5 John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 166-167
6 Ibid. at 167
7 99 NW 2d 163 (1959)
8 Ibid. at 170
9 Seymour, op. cit. at 167, emphasis added.
10 365 A 2d 748 (1976)
11 65 F Supp 138(1946)
12 Seymour, op. cit. at 167
13 38 NW 2d 838 (1949), at 841
14 Cited in Presley at 751
15 Seymour, op. cit. at 168
16 Ibid.
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Again, in Werling v Sandy17 the court stated that ‘[a] cause of action may arise 
under the wrongful death statute when a viable fetus is stillborn since a life 
capable of independent existence has expired. It is logically indefensible as 
well as unjust to deny an action where the child is stillborn, and yet permit the
10
action where the child survives birth but only for a short period of time.’ 
According to Seymour, ‘what was regarded as crucial here was the capacity 
for independent existence. Similarly, in Chrisafogeorgis v Brandenberg, the 
Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that this made the viable fetus sufficiently 
similar to a ‘person’ to allow the application of wrongful death legislation.’19 
Two other cases also apply wrongful death actions prior to birth. In White v
90Yup the court took the view that ‘a viable unborn child is, in fact, 
biologically speaking, a presently existing person and a living human being, 
because it has reached such a state of development that it can presently live 
outside the female body, as well as within it.’21 In Hall v Murphy22 the 
Supreme Court of Carolina held that a viable foetus is ‘a person’.23
All of these cases (allowing wrongful death actions where the foetus is 
stillborn) are interesting because they embody the assumption that the foetus 
has a separate existence and a ‘special status’. However, Seymour tells us, ‘it 
is important not to over-emphasize their significance. As has already been 
noted, there is United States authority for the view that until there has been a 
live birth, no claim can arise in respect of antenatal injury. This view also 
prevails in Canada, England, and Australia.’24
1.2.1.2. Negligence actions
Seymour identifies two different approaches in actions involving antenatal 
negligence. ‘In England, Canada and Australia, courts dealing with such 
actions have generally confined themselves to asking whether a child bom
17 476 NE 2d 1053 (Ohio, 1985)
18 Ibid. at 1055
19 Seymour, op. cit. at 168, citing Chrisafogeoris v Brandenberg 304 NE 2d 88 (1973)
20 458 P 2d 617 (1969)
21 Ibid. at 622
22 113 SE 2d 790 (SC, 1960)
23 Ibid. at 793
24 Seymour, op. cit. at 170
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suffering the effects of antenatal injury should be permitted to recover 
damages. When the question is posed this way, there is no need to speculate 
about the nature of the fetus... [a] 11 that must be asked is whether the child 
was a member of a class of persons who would foreseeably suffer harm as a 
result of the negligence. Its legal status while a fetus is of no interest.’25 
Essentially, this is the application of the celebrated ‘neighbourhood principle’ 
first articulated by Lord Atkin in the watershed case of Donoghue v
9A •Stevenson. ‘By contrast, in the United States courts the focus in negligence 
actions arising from antenatal injury has been primarily on whether the fetus 
is an entity of a kind that can possess rights and to which a duty o f care can be 
owed.’27 The difference between the approaches is clear: in the former case, 
the principle being applied is relational, concerning itself with questions not 
of nature or status, but of proximity; in the latter case, the focus is on the 
nature of the foetus.
In the case of State v Merrill2*, which in some aspects approaches the 
hypothesis outlined at the beginning of this chapter, ‘the defendant had argued 
that it was unacceptable for him to be exposed to a conviction for the murder 
of a non-viable fetus when a woman and her doctor who intentionally 
destroyed such a fetus would escape liability.’29 In this case, ‘the majority 
held that the analysis offered in Roe v Wade had no relevance to the issue of 
an assailant’s liability for the murder of a fetus... “Roe v Wade protects the 
woman’s right of choice, it does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, 
a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus.’”30 In Gentry v Gilmore31 the 
court held that ‘Roe is not implicated when.. .both the State and the mother 
have congruent interests in preserving life and punishing its wrongful
T9destruction.’
According to Seymour, ‘analysis of the kind seen in Merrill and 
Gentry v Gilmore...allows distinctions to be made on the basis of contextual
25 Ibid. at 176
26 [1932] AC 562
27 Seymour, op. cit. at 176
28 450 NW 2d 318 (Minn., 1990)2Q
Seymour, op. cit. at 179
30 Ibid, citing Merrill at 322
31 613 So 2d 1241 (Ala, 1993)
32 Ibid., Maddox, J at 1247, emphasis in original
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differences and differences in the scope and purpose of the relevant laws. By 
focusing on these differences it is possible to accept the inconsistency of 
which the defendants in Smith and Merrill complained: namely, that between 
laws which punished a third party’s destruction o f a fetus and those which 
permitted abortion.’33
1.2.1.3. Child protection proceedings
The general rule seems to be that, ‘just as the homicide laws come into 
operation only when a “person” has been killed, the child protection laws 
operate only when a “child’ or “person” is threatened and neither term applies 
to a fetus.’34 As this rule suggests, ‘courts have had no difficulty accepting 
that evidence of a pregnant woman’s drug taking can be taken into account in 
determining whether intervention is desirable after a child has been bom.’35 
Nevertheless, ‘there have occasionally been decisions in which courts have 
been willing to extend the operation of child protection laws to fetuses.. .these 
decisions have occasionally led to legislative action in the form of 
amendments to child protection statutes making it clear that they apply to 
fetuses. In the jurisdictions in which this legislative activity has 
occurred.. .there has thus been a recognition of the fetus as a distinctive entity 
entitled to protection. [However, it] must be emphasized that such 
developments have been rare. A review of the operation of child protection 
laws provides only limited support for the view that a fetus has legal status.’36
1.2.1.4. Proceedings to impose medical treatment
Seymour writes that ‘in the United States the courts have, in the past, shown a 
willingness to override women’s decisions. A 1987 survey of legal 
proceedings relating to obstetrical interventions indicated that court orders 
were granted in 17 of the 21 cases in which they were sought.’37 Many of the
33 Seymour, op. cit. at 180
34 Ibid. at 152
35 Ibid. at 154, emphasis added.
36 Ibid. at 174
37 Ibid. at 21
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relevant cases have involved enforced blood transfusions. In Raleigh Paul- 
Fitkin Morgan Memorial Hospital v Anderson38 the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey stated: ‘we are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law’s
, 3 9protection...
Similarly, in the case of Re Jamaica Hospital40 it was considered that, 
‘if [the pregnant woman’s] life were the only one involved here, the court 
would not interfere.. .Her life, however, is not the only one at stake. The court 
must consider the life of the unborn fetus...In this case, the state has a highly 
significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs 
the patient’s right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds.’41 The 
judgment continued, ‘for the purposes of this proceeding.. .the fetus can be 
regarded as a human being...whom the court has an obligation to protect.’42 
The court in Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital Inc v Paddock43 also permitted 
a blood transfusion against the wishes of a pregnant patient.
Other cases have involved enforced caesarean deliveries. In Jefferson v 
Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority44 the court ‘weighed the right of 
the mother to practise her religion and to refuse surgery on herself, against her 
unborn child’s right to live. We found in favour of her child’s right to live.’45 
In authorising the caesarean section, the court referred to Roe's recognition of 
a state interest in the potential lives of viable foetuses. In Re Madyun46 the 
court held that: ‘Given the significant risks to the fetus versus the minimal risk 
to the mother, the Court concludes that there is a compelling interest to 
intervene and protect the life and safety of the fetus.’47
The case of Re AC48 signalled a change of attitude in stating that ‘a 
competent woman’s decision to decline medical intervention should be 
respected’.49 The court held that the right of a woman to refuse medical
38 201 A 2d 537(1964)
39 Ibid. at 538
40 491 NYS 2d 898 (Sup, 1985)
41 Ibid. at 899-900
42 Ibid. at 900
43 485 NYS 2d 443
44 Ga, 274 SE 2d 457(1981)
45 Ibid. at 460
46 Reported in an annexe to Re AC  573 A 2d 1235 (DC App, 1990)
47 Ibid. at 1264
48 573 A 2d 1235 (DC App, 1990)
49 Seymour, op. cit. at 26
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treatment was of ‘constitutional magnitude’50 and emphasised the need to 
uphold her ‘liberty and privacy interests and bodily integrity.’51 The new 
attitude continued in Re Baby Boy Doe52 where it was held that a balancing of 
interests was not appropriate: ‘a woman’s competent choice in refusing 
medical treatment as invasive as a caesarean section during her pregnancy 
must be honoured, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to 
her fetus.’53 The court criticised the Jefferson and Madyun decisions for 
failing to recognise ‘the constitutional dimension of the woman’s right to 
refuse treatment, or the magnitude of that right.’54 It also rejected the notion of 
balancing the woman’s interests against those of the foetus, saying that courts 
‘should not engage in such a balancing’.55 It concluded: ‘[A] woman’s right to 
refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily 
integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy. The 
woman retains the same right to refuse invasive treatment, even of lifesaving 
or other beneficial nature, that she can exercise when she is not pregnant. The 
potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant; to the contrary, the 
Stallman court explicitly rejected the view that the woman’s rights can be 
subordinated to fetal rights.’56
In a Canadian case, Re Baby R57, a welfare official had ‘apprehended’ 
a foetus in utero and assumed authority to consent to emergency medical 
treatment. The issue was whether or not the foetus was ‘child’ within meaning 
of the relevant legislation. The court held that it was not, with the 
consequence that the welfare official lacked necessary authority: ‘the powers 
of the superintendent to apprehend are restricted to living children that have 
been delivered.’58
A comparable pattern of case law has emerged in United Kingdom 
case law. In Re S (Adult: Refusal o f Treatment)59 the court authorised the
50 Re AC  at 1244
51 Ibid. at 1248
52 632 NE 2d 326 (111 App 1 Dist, 1994)
53 Ibid. at 330
54 Ibid. at 333
55 Ibid. at 330
56 Ibid. at 332
57 (1988) 53 DLR (4th) 69
58 Ibid. at 80
59 [1992] 3 WLR 806
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performance of a caesarean delivery without the woman’s consent, relying on 
medical evidence that baby would not be bom alive otherwise. In the event, 
the operation went ahead and the child was bom dead. Re MB (Medical 
T r e a tm e n toverturned Re S; in this case, the woman was prepared to give 
her consent to the caesarean procedure itself, but refused to consent to the 
necessary anaesthesia because of an ‘irrational fear o f needles’. She was found 
to be ‘temporarily incompetent’, and the court held that the caesarean, and the 
anaesthesia necessary for it, could proceed despite the lack o f consent. The 
finding of incompetence was crucial, as the court held that ‘a competent 
woman who has the capacity to decide may, for religious reasons, other 
reasons, for rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to 
have medical intervention, even though the consequence may be the death or 
serious handicap of the child she bears, or her own death... ’61
This conclusion was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in St George's 
Healthcare NHS Trust v f f 2: ‘In our judgment while pregnancy increases the 
personal responsibilities of a woman it does not diminish her entitlement to 
decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment. Although human, and 
protected by law in a number of different ways set out in the judgment in In re 
MS...an unborn child is not a separate person from its mother. Its need for 
medical assistance does not prevail over her rights. She is entitled not to be 
forced to submit to an invasion of her body against her will, whether her own 
life or that of her unborn child depends on it.’63
Seymour notes that ‘in the 1990s courts in the United States and 
England appear to have changed their attitude to medical intervention and 
rejected the argument that the interests of the fetus can justify resort to 
invasive medical procedures to which the woman has not consented. In 
reaching these decisions, the courts took as their starting-point the right of a 
pregnant woman -  as a competent adult -  to decline medical treatment. In so 
doing, they shifted the focus from questions about the interests of the fetus to 
questions about maternal autonomy.’64 Referring to cases such as Re AC, Re
60 [1997] 2 FLR 426
61 Ibid. at 436
62 [1998] 3 WLR 936
63 Ibid. at 957
64 nSeymour, op. cit. at 156
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Baby Boy Doe, Re MB and St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S, Seymour 
says that ‘more recent decisions in the United States and England have 
expressed disapproval of coercive medical treatment designed to protect the 
fetus. In these decisions, the primary focus has been on the interests of the 
woman, rather than on the nature of the foetus.’65
It may be a mistake, however, to assume that the judicial position with 
regard to enforced medical treatment is completely settled. Seymour points to 
an inconsistency which may mean that there are still important issues to be 
resolved. In Re MB the court accepted foetus is not a ‘person’ and has no 
interests of its own until birth gives it a separate existence from the mother.66 
In St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S, on the other hand, the court held 
that ‘whatever else it may be a 36-week foetus is not nothing: if viable it is not 
lifeless and it is certainly human.’67 Seymour thinks these statements are 
‘possibly conflicting’68, so it could be argued that there is some tension in the 
law in this area. The property model I elaborate in the final chapter of this 
thesis is able to resolve this tension by recognising the distinctiveness of the 
foetus while acknowledging that it lacks personhood and has no interests.
1.2.2. Criminal proceedings
In the law of homicide, as in civil actions for wrongful death, the ‘bom alive 
rule’ operates. Seymour writes that ‘the courts of England, the United States, 
Canada and Australia have generally held that an assailant who injures a fetus 
(with the result that it is stillborn) cannot, under the common law, be guilty of 
murder or manslaughter. This reflects an adherence to the “bom alive” mle. 
Only a “person”, an “individual”, or a “human being” can be the victim of 
homicide and to fit any of these descriptions a child must be bom alive.’69 
However, the case of Commonwealth v Cass70 held that the foetus was a 
‘person’ for the purposes of homicide law, and two other cases, State v
65 Ibid. at 175
66 See supra, note 60 at 440,444
67 See supra, note 62 at 952
68 Seymour, op. cit. at 175
69 Ibid. at 137
70 467 NE 2d 1324 (Mass, 1984)
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Merrill71 and Brinkley v State12, take the same view. In Merrill, a pregnant 
woman was shot and killed, and her attacker was found guilty of murder of 
both the woman and her ‘unborn child’, a foetus of 4-5 millimetres long. In 
Brinkley there was a conviction of feticide because the stillborn foetus had 
been ‘quick’. Similarly, following criminal proceedings for child neglect and
73endangerment, the court in Whitner v State o f  South Carolina ruled that a 
woman who had taken cocaine during pregnancy, and whose child was bom 
affected by the dmg, had been properly charged under a statute that punished 
a person who endangered the life or health of a ‘child’.74 However, Seymour 
notes that ‘this view has gained little judicial support’.75
1.3. Criticism of the conflict model
The current model has been attacked on a number of grounds; however, most 
of the criticism can be organised under one of four main strands of critique.
1.3.1. Negative implications for the legal and moral status of women
Many commentators criticise the conflict model on the basis of the ‘violent’ 
image of pregnancy that the model promotes. For some writers, this is 
problematic because it presents an inaccurate portrait o f maternal / foetal 
relations (discussed below at 1.3.2.), and for others, the problem consists in 
what that imagery means for the public perception of pregnant women. In the 
words of Jane Mair, the notion of the maternal / foetal conflict ‘is a violent 
image which disrupts the coexistence of mother and foetus. It is an emotive 
phrase which suggests unmotherly feelings and a grotesque perception of the 
struggling foetus.’76 The fact that under the model the rights of the woman are 
pitted against those of the foetus ‘enables the presentation o f the woman as
71 See supra note 28
72 322 SE 2d 49 (Ga, 1984)
73 492 SE 2d 777 (SC, 1997)
74 Seymour, op. cit. at 18
75 Ibid. at 140
76 Jane Mair, ‘Maternal / Foetal Conflict: Defined or Defused?’ in Sheila A. M. McLean (ed.), 
Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine, and Ethics (Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), at 79
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selfishly pursuing her own desires while denying that the foetus has any 
meaning to her at all.’77
Moreover, as Dawn Johnsen has observed, ‘[b]y creating an 
adversarial relationship between a woman and her fetus, the state provides 
itself with a powerful means of controlling women’s behaviour during 
pregnancy, thereby threatening women’s fundamental rights.’78 It is not 
necessary here to catalogue the litany of ways in which the ‘rise of foetal 
rights’ has eroded the rights of pregnant women to privacy and autonomy, as 
this has been done extensively elsewhere.79 It suffices to say that strident 
statements of the individual rights of women which place them in opposition 
to the perceived ‘rights’ of the foetus are thought by many feminist 
commentators to be counterproductive in that they invite a backlash against 
the ‘unmotherly’, ‘self-interested’ view of the pregnant woman. As Anne 
Morris notes, ‘[a]ttempts to cast this debate as a conflict highlight a fear of 
women’s autonomy...’.80
1.3.2. Failure to reflect the realities of pregnancy
For some commentators, the main disadvantage of the conflict model is the 
notion of ‘conflict’ itself. They question whether the characterisation of 
pregnancy as inevitably consisting in a conflict, between the rights and 
interests of the woman and those of the foetus, is an accurate reflection of the 
maternal / foetal relationship. As Wells and Morgan observe, ‘[t]he evolving 
literature on foetal and maternal rights has been mesmerized by the potential 
conflicts between them. Sometimes these interests do clash, but often they
77 Jo Bridgeman, ‘A Woman’s Right To Choose?’ in Ellie Lee (ed.) Abortion Law and 
Politics Today (Macmillan, 1998) at 83
78 Dawn Johnsen, ‘The Creation o f Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 599-625 at 599
79 See, for example, Dawn Johnsen, ‘The Creation o f Fetal Rights’ {supra, note 78); Cynthia 
R. Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State Power and the Politics o f  Fetal Rights (Cambridge; 
Harvard University Press, 1993); Lynn M. Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels, Fetal 
Subjects, Feminist Positions (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1999); and 
Rachel Roth, Making Women Pay: The Hidden Costs o f  Fetal Rights (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2000).
80 Anne Morris, ‘Once Upon a Time in a Hospital.. .the Cautionary Tale o f  St George’s NHS 
Tmst v S., R. v Collins and Others ex parte S. [1998] 3 All ER 673 Feminist Legal Studies 7 
(1) 1999 75 at 84
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may coincide.’81 Accordingly, they claim, ‘[t]he assertion of a simple
O')
dichotomy between foetal and female interests is a mistake.’ The mistake, 
according to Jane Mair, is that any legal conflict between woman and foetus
83would ‘[require] the recognition of each as having legal rights.’ Since the 
courts in the United Kingdom have consistently refused to ascribe personhood
• • 84to the foetus, she asks, ‘[w]here is the legal conflict?’
For some of those who question the accuracy o f the conflict model, the 
problem is simply that it does not chime with the actual experience of a 
majority of women; in the words of Anne Morris, the conflict model reflects
‘an ignorance of what it means to be pregnant’.85 For others, the model is too
86narrow, focusing as it does exclusively on the ‘pregnant woman-fetus pair’ , 
and so operating to exclude consideration of other morally-relevant factors, 
such as the network of relationships surrounding pregnancy and birth. Still 
other writers consider that framing the maternal / foetal relationship as a 
conflict is unhelpful and does nothing to further the resolution of legal 
problems: as Mair remarks, ‘[t]he conflict is presented as woman or child, all 
or nothing, life or death: a model of polarization which contributes to the legal
87dilemma.’ In her view, ‘the issues involved are much more complex than the 
easy label of maternal / foetal conflict suggests... instead of seeking to resolve 
maternal / foetal conflicts by defining more clearly the individual legal rights 
of the pregnant woman and the foetus, should we not question the 
constmction of these so-called conflicts?’88
Of course, such criticisms could also be levelled at the property model 
which I will propose in chapter five of this thesis. How many women really 
experience pregnancy as an instance of ownership? Do women really think of 
their foetuses as ‘my property’? If a third party causes injury or death to a 
foetus, does the woman whose foetus it is feel aggrieved just as if someone 
had damaged or destroyed her car, her necklace, or her work? Surely, it might
81 Wells and Morgan, op. cit., at 431
82 Ibid. at 433
83 Mair, op. cit., at 86
84 Ibid. at 80
85 Morris, op. cit. at 84
86 Lisa H. Harris, ‘Rethinking Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Gender and Equality in Perinatal 
Ethics’ Obstetrics and Gynecology Vol. 96 No. 5 Part 1, November 2000 at 789
87 Mair, op. cit. at 93, emphasis added.
88 Ibid. at 93
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be argued, a woman in such circumstances feels that something far more 
destructive and hurtful than that has taken place: that someone has injured her 
future child? And surely it is common knowledge, even to those who have 
never been pregnant, that pregnant women usually form close bonds with their 
foetuses during pregnancy, and take a strong interest in their welfare?
To all this it can be responded that such criticisms need not be fatal to 
the property model. They are less damaging to the property model than to the 
conflict model precisely because the property model is presented and 
defended as a framework for adjudication in the absence o f moral consensus -  
nowhere does it claim to encapsulate or reflect an ethical truth. At the very 
heart of the conflict model, by contrast, is the attempt to ascribe the ‘correct’, 
or ‘appropriate’, legal rights to the pregnant woman and perhaps also to the 
foetus on the basis of some understanding of their moral status. If this is not 
so, and the evaluation of moral status plays no part in adjudication under the 
conflict model, then we are entitled to ask, with Mair, ‘where is the legal 
conflict?’ This is one of the chief differences between the current model and 
the property model being proposed, and it is, in my view, a great strength of 
the latter.
1.3.3. Inconsistency
The hypothesis at the beginning of this chapter illustrates the inconsistency at 
the heart of the conflict model. That a pregnant woman may choose (within 
the limits set out in the Abortion Act 1967) to destroy the foetus, but a third 
party may be liable in civil or criminal law for doing so, cannot readily be 
justified through an enquiry about the nature and status o f the foetus. Two 
United States cases, State v Merrill89 and Gentry v Gilmore90, provide real life 
examples of this inconsistency. In Gentry, as we have seen, it was held to be 
relevant that both the state and the mother had ‘congruent interests in 
preserving life and punishing its wrongful destruction’.91 As Seymour has 
remarked, these cases show the willingness of the U.S. courts to adjudicate
89 r>See supra note 28
90 See supra note 31
91 See supra note 32
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maternal/foetal cases differently ‘on the basis o f contextual differences’ and 
that this different treatment reveals ‘the inconsistency.. .between laws which 
[punish] a third party’s destruction of a fetus and those which [permit] 
abortion.’92 Two other cases, Commonwealth v Cass93 and Whitner v State o f 
South Carolina94 have held, respectively, that foetuses are ‘persons’ for the 
purposes of homicide law, and ‘children’ for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings for child neglect and endangerment.95
This inconsistency had led one U.S. commentator to complain that ‘our 
judiciary is dishonest in its treatment of fetuses, their rights, and specifically, 
their legal status as persons. On the one hand, courts routinely consider 
unborn fetuses to be “persons” and thereby protect them from criminal 
assault, allow them to maintain tort actions, and recognize their property 
rights. On the other hand, courts consider fetuses non-persons when their 
rights conflict with their mothers’ privacy interests.’96 A similar point could 
be made in the United Kindgom context, since, although the courts here have 
determined that the foetus lacks personhood throughout pregnancy (adhering 
resolutely to the principle that personhood attaches at birth), the general right 
to seek a termination applies only until the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. 
The Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990) restricts termination of pregnancy after the twenty- 
fourth week to cases of foetal disability or those where the continuation of the 
pregnancy would threaten the life or health of the mother. Thus, from twenty- 
four weeks’ gestation until term, the foetus is not a person, but there is 
nonetheless no general right to seek a termination. If, as the law currently 
holds, late-term foetuses are not persons, what justifies the current statutory 
restriction of abortion? This too has the appearance of inconsistency.
What, then, has given rise to these inconsistencies in adjudicating 
pregnancy? Seymour pinpoints the cause when he tells us that the law tries to 
respond to the foetus ‘in a way that recognizes its distinctiveness and intrinsic
92 nSeymour, op. cit., at 180
93 See supra note 70
94 See supra note 73
95 See infra at 16-17
96 William E. Buelow, ‘To Be and Not To Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding the Legal 
Status of the Unborn Fetus’ (1998) 71 Temple Law Review  963 at 994
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value.’97 He explains: ‘[w]hen asking how the law views the fetus, the courts’ 
starting-point has frequently been to determine whether the fetus is a 
“person”. The most widely accepted view is that it is not. This conclusion, 
however, is unhelpful. While the law is adept at indicating what the fetus is 
not, it throws little light on what the fetus is. It is clear that it is not a non­
entity. Whatever it is, in the words of the English Court o f Appeal, it is “not 
nothing”.’98
The property model I will set out in chapter five o f this thesis succeeds 
in resolving the inconsistency. By treating the foetus as the property of the 
pregnant woman, it allows us to understand why the law should only protect 
the foetus against the actions of third parties, and not against the actions of the 
woman herself. Within a property framework, she is entitled to dispose of her 
property without legal interference, and she is also entitled to seek 
compensation from - and criminal sanctions for - those who interfere with her 
property. The ‘distinctiveness and intrinsic value’ of the foetus is recognised 
in the property model: as an object of property, it is a separate entity, distinct 
from the pregnant woman, and its intrinsic value is the value o f property to the 
owner. Property thus allows us both to recognise a strong abortion right for 
the pregnant woman and to accept that the foetus is ‘not nothing’, but 
something of value. Under such a model, the defendants in such cases as 
People v Smith99 and State v Merrill are liable because they have wrongfully 
caused damage to the valued property of another, rather than because they 
have murdered a child or taken the life of a person. As such, the property 
model allows recovery for foetal injury or death without casting doubt on the 
right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy; reading between the lines in 
many of the U.S. cases in particular, it seems that the fear of undermining 
abortion rights has been an influential factor in preventing many civil and 
criminal cases for foetal harm from succeeding.
97 Seymour, op. cit., at 184
98 Ibid. at 183
99 App, 129 Cal. Rptr 498 (1976). This was a homicide case involving the destruction o f a 
non-viable foetus by the father. The California Court o f Appeal took the view that for a 
homicide conviction it was necessary to show that a human life had been taken, and 
concluded that the destruction o f a non-viable foetus did not represent the taking o f life. The 
defendant had complained that it would be inconsistent to regard the destruction of a non- 
viable foetus by a third party as ‘homicide’ when such destruction by the mother was lawful 
under Roe v Wade.
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1.3.4. The foetus as a ‘sentient non-person’
The conflict model of adjudicating maternal / foetal issues relies upon a 
characterisation of the foetus as a sentient non-person. This is so because 
under the conflict model a foetus possesses interests, but not rights, and (as I 
have emphasised several times already) certainly not personhood -  at least 
under United Kingdom law. The foetus must be understood as possessing 
certain interests, otherwise the notion of balancing the interests of the foetus 
against those of the pregnant woman (the ‘conflict’ at the heart of the conflict 
model) is meaningless. On the other hand, despite this implicit 
acknowledgment of foetal interests, the courts (and many commentators) are 
resistant to the idea of foetal rights, since these would limit the exercise by the 
pregnant woman of her rights. As such, the conflict model posits the foetus as 
an entity with interests, in other words a sentient being, capable of 
experiencing pleasure and pain. At the same time, the model denies foetal 
personhood, so that the foetus of the conflict model is best described as a 
sentient non-person.
This characterisation is problematic, as chapters two and three of this 
thesis will demonstrate. First, because there is widespread disagreement about 
whether and to what extent foetuses are sentient: there are three main schools 
of thought, ‘early onsent’, ‘late onset’ and ‘sceptical’ approaches to foetal 
sentience respectively, each with its supporters. The issue of when and if 
foetuses become sentient during pregnancy is thus far from conclusively 
established. The concept of personhood is also contentious. As chapter three 
explains in some detail, personhood is arguably incapable o f functioning as a 
basis on which to ascribe moral and legal status and rights. As such, both of 
the concepts -  sentience and personhood -  which are integral to the conflict 
model’s understanding of the foetus are controversial. This is a major problem 
for the conflict model and will be developed over the course of the two 
following chapters.
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1.4. Alternatives to the conflict model?
1.4.1. Refining the conflict model
The response of some commentators to the problems encountered by the 
conflict model is to propose refinements. One such suggestion is that it may 
be possible to clarify the status of the foetus in order to illuminate the nature 
of the conflict and the way the courts ought to adjudicate maternal / foetal 
cases.100 It is submitted here that this approach, if followed, is likely to prove 
fruitless, for the following reason: in United Kingdom law it is not the legal 
status of the foetus that is problematic (its status as a legal non-person is 
clear); rather, the confusion surrounds the issue of what moral status we ought 
to accord life before birth. Is it really possible to settle these ‘moral 
unanswerables’? In chapters two and three I shall argue that it is not, not least 
because the frameworks currently available to us for determining moral status 
are themselves deeply contentious and, in the case of personhood theory, 
fundamentally flawed. In the absence of any clear and uncontroversial means 
for settling questions of intrinsic moral status, the courts simply cannot wait 
upon answers to such questions. A deeper question still is that of whether or 
not our laws even ought to embody, or attempt to embody, moral ‘truths’. The 
scope of this discussion does not allow for an analysis o f this fundamental 
jurisprudential question.
Another approach to refining the conflict model is considered by Mair 
when she writes: ‘it may be that.. .by defining and refining legal elements of 
the conflict model, a set of concepts could be formulated by which the courts 
could adjudicate between mother and foetus.’101 Ultimately, Mair herself 
rejects this approach, preferring a more relational model of pregnancy to the 
conflict model, as discussed below. It is difficult to imagine, in any case, that 
concepts such as ‘duty of care’, ‘best interests’, and so on hold the key to 
making sense of the conflict model. As Mair herself has observed, there is no 
legal conflict. Why should we attempt to perfect a model that is founded on so 
basic an error? Furthermore, is such an attempt really necessary? A more
100 Buelow, op. cit. at 993
101 Mair, op. cit., at 92-93
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straightforward approach is to abandon the notion of pregnancy as conflict 
altogether and replace it with a property model which is based not upon a 
legal error, but rather upon a point of certainty in the law (that the foetus is not 
a legal person) and, as will be shown in chapter five, can readily be justified 
by reference to accepted definitions and theories o f property; which fits well 
with the developing case-law regarding the disposal o f frozen embryos; and 
which offers greater clarity than we can hope for from any refined version of 
the conflict model.
1.4.2. A more ‘relational’ approach
As mentioned above under heading 1.2.1.2, Seymour identifies two possible 
approaches to adjudicating pregnancy. The definitional approach, which is the 
approach reflected in the orthodox conflict model, involves focusing on the 
nature of the fetus, trying to identify its essential characteristics, asking, in 
Seymour’s words, ‘whether it is a “person”, a “body part”, a “potential life”, 
or a “life”.’102 Many courts, particularly in the United States, have adopted 
definitional approaches in cases involving foetal harm, and ‘in answering 
these questions, they have frequently drawn and then discarded 
distinctions.’103 In fact, says Seymour, a feature of the US courts’ analysis has 
been ‘the courts’ willingness to establish significant criteria and then to reject 
them.’104
‘The alternative approach’, according to Seymour, ‘is to avoid 
definitional questions and to inquire about the nature and purpose of a 
particular law and the consequences of applying it. This method can be 
described as the relational approach. It focuses not upon the characteristics of 
the fetus, but upon the relationship between the woman, her fetus, and, in 
some situations, a third party. While this approach accepts that a fetus is a 
distinctive entity with intrinsic value, it recognizes that in some contexts it is 
appropriate for the law to intervene to protect fetal interests, but not in
102 Ibid. at 185
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. at 176
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others.’105 Note that the focus here is on context and relationships; in this 
important respect, the relational approach identified by Seymour comes quite 
close to the property model I propose in the final chapter of this discussion.
The following cases can be viewed as examples of the relational 
approach: in State v Merrill ‘the court implied that the fact that the state 
permits the destruction of potential life in one context (abortion) does not 
mean that it will permit in another (an attack on a pregnant woman).’106 
Similarly, in Gentry v Gilmore, the dissenting judgment insisted that the issue 
at stake in a wrongful death action (whether damages were recoverable on 
behalf of a foetus) and the issue of when a woman should be free to choose an 
abortion were separate.107
According to Seymour, there are compelling reasons to prefer the 
relational approach. He writes that ‘it is necessary to go beyond the 
conclusion that the fetus is not a legal nonentity and, because it represents 
potential life, has intrinsic value [the definitional approach]. It must also be 
recognized that the fetus does not have a uniform value in the eyes of the law. 
The law makes choices as to the situations in which it will take account of 
actual or threatened antenatal harm. This raises an obvious question. In what 
circumstances -  and against whom -  should the law protect the fetus?’108 He 
continues: ‘To adopt the relational approach is to redefine the nature of the 
problem. The goal is no longer agreement as to the essential characteristics of 
the fetus and consequent agreement as to the rights possessed by an entity 
with those characteristics.’109
Seymour tells us that, in his view, ‘there are two reasons for 
abandoning this goal.’110 First, he says, ‘consensus on the categorization of 
the fetus is unlikely.’111 Moreover, ‘a system of classification aims to produce 
certainty. Given the normative character of the law, certainty is unattainable. 
The relational approach recognizes this and thus accommodates the 
inconsistencies in the law’s perception of the legal status of the fetus. This
105 Ibid. at 185
106 Ibid. at 186
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. at 187
109 Ibid. at 186
110 Ibid.
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approach does not seek consistency. It acknowledges that lawmakers will 
respond differently to claims made on behalf o f the fetus, depending on the 
context, the actors involved, their relationships, and the techniques and 
purposes embodied in the particular law invoked. Some observers will regard 
the law’s lack of consistency as a strength. It allows for flexibility of response 
when there is the possibility of legal intervention to protect the foetus or to 
provide recompense for harm done to it.’112
Another call for greater emphasis on relationships comes from Jane 
Mair, who suggests that improved communication between pregnant women 
and the medical profession would remove many ‘apparent conflicts’. O f the 
guidelines issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
following Re S, Mair says: ‘Their tone represents a positive and co-operative 
approach. Where there is an apparent conflict, attempts to resolve it should be 
made by means of communication between the doctor and the woman, with 
the involvement of her family where appropriate. The emphasis is on both 
doctor and woman trying to explain and to understand each other’s position. 
The doctor is reminded that the medical evidence on which he or she relies is 
“seldom infallible” and that ultimately the choice of the woman should be 
respected.’113
Mair’s preferred solution would emphasise communication and the 
centrality of relationships; as she observes: ‘Pregnancy and childbirth do not 
exist in isolation. They are events in a series of relationships -  personal 
relationships, relationships between women and the medical profession, 
relationships between women and society...’114 Mair seems to take the view 
that, if any resolution to maternal / foetal issues is possible, it will come 
through greater communication and co-operation between women and 
doctors.
While the content of the RCOG guidelines and their tone should be 
welcomed with caution, however, they certainly do not provide any 
guarantees for pregnant women who find themselves in conflict with 
healthcare professionals, for several possible reasons. Sometimes, as Mair
112 Ibid. at 186-187
113 Mair, op. cit. at 95
114 Ibid.
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acknowledges in her reference to ‘hurried judgements’, there is simply no 
time for sensitive discussion between doctor and patient; in cases involving a 
refusal to consent to a caesarian section, for example, the patient may already 
be in labour by the time the disagreement emerges. In other cases, a medical 
emergency may render the resolution of the ‘conflict’ similarly urgent. 
Second, to suggest that disagreements between doctors and pregnant patients 
are ‘apparent’ conflicts which will in most cases be resolved by discussion 
(which, inevitably, the doctor will dominate on account o f his learning, his 
experience, and the power he has to have the patient declared incompetent) 
seems at best naive and at worst insulting. As the case of Re MB shows, the 
concept of capacity can indeed be invoked to ensure that what the doctor 
‘knows’ to be best for the woman will be given effect, whatever legal rhetoric 
about patient autonomy is employed.
While the guidelines can be regarded as a demonstration o f the 
goodwill of the medical profession toward its pregnant patients, the law surely 
needs to go further, and actually guarantee that the fundamental rights of 
female patients be given effect. Finally, is it really enough for a doctor to be 
able to say that he ultimately respected the wishes of a pregnant patient after 
arguing with her (however politely and sensitively) and bringing the full force 
of his professional expertise and status to bear on her decision-making? Surely 
to allow the doctor any scope whatsoever to ‘negotiate’ with the patient is to 
take him out of the role of trained, experienced advisor and elevate him to the 
role of participant in the decision-making process -  a notion which many 
feminist writers, at least, would presumably wish to challenge.
In the final chapter, I will claim that a property model of pregnancy is 
preferable to Seymour’s notion of a ‘relational approach’, because it allows 
the law to dispose of maternal / foetal issues in different ways depending on 
the context without inconsistency. It is also preferable to Mair’s version of 
relationality, which focuses on the relationships between women, the medical 
profession, and perhaps also members o f the extended family, rather than on 
the relationships that exist in respect of the foetus. The most promising 
relational approach is that of Wells and Morgan, who urge that more attention
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be paid to the ‘inter-connectedness of a woman and her foetus’.115 This paves 
the way for my analysis of the nature of the relationship between woman and 
foetus, in chapter five, as a property relationship, and my claim that the nature 
of the legal ‘interconnection’ between a woman and her foetus is the 
interconnection, not between two entities each possessing interests and rights, 
but rather between a person and a thing that she owns.
Despite some reservations about the relational approaches proposed by 
other writers, the property model that I propose is unquestionably a relational, 
rather than a definitional approach, in the sense that, rather than attempting to 
discover the ‘true nature’ of the foetus, it takes as its starting point the legal 
certainty that the foetus lacks personhood. It then claims that, as a non-person, 
the foetus can be treated as property, whatever else it might be. As such, it is 
concerned with the property relationships that exist in respect of the foetus, 
making it a relational approach rather than an attempt to define foetal nature.
1.5. Conclusion: the need for a new paradigm of pregnancy
From all of the above, the problems with adjudicating pregnancy can be seen 
to flow from the fact that, currently, the issues at stake are formulated in terms 
of a conflict between the rights of the pregnant woman -  to bodily privacy / 
integrity and freedom of choice -  and the foetus’s right to life (some 
commentators have even suggested that the foetus may have second-order 
rights, such as the right to due process).116
The need for a new paradigm of adjudicating maternal / foetal issues is 
clear. As Jane Mair observes, ‘[i]f the situation is perceived as a conflict of 
interests or a case of competing rights of woman and foetus, the judge, if  he or 
she is to be the arbiter, must develop some legal method for dealing with the
117conflict and for deciding in favour of one or other of the parties.’ She 
continues, ‘it is clear that there are many unconsidered and unanswered issues. 
The hurried judgements suggest a frantic attempt to find some legal base for
115 Wells and Morgan, op. cit., at 431
116 This possibility is raised by Judith A. M. Scully in ‘Breaking The Abortion Deadlock:
From Choice To Consent by Eileen L. McDonagh’ (Book Review) 8 UCLA Women’s Law 
Journal (1997) 125 at 145; see infra, under heading 4.4.1.4.
117 Mair, op. cit. at 86
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what is in effect a moral and personal decision. If  the courts are to continue, 
and perhaps to increase, their involvement in the resolution of such disputes, 
there is an urgent need for greater consideration and clarification o f the legal
1 1 0
rules which they are to apply'
‘Rights talk’ has been subjected to general criticism.119 The specific 
problem with its application to maternal / foetal issues, however, is that when 
an issue arising from pregnancy is presented as a clash o f fundamental rights 
(a ‘clash of absolutes’, to use Laurence Tribe’s famous phrase), those 
interested in resolving the issue are forced to look deeper at the philosophical 
and ideological foundations of the ‘rights’ at stake. Claims of right are not, 
after all, self-explanatory or self-justifying; they are invariably underpinned 
by deeper moral and political claims that attempt to explain or justify why the 
right ought to be recognised or respected. To this extent, rights (and claims 
about rights) can be described as symbols or emblems -  a kind of legal 
shorthand for, or summary of, the mass of moral and political factors involved 
in an issue. Returning to the context of pregnancy: if  we take the example of 
abortion, we are presented with a clash between a pregnant woman’s claimed 
‘fundamental right’ to choose a termination and the foetus’s claimed 
‘fundamental right’ to life. These claims are irreconcilable, of course, and it is 
necessary to look beyond the slogans of the ‘right to choose’ and the ‘right to 
life’ in order to determine which of the two claims should be given priority. 
This is the crux of the problem. When we look beyond the legal shorthand in 
the context of pregnancy, the more fundamental issues underlying the claims - 
issues of intrinsic moral status, of personhood and non-personhood - do not 
clarify them; they merely add to the confusion.
As I shall demonstrate in chapters two and three, arguments over the 
intrinsic moral status of the foetus and over its status as a person or non­
person are inherently and unavoidable interminable; moreover, I will claim 
that the concept of personhood is in itself incapable of providing guidance 
regarding the moral status of entities in hard cases (of which pregnancy is 
perhaps the paradigm example). For the moment, it is enough to say that, far
118 Ibid. at 92, emphasis added.
119 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment o f  Political Discourse (The 
Free Press, 1994)
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from clarifying and helping adjudicate claims about rights, appeals to 
underlying principles in the pregnancy context actually complicate matters 
further since the principles underpinning the rights-claims are as controversial 
as are the claims themselves.
As such, the ‘conflict model’ of maternal/foetal issues is no less of a 
conflict at its foundations; where we have a conflict of rights on the face of 
things, we have a metaphysical mess underneath. The claims o f right being 
articulated in the courts and in the public arena are premised (often implicitly) 
on notions of personhood and moral status which are in themselves highly 
controversial and - 1 will argue -  intractable.
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2. The Conflict Model: Sentience
In this and the following chapter I examine whether any consensus on the 
moral status of the embryo / foetus is possible, by reference to two of the most 
promising criteria for moral status to emerge from moral philosophy: 
sentience and personhood. My main concern is with the concept of 
personhood, because of the preponderance of the language of personhood -  
and in particular, the frequent references to whether or not the foetus is ‘a 
person’ - to be found in academic, judicial and lay discourse on maternal / 
foetal issues. First, however, I discuss sentience, primarily because it can be 
regarded as more fundamental than personhood in the sense that ‘personhood 
relevant qualities’ all presuppose consciousness, of which sentience may be 
said to be the most primitive form.
2.1. Introduction
Some philosophers believe that the moral status of an entity derives from its 
sentience -  its capacity to feel, to experience pleasure and pain. On what 
Mary Anne Warren calls the ‘sentience only’ (SO) view sentience is both 
necessary and sufficient for full and equal moral status. She distinguishes the 
‘sentience plus’ view (SP), which she says regards sentience as a valid 
criterion for moral status, but not the only valid criterion. SP views will be 
considered later, after a discussion of the concept of sentience itself. Warren 
makes a distinction between sentience and consciousness, although some 
writers use the terms interchangeably120:
Sentience is the capacity to have, not just experiences of some sort or 
other, but experiences that are felt as pleasurable or painful...Because 
not all conscious experiences are pleasurable or painful, evidence of 
consciousness is not necessarily evidence of sentience. It seems likely, 
however, that most naturally evolved organisms that are capable of
120 For example, Ingmar Persson in his article, ‘Harming The Non-Conscious’ Bioethics 13 
(3/4) (1999) 294
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having conscious experiences are capable of experiencing (among 
other things) pain and pleasure.121
This expresses a view that will shortly be examined in greater detail, namely 
that sentience is a basic level of consciousness, although there are higher 
levels. Although Warren states that most conscious beings are likely to be 
sentient, and that in fact we no of no real-life examples o f non-sentient 
conscious entities, she attempts nevertheless to show that we can at least 
conceptualise a kind of being which, although conscious, lacks sentience -  the 
example she uses is the character of Data, the advanced android in Star Trek: 
The Next Generation: ‘[although he is conscious, rational, morally 
responsible, and highly self-aware, his programming includes no capacity to 
experience pain, pleasure or emotion.’122 To argue that an entity devoid of 
emotion can indeed be morally-responsible seems to me to be to espouse a 
very Kantian, rationalistic conception of morality, rejecting the Humean 
notion of ‘moral sentiment’. Moreover, surely the essence of morality is 
choice, rather than programming? These are interesting questions; however, 
my immediate task is to enquire about the varying degrees of sentience of 
some real-life beings.
2.1.1. Degrees of sentience
Warren identifies four major criteria that she says are ‘indications of 
sentience’. These are: the structure and function of the nervous system; the 
presence of sense organs; behavioural indicators; and the presence of 
neurochemicals. ‘The more of the usual indications of sentience are present’, 
Warren tells us, ‘the more confident we may be about the attribution of 
sentience.’123 She then helpfully lists the major classifications of terrestrial 
organisms, stating for each how sentient she thinks they are likely to be. As 
far as ‘higher vertebrates’ (mammals and birds) are concerned, ‘given the 
strength of the behavioural and physiological similarities between human
121 Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 55
122 Ibid. at 56
123 Ibid. at 61
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beings and these other vertebrate animals, the most plausible hypothesis is 
that these animals can experience pleasure and pain.’124 For ‘lower 
vertebrates’, including fish, reptiles and amphibians, Warren claims, ‘the 
neurophysiology and behaviour of fish, reptiles and amphibians are somewhat 
less similar to our own than are those of mammals and birds...Nevertheless, 
the similarities between their behaviour and neurophysiology and our own are 
sufficient to place the burden of proof upon those who deny that these animals 
are sentient.’125 Similarly, with regard to ‘complex invertebrates’ like 
cephalopods and arthropods, Warren opines that ‘many of these animals are 
highly mobile, and possessed of sophisticated sense organs and nervous 
systems: moreover, their behaviour when injured is often strongly suggestive 
of pain. Thus I think it reasonable to conclude that many of these complex 
invertebrate animals are sentient.’126 On the other hand, she claims, ‘plants, 
bacteria and viruses are almost certainly non-sentient...[a]s far as we can tell, 
these organisms have neither sense organs nor nervous systems; and their 
behaviour rarely seems indicative of a capacity for pleasure and pain...This 
argument applies even more strongly to most inorganic objects.. . ’
These claims are at odds with classical philosophy’s approach to the 
sentience of non-human animals. As Warren reminds us, ‘Descartes held that 
all non-human animals are automata.. .His primary argument for this is that
animals do not use language, and that only language users can think or
128feel.’ There are contemporary proponents of this kind of view, notably 
Peter Carruthers, who is sceptical about the ability of animals to feel anything, 
including pain.129 Warren thinks this is a strange view:
As Joseph Lynch points out, it is difficult to understand how the 
capacity to experience pain could have survival value for animals, if 
animals never felt their pains...‘The process of conditioning is
124 Ibid.
X25Ibid.
126 Ibid. at 62
127 Ibid. at 63
128 Ibid. at 57
129 Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) esp. at 181.
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utterly mysterious unless it is presupposed that stimuli can be 
felt.’130
Questionable logic is only one potential problem with denying the sentience of 
non-human animals, however. Other problems include the vulnerability of such 
positions to charges of simplicity and subjectivity, at best, and baseless 
‘speciesism’ and anthropocentrism at worst.
[A]s Donald Griffin points out...it is often impossible to say anything 
illuminating about what an animal is doing, without presupposing that it 
has conscious experiences. Griffin cites as an example the behaviour of 
some species of plovers, which appear deliberately to lead predators 
away from their nests by pretending to have a broken wing.131
Similarly,
The difficulty of knowing, or even imagining, exactly what other 
animals experience.. .must often deter a careful observer from 
speculating at any length about those experiences. But this pragmatic 
difficulty lends no credence to the conclusion that no non-human 
animal has conscious experiences.132
I turn now to consider a famous defence of sentience as a determinant of moral 
status.
2.1.2. Peter Singer’s ‘Preference Utilitarianism’
Peter Singer defends his sentience-based approach to moral status in his 
celebrated book, Practical Ethics}33 Warren tells us that ‘Singer argues that all 
and only sentient beings have moral status, because all and only sentient beings
130 Warren, op. cit. at 58
131 Ibid. at 59
132 Ibid. at 60
133 (Second Edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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have interests.’134 So what counts as an ‘interest’? Bernard Rollin writes that an 
entity’s needs can be regarded as interests according to
our ability to impute some ‘mental life’, however rudimentary, to the 
animal, wherein...it seems to care when certain needs are not fulfilled. 
Few of us humans can consciously articulate all o f our needs, but we 
can certainly [sometimes] know when these needs are thwarted and 
met. Pain and pleasure are...the obvious ways these facts come to 
consciousness, but they are not the only ones. Frustration, anxiety, 
malaise, listlessness, boredom [and] anger are among the multitude of 
indicators of unmet needs, needs that become interests in virtue of these 
states of consciousness.135
Utilitarianism, of course, is the consequentialist moral theory that ascribes 
value to actions according to their ‘good’ or ‘bad’ consequences. In 
identifying pleasure and pain as the morally-relevant determinants of utility, 
Singer follows the example of Jeremy Bentham, often regarded as the ‘father’ 
of utilitarianism. Of course, to insist upon the moral centrality of pleasure and 
pain is not uncontroversial:
This classical utilitarian definition of utility is subject to the 
objection that pleasure and freedom from pain are not the only 
things that people value. Some people choose to spend time in ways 
that are evidently less pleasurable than some of the alternatives, but 
that they consider more worthwhile.136
Singer seeks to avoid this objection by refining his utilitarianism to take 
account of personal preferences (hence ‘preference utilitarianism’):
134 Warren, op. cit. at 66
135 Bernard Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo, N Y : Prometheus Books, 
1981) at 40-41
136 Warren, op. cit., at 64
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Preference utilitarians respond to this objection by defining happiness 
as the satisfaction of preferences. This amendment permits the good of
137individuals to be determined by their own values...
For Singer, all valid moral claims derive from the principle of equal 
consideration of interests. ‘This principle requires that the comparable 
interests of all sentient beings be given equal weight in our moral 
deliberations.’138 As such, preference utilitarianism claims to avoid 
speciesism:
Singer argues that the moral equality of all sentient beings follows 
from the general principle that “ethical judgments must be made from 
a universal point of view”.139
Singer does not deny that sentient beings may be more or less sentient than 
one another, or embody other qualities, such as intelligence, physical strength 
or virtue, to a greater or lesser extent. He claims, simply, that sentience alone 
is sufficient to establish some moral status.
Similarly, ‘the fact that other animals are less intelligent than we are 
does not mean that their interests may be disregarded.’ If it did, then 
we would be equally entitled to disregard the interests of less 
intelligent human beings, such as infants and those who are mentally 
impaired.140
This is not radical biological egalitarianism, obviously, because life that is 
non-sentient is devoid of interests and therefore of intrinsic value, according 
to Singer. Moreover, although Singer believes that we are morally obliged to 
consider the interests of all sentiment animals, we need not value all of these 
interests, or lives, equally. Although Warren observes that Singer believes in 
‘the moral equality of all sentient beings’, she acknowledges that in practice,
137 Ibid. at 65
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid. at 66
140 Ibid. at 68, citing Singer, Practical Ethics at 56
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he differentiates between the subjective moral value of ‘persons’ and ‘non­
persons’.141 Singer defines ‘persons’ as ‘rational and self-conscious 
being[s]’,142 and argues that the lives of such beings are more valuable to them 
than the lives of non-persons ‘since persons are highly future-oriented in their 
preferences’.143 Singer also argues that some non-human animals may be 
classed as persons (he is famously involved in the ‘Great Ape Project’, which 
argues that personhood ought to be extended to great apes and perhaps other 
nonhuman animal species).144
It should be clear from the above that Singer’s view is not a strictly SO 
view, since although it regards sentience as a necessary criterion for moral 
status, it recognises the additional value of personhood as a ground for 
ascribing greater moral status to the beings who qualify as ‘persons’. This 
being the case, I would suggest that Singer’s position is properly described as 
a ‘sentience plus’ view145.
2.1.3. Objections to Sentience Only
Warren identifies four potentially-fatal objections to theories of moral status 
based solely on sentience. If these seem not to apply to Singer’s preference 
utilitarianism, it is important to remember that, at least in my own view, 
Singer is a proponent of SP, not SO. First, there is what Warren calls the 
‘environmentalist objection’:
Many environmental ethicists reject the Sentience Only view because 
it denies moral status to plants, species, and other non-sentient 
elements of the biosphere. On the Sentience Only view, we may have 
morally sound reasons to protect these things, but these reasons can 
only be based upon the interests of sentient beings, since non-sentient 
entities have no interests that can enter directly into our moral
141 Ibid. at 69
142 Singer, op. cit. at 87.
143 Ibid. at 95
144 Ibid. at 87
145 More specifically, I understand Singer’s ethical theory as being a personhood  theory of 
moral status, and it is assessed as such in the following chapter, where such theories are 
analysed in detail.
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calculations. Species, Singer says, ‘are not conscious entities and so 
do not have interests above and beyond the interests of the individual 
animals that are members of the species.’ We have, therefore, no 
moral obligations to species as such.146
This position is rejected by proponents of ‘deep’ environmentalism, who 
argue for the theoretical and practical benefits of recognising the relationships 
between human beings and all other biological life and ‘lifelike processes’.147
Another objection comes from feminism. Many feminist writers 
emphasise the importance of relationships in determining moral status, 
although unlike deep environmentalists, ‘they have usually emphasized social 
and emotional relationships rather than ecological ones.’148 Following Carol 
Gilligan’s seminal book, In A Different Voice,149 some feminists employ the 
notion of an ethic of care to argue that ‘moral obligations are rooted in 
specific social relationships, rather than in general mles and principles.’150 For 
example, ‘Nel Noddings...maintains that our moral obligations cannot be 
understood in isolation from “our human intuitions and feelings”.’151
The conviction that human infants have a moral status different from 
that of pigs is, in Noddings’s view, an entirely appropriate 
consequence of the fact that human beings care for infants in ways 
they do not usually care for pigs; and that infants respond to human 
caring in ways that pigs usually do not. Noddings recognizes that 
many people care for animals, and she holds that this caring creates 
moral obligations. She argues, however, that active concern for the 
interests of animals is ethically optional, whereas concern for children
146 Warren, op. cit., at 71-72
147 For examples o f ‘deep environmentalist’ writing, see: Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity o f  
Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992); Stephen R. Kellert and Edward O. 
Wilson, (eds.) The Biophilia Hypothesis (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993); and J. Baird 
Callicott, ‘On the Intrinsic Value o f Nonhuman Species’ in Bryan G. Norton (ed.) The 
Preservation o f  Species (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
148 Warren, op. cit., at 74
149 Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982
150 Warren, op. cit., at 75
151 Ibid.
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is morally basic: to abandon or weaken it is to undermine the human 
capacity for moral response.152
Citing yet another feminist author, Warren continues:
It is not always irrational for human beings to show special concern 
for members of their social communities... As Lori Gruen points out, 
“ ...humans are not just humans; they are friends and lovers, family 
and foe. The emotional force of kinship or closeness to another is a 
crucial element in .. .moral deliberations. To ignore the reality of this 
influence in favor of some abstraction such as absolute equality may 
be not only impossible, but undesirable.”153
The third ‘potentially fatal objection’ to SO views is what Warren refers to as 
‘the human rights objection’, the claim that utilitarianism generally ‘provides 
no basis for ascribing strong moral rights to individual human beings.’154 
Instead of treating individuals as having ends of their own, utilitarianism 
treats them as instruments that may be manipulated towards the ends of the 
majority. This is traditionally a charge against classical utilitarian theory, and 
Singer has described himself as a ‘preference utilitarian’ in the hope of 
avoiding this type of objection. Warren remarks that ‘other philosophers have 
pointed out that this argument does not show that persons are not receptacles 
on the preference utilitarian theory; what it shows is that they are receptacles 
for both pleasure and preference-satisfaction, rather than merely for 
pleasure.’155 While Singer may accept that classical utilitarianism is guilty of 
treating people as mere instruments, however, he is confident that his theory’s 
willingness to distinguish a higher category of ‘persons’ absolves it of guilt in 
this respect.
My response to this would be simply to say that it is Singer’s 
reference to persons, and not to preferences, which shields him from the usual
152 Ibid. at 76
153 Ibid. at 76-77, citing Lori Gruen, ‘Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis o f the Connection 
Between Women and Animals’ in Greta Gaard (ed.), Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993) at 79
154 Ibid. at 77
155 Ibid. at 78
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challenges to utilitarianism, but which also takes his theory away from 
utilitarianism and SO altogether, and towards SP and ‘personhood theory). As 
such, most of what can be said about Singer will be in response to the 
personhood element of his theory, and since personhood will be examined 
fully in the following chapter, a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties 
with this aspect of Singer’s preference utilitarianism will be postponed until 
then. The final immediate objection that Warren discusses is the ‘comparable 
interests dilemma’:
Singer’s principle of equal consideration requires us to weigh equally 
the equally strong interests of all sentient beings. Yet it does not 
require us to attribute to all sentient beings an equally strong interest 
in life, pleasure, freedom from pain, or any other specific good. 
Moreover, it does not require us to regard each sentient being as 
possessing an “interest package” with the same total value as that of 
any other sentient being.156
So Singer maintains that the lives of sentient non-persons are less valuable 
than the lives of persons; but he also makes the claim that only self-aware 
beings can have any form of interest at all in their own continued existence. 
Warren says:
this stronger claim is difficult to justify. Non self-aware beings may 
not consciously take an interest in their own survival, but it does not 
follow that they cannot have such an interest. Having an interest in 
something does not require a conscious desire for it, but only the 
potential to experience some benefit from it.157
It is potentially problematic for the comparable interests thesis that Singer 
believes many invertebrates to be sentient.158 While Warren agrees that this is
156 Ibid. at 78-79
157 Ibid. at 80
158 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic fo r Our Treatment o f  Animals (New York: 
Avon Books, 1975)
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likely -  and goes so far as to suggest that some invertebrate animals may even 
be self-aware -  she notes that ‘sentience is probably the only plausible 
criterion of strong moral status that most common sentient invertebrate 
animals meet.’159 They do not usually fulfil relational criteria for moral status; 
Warren accepts that ‘most invertebrates tend not to arouse human sympathies’ 
and ‘they rarely become members of our social communities, or we of 
theirs.’160 On a strict SO view, however, sentient invertebrates must qualify 
for full moral status (since, unlike Singer’s theory, strict SO does not 
distinguish between persons and non-persons).
Yet SO cannot coherently claim that sentience alone is a sufficient 
criterion for the ascription of full moral status while simultaneously excluding 
a certain category of sentient beings, seemingly at random or on the basis of 
subjective human preference. However, if we do accord full moral status to all 
sentient invertebrates, as the consistency of SO demands, then we inevitably 
find that SO begins to encounter many of the same difficulties that have 
plagued ‘life only’ approaches (those ethical frameworks which take the 
sanctity of life, or reverence for life, as their core value). As Warren says: 
‘any human society which seriously sought to accord equal moral status to all 
sentient beings would severely endanger its own survival.’161 In other words, 
strict SO, like ‘reverence for life’, is too onerous and impractical.
2.2. What guidance, if any, does sentience provide?
Can the sentience criteria offer us any real, practical guidance in determining 
the moral status of the foetus? It is to this question that I now address my 
attention. The first step will obviously be to ask whether the foetus is, in fact, 
sentient. Although, as I have shown, sentience is concerned with both pleasure 
and pain (and possibly also preference-satisfaction), in the context of the 
foetus, this question is usually expressed in terms of whether the foetus can 
‘feel pain’. There is an obvious reason for this — the question of foetal 
sentience arises most often in contexts wherein the foetus might suffer pain if
159 Warren, op. cit. at 83
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid. at 84
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it is, indeed, sentient, such as foetal surgery and other intra uterine procedures, 
and of course, in the context of abortion. The question o f foetal ‘pleasure’, as 
such, simply does not arise with any regularity in a medico-legal context 
(although, of course, pregnant women and their partners may well be 
interested in investigating any possible ways to engage positively with the 
foetus during pregnancy). After investigating whether or not the foetus might 
reasonably be regarded as sentient I will go on to argue what my conclusions 
with regard to this initial question permit or require, if  anything.
2.2.1. Is the foetus sentient?
There are three views which may all be regarded in some sense as 
‘mainstream’: the view that the foetus becomes sentient early in pregnancy (in 
the first and second trimesters); the view that the foetus becomes sentient late 
in pregnancy (in or just before the third trimester); and the view that the foetus 
does not become sentient at any stage during pregnancy. I will examine these 
views, introducing ‘expert witnesses’ in support of each. I will begin with 
what seems to be the most widely-held view, the Tate onset’ or ‘third 
trimester view’ of foetal sentience.
2.2.1.1. A ‘late onset ’ view o f foetal sentience
In their comprehensive article When Did You First Begin To Feel It? — 
Locating The Beginning O f Human Consciousness, 162 J. A. Burgess and S. A. 
Tawia distinguish between two kinds or levels of conscious experience: 
experiences with sensational content and experiences with representational 
content (a ‘higher’ level of consciousness).163 The authors declare that their 
purpose is only to assert that the foetus has the capacity for sensational 
content. The authors call this most basic level of consciousness, which is 
essentially the same as sentience, consciousness in the ‘most liberal sense’.164
162Bioethics 1996 10(1) 1
163 Ibid. at 4
164 Ibid. at 5
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The authors begin by acknowledging the claims of other experts that the 
foetus is sentient in the first trimester o f pregnancy, claims which are usually 
based upon observations of foetal movement, either spontaneous or in 
response to sensory stimuli:
Since the fetus moves in response to being touched, it might appear to 
follow that the fetus can feel the stimulus. (We shall soon see, 
however, that this appearance is quite deceptive.)165
They go on to argute that ‘it is...possible to account for a variety of 
spontaneous and reflex activities of the fetus as a consequence of spinal cord 
and brainstem activity in the absence of higher brain centre development.’ 166 
However, according to Burgess and Tawia, all genuine human consciousness 
depends upon cortical activity:
If widespread and severe cortical damage is enough to deprive a 
subject of consciousness, then this would indicate that the content of 
consciousness is at least largely a product of -  perhaps even identical 
with -  some kind of activity in the cortex.167
So what kind of cortical activity is relevant for this purpose? The authors 
outline two ways of understanding the concept of a ‘functioning brain’.
Brain (cortical) functioning might be said to occur when there is 
identifiable activity -  just any old activity -  in what recognisably is (or 
will become) the brain (cortex).168
Alternatively, ‘The brain (cortex) might be said to function when there is 
identifiable activity of the kind that normal adult brains (cortices) have
165 Ibid. at 12
166 Ibid. at 15
167 Ibid. at 8
168 Ibid. at 18
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evolved to indulge in, or at least activity identifiable as a crude, 
undifferentiated ancestor of mature activity of this kind.’169 With reference to 
the latter sense of ‘functioning’, the authors point out that ‘Clearly no brain 
(cortex) can function in this sense until (a) it has attained a critical minimal 
level of structural organisation, (b) the functional components are not only “in 
place” but are mature enough to perform.. .and (c) there is clear evidence that 
they are “up and running”.’170 Evidently, this is the authors’ preferred 
understanding of ‘brain function’, as they make clear in the following 
passage:
Cortical ‘life’ does not begin while the cortex is getting organised, nor 
does it begin even then until everything is ‘settled’, ‘feels at home’ and 
has ‘limbered up’, as it were. (A football match has not begun while a 
team is being gathered together, no matter how frantic the activity 
involved.)171
Burgess and Tawia proceed to describe some aspects of cortical development 
that might be relevant in determining at the likely onset of foetal sentience. 
The first is that cortical development is ‘so gradual that it might seem more
1 72accurate to speak of functional “evolution” rather than [cortical] birth.’ In 
addition, ‘EEG [electro encephalogram] data make it clear that the stream of 
consciousness begins not suddenly, nor as a trickle, but as a series of isolated 
discontinuous puddles ' 173 Furthermore, in normal, full-term babies, neonatal 
EEG activity can be discontinuous ‘for several seconds, and, in extreme cases, 
for hours -  for some weeks after birth’.174 The cumulative effect of these 
factors, according to the authors, is that we are left with two plausible options. 
First, we could locate the beginning of conscious experience (the authors call 
it ‘cortical birth’) at the occurrence of the first ‘puddle’ of cortical EEG
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid. at 19
171 Ibid. at 18
172 Ibid. at 19
173 Ibid. at 20
174 Ibid. at 22
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activity (normally at around 20 weeks gestational age). The problem with this 
is that ‘we can see no reason to suppose that these states have sensational 
content; in short, we do not think it plausible to claim that a fetus at this 
gestational age is yet conscious.’175 The authors go on:
The second possible answer is to locate the beginning of 
consciousness at the time when the first waking -state EEG readings 
appear, or, better, the first EEG readings appear that indicate states 
that could plausibly be regarded as ancestors of adult waking states. 
This varies from fetus to fetus but occurs somewhere between 30-35 
weeks of gestation... at about this time, the periods of continuous EEG 
activity are considerably longer than the periods of inactivity.. .this is 
also the period in which something recognisable as the precursors of 
sleep/ wake cycles develop. These landmarks in cortical development 
are undeniably significant. But we do not rest our case for locating the 
beginnings of consciousness at this point on either of these features. 
Rather, what we regard as significant is the emergence of waking 
states. Surely, it is states of this kind that we really value.. .If this is 
not the only notion of consciousness that can be isolated, it is certainly 
the most important to us, and, at least in the current state of scientific 
knowledge, it is here that we are inclined to locate the beginnings of 
consciousness, properly so called.116
The authors cite previous evidence in support o f the view that arousal (the 
presence of states of wakefulness in addition to sleeping states) is a necessary 
precondition for even the most basic form of consciousness,177 but they are 
also at pains to point out that they ‘cannot be certain’ of their conclusions, and 
that ‘all we claim for our proposal is that it seems vastly more plausible than 
any other we know of.’178 They make no definite moral claims, saying that ‘It
175 Ibid. at 23
176 Ibid. at 23-24
177 Ibid. at 8
178 Ibid. at 24
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1 70is no part of our project to defend the interest view of moral status’, but add 
that they hope their findings and conclusions might be valuable to anyone 
engaged in debating philosophical questions o f foetal status and human 
consciousness:
In the absence of a tolerably clear and carefully argued answer to the 
question we have been addressing, it is simply impossible to apply the 
interest view to the question of the moral status of fetuses. We have 
attempted to produce both a proposal that is sufficiently explicit, and 
an argument for that proposal that is sufficiently rigorous, to provide 
both proponents and opponents of the interest view with a plausible 
working hypothesis about the onset of human consciousness.180
2.2.1.2. A sceptical view o f foetal sentience
In his article Locating The Beginnings O f Pain,m  Stuart W. G. Derbyshire 
disagrees with the thesis that the foetus is sentient during pregnancy, and 
specifically, with the conclusions reached by Burgess and Tawia:
Not surprisingly, the medical literature has also discussed the question 
of whether the fetus can feel pain. Unlike Burgess and Tawia, medical 
researchers largely concluded that the fetus could not feel pain, 
regardless of gestational age. This conclusion was based upon an 
understanding of what pain is, rather than upon an understanding of 
the biological development of the fetus.182
179 Ibid. at 25
180 Ibid. at 26
181 Bioethics 1999 13(1) 1
182 Ibid. at 2
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If we presume for a moment then, that the nature of pain, rather than foetal 
development, is decisive, how ought we to define ‘pain’? Derbyshire suggests 
that there has been a recent shift in the way we understand pain:
Pain is no longer regarded as merely a physical sensation of noxious 
stimulus and disease, but is seen as a conscious experience which may 
be modulated by mental, emotional and sensory mechanisms and 
includes both sensory and emotional components. Pain has been 
described as a multidimensional phenomena for some time and this 
understanding is reflected in the current IASP [International 
Association for the Study of Pain] definition of pain as ‘an unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage’.183
He goes on to express his opinion that the onset of pain is not a sudden 
experience, but rather that our capacity to experience pain ‘is gradually 
formed as a consequence of general conscious development. Thus pain 
requires the support of a sophisticated neurological and cognitive 
architecture.’184 This leads him to refute Burgess’s and Tawia’s identification 
of the cortex as the ‘seat of pain’ in the body:
In summary, the conscious appreciation of pain cannot be explained as 
the consequence of an active “pain centre”. Instead a 
“neuromatrix”...is proposed as necessary for the experience of pain. 
Parallel interacting areas...each of which add a component to the
185experience of pain but none of which define it in its entirety...
The upshot of all of this for the foetus obviously depends upon when 
Derbyshire regards such a ‘neuromatrix’ as being in place:
183 Ibid. at 4
184 Ibid. at 5
185 Ibid. at 15
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It can be said with confidence that at 30 weeks gestation the human 
fetus has a well-developed system for the projection of noxious 
information from the periphery (the skin) to the central nervous 
system. It is known that activation o f this system results in 
coordinated behavioural responses, regulated neural discharge and up- 
regulation of the endogenous anti-inflammatory agent cortisol and the 
endogenous pain analgesic p-endorphin. However, while there are 
similarities between the fetal nervous system and the adult, it is
important to remember that the real explosion of events in the cortex
186occurs postnatally between the third and sixth months of life.
According to Derbyshire, it is all too often the case in literature about foetal 
sentience that ‘the complexity of pain is being underestimated while the 
biological development of the fetus is being exaggerated.’ He also argues that, 
while conclusions in favour of foetal sentience (such as those arrived at by 
Burgess and Tawia) may well create an impetus for change to current 
practices (for example, the introduction of analgesic and anaesthetic use in 
foetal procedures), we ought to resist the pressure for such change:
At this stage it would be inappropriate for the debate about fetal pain 
to affect clinical practice involving the fetus. Only when it is shown to 
be clinically beneficial should analgesic and anaesthetic intervention 
be carried out during fetal operations. The seminal paper by Anand 
and Hickey clearly demonstrated that analgesic intervention during 
neonatal operations improves clinical outcome. This is in itself 
sufficient to place an ethical premium upon the use of analgesics 
during invasive procedures with the neonate. Although it is likely that 
similar mechanisms may be operative in the fetus, meaning that the
186 Ibid. at 21
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fetus may also benefit clinically from analgesic practice, this should
not be assumed.187
Several difficulties arise from Derbyshire’s position. First, he declares that the 
benefits of analgesic use in neonates have been demonstrated to his 
satisfaction, and concedes that it is likely that the foetus could derive similar 
benefits, yet maintains despite these admissions that we ought not to ‘assume’ 
this, or even err on the side of caution.
Perhaps because he focuses on the nature of pain rather than on the 
physiology of the foetus, Derbyshire does not address the question of why a 
near-term foetus should be so different in terms of sentience from a neonate 
as his theory seems to require. Surely, unless birth itself triggers ‘an explosion 
of events in the cortex’ (a claim that Derbyshire never makes) we have no 
reason to differentiate, either in terms of our assumptions about the levels of 
sentience these entities possess, or in terms of clinical practice? The fact that 
the evidence which has convinced Derbyshire of the value of neonatal pain
• 1R Rrelief was conducted upon neonates rather than late-term foetuses is surely 
irrelevant; if we have no scientific basis for distinguishing between the 
cortical and nervous capacities of neonates and late-term foetuses, then what 
is the clinical basis for failing to extend the conclusions of the research in 
question to beings falling within the latter category?
To all this, Derbyshire might of course respond with the claim that he 
advocates the use of analgesic and anaesthetic drugs not from birth onwards, 
but from three months after birth (since this is the earliest point at which he 
claims the cortical ‘explosion’ can take place). This would clearly contradict 
the passage in which he recognises ‘an ethical premium upon the use of 
analgesics during invasive procedures with the neonate’, but let us consider it 
for a moment. If we permit Derbyshire to claim that by ‘neonate’, he means 
an infant of three months or older, then he is able to avoid contradicting 
himself in differentiating unjustifiably between the foetus and the ‘neonate’
187 Ibid. at 28-29
188 artjcje to which Derbyshire refers is K.J.S. Anand and P.R. Hickey, ‘Pain and its 
effects in the human neonate and fetus’, New England Journal o f  Medicine 317 (1987) 1321- 
1329
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(as speculatively redefined). However this reinterpretation of Derbyshire’s 
claim has an obvious, shocking implication; it would mean that analgesics 
and anaesthetics need not be administered during invasive surgical procedures 
on neonates under three months of age.
There is an obvious ‘yuck-factor’ associated with this interpretation, 
but it would not be the first time a medical practitioner had denied neonatal 
sentience. In his challenging paper Babies D on’t Feel Pain: A Century o f  
Denial in Medicine,189 David B. Chamberlain catalogues the experiments 
performed on newborns up until as recently as 1974 in American hospitals 
and universities, and accuses the researches involved of dehumanising these 
newborns, and depriving them of their cries, tears, smiles, memories and 
experiences by reclassifying all of these things as ‘reflexes’, ‘grimaces’, 
‘fantasies’ or even simply the result of ‘gas’.190 Chamberlain speaks of 
‘painful encounters between physicians and newborns’,191 infants having 
‘head-on collisions with physicians, typically male physicians’192 and claims 
that ‘generally, doctors have not been concerned about babies’ pain’.193 He 
tells us:
Babies have had a difficult time getting us to accept them as real 
people with real feelings having real experiences. Deep prejudices 
have shadowed them for centuries: babies were sub-human, prehuman, 
or as Luis de Granada, a 16th-century authority put it, ‘a lower animal 
in human form.’194
As Derbyshire indicates, Anand and Hickey make a persuasive case for 
neonatal sentience, without reference to the three-to-six-month age 
specification which Derbyshire himself would appear to favour. As it stands, 
therefore, Derbyshire’s position is either incoherent (if he accepts Anand and
189 Paper presented by Dr. Chamberlain to The Second International Symposium on 
Circumcision, San Francisco, California, May 2, 1991
190 Ibid. at 1
191 Ibid. at 2
192 Ibid. at 1
193 Ibid. at 4
194 Ibid. at 1
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Hickey’s findings and fails to distinguish between the neonate and the foetus, 
yet refuses to extend their recommendations on analgesic use to the late term 
foetus) or disingenuous (if he really wishes to refute Anand and Hickey and 
argue against pain relief for neonates, but shrinks from making such an 
argument for fear of the yuck-factor). I suspect that the former is the case, but 
either way, the sceptical approach to foetal sentience is problematic - at least, 
Derbyshire’s version is.
2.2.13. An ‘early onset’ view offoetal sentience
Some writers have claimed that the human foetus is sentient as early as the 
first trimester (weeks 0-12 of pregnancy) or early in the second (weeks 12- 
24). This view is usually based upon observations of foetal movement in 
utero. Burgess and Tawia note that studies have shown foetal movement as 
early as 5.5 weeks gestational age, and that patterns of movement, both 
spontaneous and in response to external stimulation, have been detected from 
this point onwards.195 They tell us that ‘between 5 and 6.5 weeks of 
gestation.. .the lips are the only region on the surface o f the fetus which elicit 
a reflex response on stimulation. Stimulation of this kind consistently causes 
the head to bend or move away from the side of the mouth being 
stimulated...by 6.5 weeks gestational age the contralateral flexion reflex 
involves movement of the head, trunk and pelvis away from the 
stimulus...more isolated movements of the head and limbs are detected in 
utero from about 8 weeks of gestation.’196 Later in the first trimester:
Stimulation of the palm of the hand results in partial finger closure by 
9 weeks of gestation; stimulation of the sole o f the foot results in 
flexion of the toes by 9.5 to 10 weeks; and stimulation of the lips 
elicits reflex swallowing at 10.5 weeks. Isolated respiratory 
movements and respiratory reflexes are observable at 11 and 12 weeks
195 Burgess and Tawia, op. cit., at 10
196 Ibid. at 11
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of gestation, respectively, and by 16.5 weeks, spontaneous chest
contractions are detectable.197
Burgess and Tawia consider that the spontaneous movement detected must be 
‘a result of some sort of intrinsic activity o f the developing nervous 
system’;198 as we saw above, they do not regard this, or movement in 
response to external stimuli as evidence of foetal sentience at this early stage 
of pregnancy. So on what basis do other commentators favour the ascription 
of sentience to the foetus at a very young gestational age?
Proponents of early-onset approaches tend not to rely upon the 
positive claim that there is strong evidence of foetal sentience in the first or 
second trimesters of pregnancy. Instead, this type of approach is characterised 
by caution and typically emphasises two things: the relative lack of available 
scientific knowledge on foetal pain, and the appropriate response to this lack 
of knowledge.
2.2.1.3.1. Lack of knowledge
The early-onset approach was advocated in a 1996 report by the UK 
Parliament’s All Party Pro-Life Group entitled Foetal Sentience}99 The 
authors acknowledge that ‘considerations about the capacity of the foetus to 
experience pain should be based on the best scientific information currently 
available’, but they emphasise the lack of scientific certainty regarding foetal 
sentience. The authors insist that claims that sentience occurs late in gestation 
(if at all) ‘can only be sustained if  we can confidently exclude beyond 
reasonable doubt that the stimulus which brought about the reflex movement 
does not also reach any centre in the brain concerned with pain awareness. To 
claim that a foetal movement in response to noxious stimulus is not 
accompanied by pain is warranted only if this exclusion can be firmly
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Published in the Catholic Medical Quarterly XLVII no. 2 November 1996 at 6
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established.’200 Contrary to Burgess’s and Tawia’s claim that their proposal is 
‘vastly more plausible than any other we know o f ,  the report points out that:
Current information suggests that many functions which were 
originally assumed to be exclusively located in the cerebral cortex can 
be undertaken by lower centres in the brain. Those who claim that 
‘sentience is a function of the cerebral cortex’ seem to overlook this 
scientific evidence.201
The authors refer to instances where sentience or probable sentience has been 
detected in neonates and infants bom with hydrocephalus and even 
anencephaly (a condition where large parts of the brain, including the cortex, 
are undeveloped or even absent). They also cite research based upon a post­
mortem examination carried out on the corpse of an adult, Karen Quinlan,
who had lived in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for more than ten
202years. On examination of the brain, it was determined that while the cortex 
was only slightly damaged, damage to the thalamus (a region of the brain 
normally associated with Tower’ functioning) was ‘very substantial’. The 
Parliamentary report concludes: ‘These findings suggest that the thalamus
203plays a more crucial role in consciousness than was previously thought.’ 
Clearly, the authors interpret this research as suggesting that much of the 
‘higher brain function’ commonly attributed to cortical activity may in fact be 
sustainable by Tower’ areas of the brain.
This is problematic in at least two ways. One very practical difficulty 
with this interpretation arises from the notorious frequency with which 
medical practitioners misdiagnose PVS.204 In one study o f a group of 40 
patients diagnosed as ‘vegetative’, this diagnosis was later found to have been
200 Foetal Sentience at 9
201 Ibid.
202 H. C. Kinney, J. Korein, A. Panigraphy et al, ‘Neuropathological Findings in the Brain of  
Karen Quinlan’, New England Journal o f  Medicine (1994) 330: 1469-75
203 Foetal Sentience at 10
204 See for example C. Borthwick, ‘The Permanent Vegetative State; ethical crux, medical 
fiction?’ Issues in Law and Medicine 1996 12 (2) 167-188
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incorrect in 17 of the patients.205 This is an alarming level of error, although 
the facts that the vegetative state is uncommon (only occurring in up to 1500 
patients in the United Kingdom ) and that medical practitioners therefore 
have few opportunities to become proficient in its management and diagnosis 
may be thought to mitigate. Alternatively, the Quinlan research might 
equally be viewed as evidence in support o f Derbyshire’s ‘neuromatrix’ thesis 
-  the view that pain and other manifestations o f sentience arise not from any 
one area of the brain (a ‘pain centre’) but from various areas functioning in 
concert. Thus, Derbyshire might argue that the ‘reasonable doubt’ cast on the 
‘cortical’ understanding of sentience by the Quinlan research might just as 
plausibly form the basis for denying sentience altogether up until the third 
month after birth (the time by which he claims all of the relevant cerebral 
areas are functioning at the requisite level).
That all of our current knowledge regarding foetal neurological and 
neuropsychological development leaves room for reasonable doubt, however, 
is a difficult claim to dispute. This brings me to the second strand of the early- 
onset argument: what ought our practical response to be in the face of 
reasonable doubt?
2.2.1.3.2. Methodology
The authors of Foetal Sentience favour the approach adopted by Professor 
Christopher Hull, the Vice President of the Royal College of anaesthetists and 
a Professor of Anaesthesia at the University of Newcastle, when he says:
So far as I am concerned I would be prepared to accept that the foetus
does not feel pain when somebody proves to me that they don’t feel
207pain. But until that time I would have to assume that they do.
205 K. Andrews, L. Murphy, R. Munday, C. Little wood, ‘Misdiagnosis o f  the vegetative state’ 
British Medical Journal 1996; 313: 13-16
206 N. Craft, ‘Looking living death in the face’ British M edical Journal 1996; 313: 1408
207 Prof. Christopher Hull, interviewed on BBC World At One on 29th April 1996
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In 1991, such concerns prompted scientific advisers to the German Federal 
Medical Council to advise the use of analgesia and anaesthesia in foetal 
procedures, and this ‘cautious’ approach also characterises current UK 
practice regarding neonatal anaesthesia (until 1986, only minimal analgesia 
and anaesthesia were used in neonatal surgical procedures). One of the main 
factors cited by early-onset proponents is the concern that ‘[a]t the very 
least... [the burden of proof] should match the standards in relation to burden 
of proof that apply to experimental use o f animals.’ Animal 
experimentation is currently regulated in the UK by the Animal (Scientific 
Procedures) Act 1986, which provides that any ‘protected animal’209 (this 
category includes the embryos and foetuses of birds, reptiles and all mammals 
‘except man’ throughout the second half of the gestational period) must only 
be killed ‘humanely’ in the course of experimental procedures. 210 Ultimately, 
then, for early-onset proponents, the central question concerns the burden of 
proof:
[T]he question of whether a subject, who lacks the capacity to 
communicate, is feeling pain can only be deduced. Essentially then, 
any decision about the likelihood that any subject (animal or human) 
feels pain requires society to decide what is an acceptable risk of error. 
How confident must we be that our actions will not inflict pain on a 
sentient creature? In this type of situation, it is generally required that 
the burden of proof (of non-sentience) rests on the person who is 
undertaking the action.211
What we treat as an ‘acceptable risk of error’ will depend in turn upon what 
obligations we consider might arise from a presumption in favour of foetal 
sentience. I consider the potential moral and ethical implications next.
208 Foetal Sentience at 11
209 The category of ‘protected animal’ is defined in s i o f the Act, and s i (2) extends the 
protections in the Act to vertebrates in their ‘foetal, larval and embryonic’ forms.
210 Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the requirements for human killing.
211 Foetal sentience, at 11
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2.3. Conclusions: sentience and the foetus - an overview
If the foetus can feel pain, what ethical conclusions might follow from this? 
More specifically, if  we were either to establish or to presume that the foetus 
is capable of experiencing pain, would this fact impose any general moral 
obligations vis a vis the sentient foetus? One possibility is that foetal 
sentience might be regarded as imposing a general obligation not to inflict 
harm upon foetuses needlessly, incorporating a duty to use anaesthesia / 
analgesia during invasive surgical procedures involving the foetus. What 
about abortion? Does the fact that the foetus is not intended to survive such a 
procedure make any moral difference? Ought we still to minimise the pain of 
the foetus being deliberately killed? The answers to questions such as these 
will depend upon whether, and to what extent, we think sentience is relevant 
to moral status.
On a SO view, the establishment of sentience would constitute, in 
itself, sufficient grounds for the ascription of fu ll moral status. As such, on 
this view, were we to prove (or presume) that the foetus is sentient, we would 
thereby accept a prohibition, not only on inflicting unnecessary foetal pain 
and suffering, but also on ending the life of the foetus. This would require the 
use of pain-minimising drugs during foetal surgery, and would forbid abortion 
altogether. But these are not reasons to resist the SO view and the extension 
of its moral implications to the foetus; I have already provided an explanation, 
above, of some of the reasons why the SO position is problematic.
If we adopt an SP approach (taking sentience as relevant to, but not 
decisive of moral status) we are able to regard any determination or 
presumption of foetal sentience as a strong reason not to cause the foetus pain 
or distress, such that pain-minimising drugs would be morally-necessary in 
foetal procedures. To justify any prohibition on abortion with anaesthetic, it 
would be necessary to demonstrate that the foetus is not only sentient, but also 
possesses whatever quality is necessary, under the particular SP view in 
question, for the ascription offu ll moral status. The sorts of additional criteria 
required for full moral status under a SP view might include, for example, a
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conscious will-to-live, a subjective valuing o f one’s own life, or even the 
group of qualities and capacities that some philosophers call ‘personhood’. In 
the following chapter, I conduct a detailed examination of the concept of 
personhood as a criterion for full moral status.
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3. The Conflict Model: Personhood
3.1. Introduction
The unrealistic and overly-burdensome breadth o f moral obligation under 
sentience- based accounts of moral status has led many commentators to look 
for alternative accounts in which the range o f beings to whom we owe moral 
obligations is narrower. One possibility is to adopt an account in which we 
distinguish between ‘persons’ and ‘non-persons’, and to claim that we owe 
strong moral obligations only to persons. Before explaining what a 
‘personhood only’ account of moral status involves, it is necessary, first of all, 
to distinguish between this use and the ordinary language use of ‘person’. In 
ordinary usage, it is sometimes claimed, ‘person’ is used to mean the same 
thing as ‘human being’. For those who treat the terms synonymously, the 
question is not ‘what is a person?’ but ‘when is a person?’: in other words, ‘at 
what stage of human development can we say that a human being has come 
into existence?’ Several events which take place (or are thought to take place) 
during early human development have been suggested as alternative points for 
the coming-into-existence of ‘human beings’: birth, viability, conception and 
ensoulment.
Birth is perhaps the most obvious event to choose, since unlike the 
others, it is observable. The problem in identifying it as the point at which a 
human being comes into existence is, essentially, the difficulty in 
differentiating between the foetus immediately prior to birth, and the neonate. 
As Christian Perring writes, ‘there is no sudden change in the intrinsic 
capacities of the fetus. The metaphysical concept o f personhood depends only 
on the intrinsic properties of the individual. Therefore personhood cannot be 
determined by the location of the individual, inside or outside the womb.’212 
Others disagree that birth lacks real significance; Liam Clarke tells us that 
birth ‘is not only a question of geography or indeed o f biology; it is a social 
condition in that issues and problems pertaining to the fetus/mother may,
212 Christian Perring ‘Degrees o f  Personhood’, Journal o f  Medicine and Philosophy, 22(2) 
173 at 181
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before birth, be discussed only in the context o f their unity. The fetus does 
not inhabit the mother but is inherent of the mother.’
Viability was the standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court 
in the celebrated case of Roe v Wade.214 The effect o f that decision was that 
before viability, the state had no interest in restricting the right of a woman to 
terminate her pregnancy. After viability, however, state laws restricting access 
to termination would not be unconstitutional. But viability is a problematic 
threshold. Firstly, as Clarke notes, ‘the Court failed to elaborate on why the 
capacity to exist outside the womb should be the deciding factor. They used 
the language of “potential” life, failing to note that the nonviable is as 
potential as the viable. Another drawback is that viability is dependent on 
medical technology. At a time when babies of six and even five months 
gestation can now survive, and taking account of the geographical differences 
in the availability of technology, are moral judgements to be contingent upon 
that availability?’215
The ‘arbitrariness’ of birth and viability has led others, like Peter 
Kreeft, to place the beginnings of personhood at the earliest stage, conception.
No other line than conception can be drawn between pre-personhood
and personhood. Birth and viability are the two most frequently
suggested. But birth is only a change of place and relationship to the
mother and to the surrounding world (air and food); how could these
things create personhood? As for viability, it varies with accidental
and external factors like available technology (incubators). What I am
in the womb — a person or a non-person cannot be determined by what
machines exist outside the womb. But viability is determined by such
216things. Therefore personhood cannot be determined by viability.’
That ‘birth is only a change of place’ can o f course be disputed quite 
vigorously, and in the following chapter I will analyse one particular feminist
213 Liam Clarke, ‘The Person in Abortion’, Nursing Ethics 1999 6(1) at 39
214 Roe v Wade 410 US 113; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973)
215 Clarke, op. cit. at 39
2,6 Peter Kreeft, ‘Human Personhood Begins at Conception’ Journal o f  Biblical Ethics in 
Medicine 4(1) (1990) 9, at 15
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challenge to this notion; for the time being, however, it is necessary only to 
note that the idea that personhood begins at birth is not uncontroversial.
Yet another ‘event’ criteria for personhood is ensoulment — the view 
that what makes us persons is our possession o f an immortal, immaterial soul. 
Theologians and moral philosophers have disagreed, historically, about when 
this event occurs, and nowadays there is a great deal o f scepticism about 
whether it occurs at all: ‘most philosophers now agree that positing the 
existence of a soul runs into huge explanatory and epistemological problems, 
and so reject metaphysical substance dualism. The option of believing in a 
soul has largely been dropped from modem philosophical discussion, and the 
debate focuses instead on what is the best form o f substance monism.’217 The 
widespread rejection of the notion of ensoulment notwithstanding, however, 
much of our contemporary discourse about personhood is traceable to 
Cartesian thought, as we shall see.
Whatever other problems we can identify in these sorts of criteria for 
personhood, one difficulty shared by them all is that they are all events in the 
course of human development. While it may well be true that in ordinary 
language we use the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ coextensively (and I 
will dispute this assumption later when I reject, with DeGrazia, Mary 
Midgley’s proposal that we allow the ordinary usage of ‘person’ to delineate 
the parameters of the moral sense of personhood), many theorists claim that 
‘person’ can be used in another way, to denote beings with ultimate, or 
radically superior, moral status. This is neither a new nor a minority usage of 
‘person’; indeed, ‘the concept of personhood is generally assumed to have a 
central place in morality. Nearly every moral theory in the history of (at least 
Western) philosophy has held that persons possess exclusive or radically 
superior moral status, that nonpersons have no or radically inferior moral 
status, and that there are no beings existing between the categories of person 
and nonperson. ’218
Used in this way, personhood is ascribed to beings not on the basis of 
the species to which they belong, but rather on the basis of the qualities, or
217 Perring, op. cit. at 180-181
218 David DeGrazia, ‘Great Apes, Dolphins, and the Concept o f Personhood’, The Southern 
Journal o f  Philosophy (1997) vol 35(3) 301-320 at 301
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characteristics, which they possess. Obviously, then, this moral sense of 
‘personhood’ requires us to decide which qualities are relevant, and which are 
not, in determining personhood.219 Whatever we decide the personhood­
relevant properties to be, ‘person’ in the moral sense is not coextensive with 
‘human being’, since ‘human life is no longer respected per se, but in terms of 
its possession o f these features.’220
Moreover, since it is the relevant qualities themselves which are 
morally-important, and not mere humanity, it follows that, if  we observe the 
presence of these features in beings other than humans, we ought to recognise 
such beings as non-human persons. One of the leading proponents of 
personhood for nonhumans is Peter Singer, and I will explore his arguments 
later on in this chapter.
As such, personhood theory goes beyond the traditional notion of the 
‘sanctity of life’ which has long been accorded a central (and arguably, a 
privileged) place in the law of the United Kingdom, and which has been 
influential in such landmark judgments as those in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland221 and, more recently, Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation)222, among many others. Later, I will consider how personhood 
theory runs up against a ‘paradox’ in the context of end-of-life decision­
making - a paradox created by the tension between the nature of such 
decisions, on the one hand, and the nature o f the ‘personhood-relevant 
properties’ on the other. I turn now to consider what these personhood- 
relevant properties are, and how the concept o f personhood has developed 
historically.
3.2. Personhood-relevant properties
Many attempts have been made to produce a list of the features relevant to 
personhood. In Brainstorms 223 Daniel Dennett identifies the following six 
qualities as particular to persons: rationality; consciousness; the ability to be
219 Clarke, op. cit. at 38
220 Ibid.
221 [1993] AC 789
222 [2000] 4 All ER 961
223 Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Penguin,
1997)
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considered a person by others, and the ability to reciprocate this recognition; 
the capacity for verbal communication; and a particular kind of consciousness 
only possessed by persons.224 The last criterion seems somewhat vague, but 
could refer to self- consciousness, self-awareness, or the ‘freedom from causal 
determination’ required by Kant (see below). The Protestant theologian 
Joseph Fletcher made a similar attempt to list the relevant criteria in his article 
Indicators o f Humanhood: A Tentative Profile o f  Man225, wherein he 
identified self-awareness, self control, an awareness of the future, an 
awareness of the past, concern for others, the capacity to relate to and 
communicate with others, and curiosity. Although he listed these as features 
of what he called ‘humanhood’, there is nothing necessarily human about the 
qualities he identifies, and there is no reason for thinking that he is making the 
prescriptive claim that personhood is coextensive with genetic humanity.
Christian Perring notes that ‘the capacity for rationality, 
consciousness, self-consciousness, language, membership in a community of 
persons, or the possession of personality, emotions, and beliefs’ have all been 
suggested as criteria for personhood226 , whereas Laurence Locke takes the 
view that ‘it is the very nature of our self-awareness that justifies persons 
reserving for ourselves and for no other entities the honor (or burden) of moral 
responsibility’227. Bernard Williams defines a person as having ‘a character, in 
the sense of having projects and categorical desires with which he is 
identified’ and ‘which are closely related to his existence and...to a 
significant degree give a meaning to his life.’229 Cranford & Smith discuss 
personhood in the end-of-life context, concluding that ‘consciousness is the 
most critical moral, legal and constitutional standard, not for human life itself, 
but for human personhood...In our view, consciousness is the most important 
characteristic that distinguishes humans from other forms of animal life, going
224 Ibid., chapter 14, ‘Conditions o f Personhood’ at 269-271
225 (1972) 2 The Hastings Center Report no. 5
226 Perring, op. cit. at 181
227 Laurence Locke ‘Personhood and Moral Responsibility’ (1990) 9 Law and Philosophy 39- 
66 at 41
228 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in A.O.Rorty (ed.), The Identities o f  
Persons (University o f California Press, 1976) at 210
229 Ibid. at 209
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beyond the vegetative functions of heartbeat and respiration.’ It is difficult 
to understand this choice. If personhood means something more than 
sentience-only, then consciousness, in the sense o f wakefulness, is surely 
insufficient for personhood. Admittedly, the Cartesian/Lockean notion of 
personhood discussed below takes ‘consciousness’ as it’s starting point, but 
upon closer examination it is clear that Locke is referring to something more 
than mere consciousness -  se/f-consciousness perhaps. Moreover, can we 
really agree with Cranford & Smith that non-human animals are not 
conscious? Perhaps the confusing conclusion results from the context in 
which the question is considered: the authors are more concerned with when 
personhood ends than with how we ought to go about establishing it in the 
first place, and as such their focus is on discovering the point at which 
clinicians may judge a loss o f personhood to have occurred. This 
methodology has led them to identify a necessary rather than a sufficient 
condition for personhood.
What is evident from the foregoing is that most proponents of 
personhood conceive of the person as consisting in psychological qualities, 
rather than as something necessarily physical. I will now consider two 
influential strands in personhood, one Kantian, and the other 
Cartesian/Lockean, before considering the dominance of the psychological 
element in contemporary personhood theory, and the marginalisation of the 
notion that persons are essentially embodied.
3.3. Kantian Personhood: Autonomy
Kant’s definition of ‘person’ is a maximalist one; he holds that personhood 
consists in rational moral agency. His theory is that being a moral agent is (1) 
a necessary condition for any moral status; and (2) a necessary and sufficient 
condition for full moral status.231
230 Ronald E. Cranford and David R. Smith, ‘Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral 
(Constitutional) Standard for Human Personhood’ American Journal o f  Law and Medicine 
Vol. XIII No. 2-3, 233 at 233-234, emphasis added.
231 Warren, op. cit. at 90
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In a famous passage in the conclusion to his Critique o f  Practical Reason , 
Kant writes, ‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing 
admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect upon them: the 
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.’ This ‘moral law 
within’ is what separates persons from non-persons in Kant’s view. Warren 
explains what Kant means by the ‘moral law within’: ‘For Kant, the moral 
agency of persons is evidence of a metaphysical difference between persons 
and all other entities. Persons are, in his view, the only earthly beings that are 
free of causal determination.. .As long as we regard ourselves solely as part of 
the sensible world, our actions will appear to be governed by causal laws, and 
thus to be unfree. Yet we know that, as moral agents, we are free to act upon 
the deliverances of reason, rather than merely from natural causes. Unlike 
other animals, we are not motivated solely by emotion, instinct, and other 
non-rational forces.’233
Only beings who possess the capacity for autonomy, or ‘moral 
agency’, are morally valuable, are ‘persons’ in the Kantian sense. Such beings 
can have moral obligations toward one another. The rest are non-persons, and 
have ‘only a relative value as means, and are consequently called things’ 234 
Unlike non-persons, persons must not be treated as means or manipulated 
toward the achievement of ends which are not their own. They must at all 
times be treated as ends-in-themselves. Kant’s model is unicriterial and 
categorical; all and only persons count, and personhood matters in an all-or- 
nothing way.
This Kantian freedom or autonomy forms the basis for modem 
understandings of personhood, for example that described by Harry 
Frankfurt.235 Frankfurt tells us that human beings like other animals, possess 
certain desires which motivate them towards action. These desires may arise 
out of deliberation, or they may derive from non-rational feelings including 
hunger, fear, discomfort, or the subconscious. ‘According to Frankfurt’,
232 Immanuel Kant, trans. Lewis White Beck, Critique o f  Practical Reason (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1956) at 166 [162]
233 Warren, op. cit. at 100
234 Immanuel Kant, trans. H.J. Paton, The Moral Law: K an t’s Groundwork o f  the Metaphysics 
o f  Morals (Hutchinson, 1948) at 41
235 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Freedom o f the Will and the Concept o f  a Person’ (1971) 86 Journal o f  
Philosophy 5
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Laurence Locke writes, ‘what is special about the consciousness of persons is 
the capacity to become reflectively aware of, and evaluate, first-order desires. 
Through this capacity persons determine whether they want those desires to 
be effective, i.e. to constitute their will. “No animal other than man...appears 
to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the 
formation of second-order desires”, but it is having second order volitions, 
and not second order desires generally, that he regards as essential to being a 
person.’236
Unlike animals, then, persons can form second-order volitions and use 
these to affirm or deny their first-order desires rather than simply being stuck 
with them, as animals are. Whereas animals and other non-persons are victims 
of their desires, persons are the masters of theirs. This is what Kant means by 
freedom from causal determination. ‘An interesting implication of this point is 
that a person can possess all sorts of reprehensible first-order desires and yet 
in no way have a reprehensible character. The character would not be 
reprehensible unless the person identifies with the reprehensible desires and 
formed second-order volitions that they be effective.’ 237
Another Kantian approach to moral status is that found in the work of 
John Rawls. Rawls characterises persons (he refers to them as ‘moral 
persons’) as ‘rational beings with their own ends and capable of a sense of 
justice.’238 This definition is firmly in the Kantian mould, emphasising moral 
agency, autonomy (in the determining of one’s own ends) and the moral law 
(entailed by the capacity for a ‘sense of justice’).
3.4. Self-consciousness: the development of personhood theory from 
Locke to Parfit
3.4.1. Personhood as a purely psychological property
Jerry Goodenough traces one strand of personhood theory back to ‘Descartes’ 
conclusion that he was essentially a thinking thing, non-essentially an
236 L. Locke, op. cit. at 60, citing Frankfurt, op. cit. at 7
237 Ibid. at 61
238 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999)
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embodied thing, and therefore potentially capable o f continuing to exist after 
the destruction of his body. This underlies much of Locke’s (entirely non­
physical) definition of a person.’239 John Locke famously defined ‘person’ as 
‘[a] thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it 
seems to me essential to it.’240 For Locke, then, a ‘person’ is a psychological 
entity, conscious of its own thought processes. Locke defined a person and his 
experiences by reference to the ‘reflective consciousness’: ‘as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now as it was then; and 
‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that action 
was done.’241 Elsewhere, he states that the term person ‘belongs only to 
intelligent agents capable of law, happiness and misery.’242
Locke’s purely psychological definition of personhood is clearly based 
upon the concept of memory, as it states that personhood depends upon 
reflective consciousness extending backwards through time. For Locke, then, 
a person is the same person who performed a past action only if he can 
remember performing that action. Laurence Lock points out that: ‘Locke’s 
concept of a person is simplistic, but it introduces several intuitions which, 
fleshed out one way or another, remain in the literature today: that persons are 
essentially non-physical entities, that psychological criteria are sufficient to 
identify them, that persons are temporally limited by psychological features, 
and, as has been mentioned, that persons are the rightful bearers of 
responsibility.’243
An important feature of Locke’s view is that it does not take 
embodiment in a human physiology to be a necessary component of 
personhood, since Locke maintains that it is ‘not the same body, but the same 
continuing consciousness, which constitutes the criterion for the identity of
239 Jerry Goodenough, ‘The Achievement o f Personhood’, Ratio (New Series) X 1997 141 at 
143
240 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Roger Woolhouse (Penguin, 
1997) at 302
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid. at 312
243 L. Locke, op. cit. at 44
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persons.’244 Laurence Locke considers this unembodied-memory definition to 
have a certain appeal: ‘There is a strong attractiveness to the idea that bodily 
integrity is not a necessary condition for personal identity...Suppose I have 
total and irreversible amnesia and forget all my past experiences, including 
those upon which I draw for my beliefs, values, and goals. Those who knew 
me might well feel that the person they came to know when they came to 
know me “as a person” bears little relation to the person existing in the wake 
of this amnesia. They seem to have reason to claim that they are not 
confronted with the same person even though confronted with the same live 
human body. For the above sorts of reasons, philosophers have tried to appeal 
to psychological continuity as the criterion of personal identity.. .what we are 
really interested in finding, when we are interested in finding the same person, 
is someone psychologically continuous with him .. .psychological continuity 
has often been analysed in terms of memory, and memory criteria have been 
offered as criteria for personal identity.’245
The purely psychological character of Lockean personhood encounters 
two significant problems, however. One is a problem of circularity created by 
the reliance on memory, and the other is the problem that psychological 
continuity defines personhood too broadly. The problem of circularity is 
described as follows: ‘An account of personal identity in terms of memory is 
necessarily circular, because memory “presupposes and so cannot constitute 
personal identity” . . .for a person to really remember a past action, he must be 
the person who performed the action. To claim that a person’s memories are 
real memories, then, we must first know that he is the same person who 
performed the action or who had the experience. Therefore, when we use 
memory criteria, we are presupposing personal identity.’246 Both this problem 
and the problem of the definition’s breadth are addressed by more recent 
psychological analyses of personhood. In a significant strand o f development, 
Derek Parfit and John Perry reformulate the survival of personhood in terms 
of psychological connectivity, rather than psychological continuity. They do 
so ‘by requiring a causal link between successive psychological stages of a
244 B. A. Rich ‘Postmodern Personhood: A Matter o f Consciousness’ Bioethics 11 (1997) 206 
at 209
245 L. Locke, op. cit. at 46
246 Ibid. at 47
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person. The causal link is provided by the embodiment of the successive 
psychological stages within the human brain. Embodiment is thought to solve 
the circularity problem since it allows persons to be identified along a spatio- 
temporal path, thus preventing persons who have exactly similar memories
247from becoming counterexamples to the psychological theory.’
S. 4.1.1. Parfit: psychological connectivity
Laurence Locke explains that, for Parfit, it is not psychological continuity, but 
rather psychological connectedness that is crucial to personal survival. Parfit 
defines psychological connectedness, or ‘connectivity’ as ‘the holding over 
time of particular “direct” psychological relationships’248 and Locke gives, as 
examples, the relationships between an intention and an action, or between an 
experience and the memory of that experience. We are psychologically 
connected with that temporally extended stretch of our psychological 
continuity with which we are connected by memories, present experiences, 
future ‘projects’ and so on. Psychological continuity, on the other hand, is 
defined as a ‘chain of overlapping “direct” psychological relationships’.249 
Thus, while we are psychologically continuous with our infant selves, we are 
not, to any significant degree, psychologically connected to them. So what 
justifies positing connectedness as the key to personal identity? Laurence 
Locke says that the importance of conenctedness lies in the fact that it is ‘a 
necessary condition for our past experiences to contribute to our present 
experience and for our present experience, via projects extending into the 
future, to be connected with the future.’250 Put simply, ‘[t]hose periods of our 
psychological continuity with which we are not “connected” are felt to be, in 
Bernard Williams’ phrase, “beyond the horizon of our interest”.’251
This emphasis on connectedness rather than continuity also seems to 
solve the problem of breadth: whereas we are psychologically continuous with 
our infant, and perhaps even our foetal selves, we are not psychologically
247 Ibid.
248 Derek Parfit, ‘Lewis, Perry and What Matters’ in A.O. Rorty (ed.) The Identities o f  
Persons (University o f California Press, 1976) at 98
249 Ibid.
250 L. Locke, op. cit. at 55
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connected to these stages of our lives. They are ‘beyond the horizon of our 
interest’, as described above, unlike ‘those stages o f ourselves with which we 
are closely enough connected that they bear some significant relationship to
252our present characters, to our reasons for acting, to what we are as persons.’
In extreme cases, ‘[w]here two person-stages are sufficiently disconnected 
(the story goes) we might, if  we wish, consider them to be stages o f different 
persons. So a life, given radical changes in character, can be viewed, if  we 
wish, as a series of selves.’ I will consider this point concerning the 
notional separability o f persons and their lives more fully in due course.
Locke goes on to consider some interesting implications of this 
proposition for the notion of moral responsibility, particularly as it operates 
within the criminal justice system. He argues that we already take 
connectivity into account in determining issues of moral responsibility, as 
evidenced both in our everyday language and in current legal practice. Many 
of our ordinary phrases, like ‘that was a long time ago’, and ‘but I was only 
sixteen’, seem to reflect the intuition that degrees of psychological 
connectedness are relevant to moral responsibility.
With regard to the legal context, Locke writes: ‘By the suggestion that 
we should take degrees of connectedness into account, it seems reasonable to 
simply mean something like this: When we have lost a significant amount of 
the character-reasons why a person was morally-culpable, then we should take 
that into account in our thought about justice, responsibility, and punishment. 
This would not call for radical changes in our behaviour or thought. We 
already recognize that justice demands this. Evidence of positive character 
change is already a mitigating factor in myriad situations. Evidence of 
character impairment is often a mitigating or even an exonerating factor.’254 
This suggests another potential argument in favour of a psychological 
connectivity account such as Parfit’s; namely, that it might satisfy the 
Dworkinian tests of fit and justification.
Continuing in this vein, Locke sketches the following scenario: 
‘Suppose, for example, that a remorseless, sociopathic, habitual criminal
252 Ibid. at 65
253 Ibid. at 56
254 Ibid. at 64
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contracted a rare disease that left him with irreversible amnesia, to the extent 
that his mind became a virtual blank slate. He was thereafter nurtured, 
properly socialized and educated; he now has all the characteristics of a solid 
citizen.. .there is no psychological connectivity at all, and we might as well 
consider him to be a different person.’255 Surprisingly, Locke concludes that 
‘we are inclined to find such persons blameworthy and deserving punishment 
even under the above science fiction circumstances. The inclination is even 
stronger in the following cases: (a) A brutally kills B, knowing and relying on 
the fact that the horror o f the experience will radically transform his character 
in all the appropriate ways; (b) A brutally kills B and then cleverly chooses to 
undergo the proper sort o f radical character reconditioning in order to avoid 
punishment and accountability. We are inclined to feel that A should not be 
off the hook in either case.’256
Locke’s explanation for why we would (in his opinion) be inclined to 
punish in the above cases rests on the acknowledgement that ‘we have reasons 
for imposing criminal sanctions besides moral desert.’257 These other reasons 
might include the wish to ‘make a social statement’, to deter others, or to 
satisfy demands for revenge or retribution (although Locke notes that such 
motives are ‘understandable but inappropriate’ in the absence of moral 
desert). All of these reasons treat the person instrumentally, however, 
manipulating them in order to achieve social goals. I fail to see the need for 
utilitarian ‘justifications’ in this case, since I would argue that the notion of 
psychological connectivity is perfectly capable of explaining the inclination to 
punish A, since it allows us to distinguish between the first case, that of the 
sociopathic criminal who experiences severe amnesia, and the latter two cases 
involving A and B. In each of the latter two cases, there is psychological 
connectivity between the individual, A, before and after the character changes, 
because A is linked to his ‘subsequent self in each case insofar as (a) he had 
the intention to become that later self, and (b) his transformation is an 
application of his authentic will. In other words, if  A has the intention to 
become A ’, then such intention is a bridge of connectivity between the former
255 Ibid. at 63
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid. at 64
71
and latter selves, and while not a high degree o f connectivity, it is nonetheless 
sufficient by virtue of its relevance, in particular its causal nature.
My minor disagreement with Locke on this point serves only to 
emphasise the strength of his argument that connectivity plays a role in our 
intuitions about moral responsibility, however, and to bolster his conclusion 
that ‘for moral responsibility as well as for other subjects o f concern about
7 r o
persons, numerical identity has no intrinsic importance.’ Instead, what 
matters is Parfitian connectivity between person-stages. Whereas the Lockean 
view took personhood to extend backwards through time via psychological 
continuity, Parfit’s analysis takes personhood to extend to the present person- 
stage and to other person-stages sufficiently connected with it that they bear 
substantially upon our present character and motivations.
Any attempt to conduct a critical analysis of the development of the 
concept of personhood in the direction of connectivity is hampered by the fact 
that so much of the writing in this area resembles nothing so much as pure 
science-fiction. So rarified has the personhood debate become, and so 
frequently do the academic commentators invoke abstruse hypothetical 
thought-experiments involving clones, mind-melds, cell-by-cell duplicates 
etc., that at one point Laurence Locke refers (seemingly without irony) to a 
‘garden variety brain transplant case’, which surely makes as much sense as 
talking about a garden variety lottery win, out-of-body experience, or virgin 
birth.
3.4.1.2. ‘Parfitian Persons ’ and their lives
Laurence Locke writes that ‘a “person-stage” (like Quinton’s “soul-phase”) 
defines the entire composition of a person at a given moment. Where two 
person-stages are sufficiently disconnected (the story goes), we might, if  we 
wish, consider them to be stages of different persons. So a life, given radical
9 SOchanges in character, can be viewed, if we wish, as a series o f  selves.’ This
258 Ibid. at 65
259 Ibid. at 56, emphasis added.
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amounts to a conceptual requirement that persons and their lives be regarded 
as conceptually separable, and it is problematic.
In the first place, is the notion of a ‘series o f  selves’ really the 
exception and not the rule in Parfit’s model? Is not every adult person 
sufficiently disconnected from, e.g., their infant self to qualify as a separate 
person? If so, then ‘radical changes in character’ do not appear necessary in 
order to bring about the circumstances where one life is lived by different 
persons at different times! Alternatively, perhaps Locke and Parfit would 
rather say that an infant (and, for that matter, a patient with severe dementia) 
is not sufficiently self-aware to count as a person at all, so that infancy and 
senile dementia would not qualify as ‘person-stages’ under the Parfitian 
model, and accordingly, lack of connectivity with such phases is inevitable 
and thus irrelevant for personhood purposes.
Another difficulty concerns the role of the physical body in the 
Parfitian account. Parfit and Perry make embodiment in the human brain a 
‘background criterion’ for personal identity, and rely upon this requirement 
for embodiment to avoid the circularity inherent in purely psychological 
accounts of personhood. The effect of this is to treat the human brain as the 
seat, if  not the sum, of personhood. Alternatively, we might say that the brain 
provides the ‘equipment’ for personhood, although it cannot be said to contain 
‘the person’. This can be queried using a rather prosaic analogy. When I say 
that there is ‘baking in the oven’, the noun ‘baking’ refers to the food cooking 
inside the oven, and not to the oven itself. However, it would be inaccurate to 
refer to the food as ‘baking’ were it not in the oven. In other words, the oven 
is not part of the baking, yet it is a necessary part of the definition o f the noun, 
‘baking’. Without the oven, there would be no ‘baking’, just a bowl full of 
raw ingredients; when I talk about ‘the baking’ I mean something situated, 
something which is necessarily in the oven (all of which confirms that the 
oven is not part o f the baking, since the oven cannot be located within itself!) 
To claim that the human brain is constitutive rather than supportive of 
personhood, then, is not to claim that the brain is part o f the person, but that 
the meaning of personhood includes the physical component, the brain, rather 
than existing separately from it although supported by it.
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If we accept that a person is an entity consisting chiefly in psychological 
states, but is also necessarily -  and constitutively - embodied, then we can 
sketch an account of the Parfitian ‘series of selves’ as follows: Let A represent 
the relevant physical component (the brain/ cortex/ neocortex), and B the 
personhood-relevant psychological states. We may then give different 
numbers to those ‘person-stages’ which are so disconnected from the other 
person-stages that they might potentially represent different ‘personhoods’. 
Let us imagine three such disconnected ‘person-stages’, represented by B l, 
B2, and B3. We can then let AB to represent ‘normal’ personhood (in the 
absence of disconnected person-stages). Such an example would involve a 
case where only one ‘person’ or ‘self could be said to exist during the course 
of one lifetime. In a case where substantial changes occur giving rise to 3 
periods of disconnectivity (Bl, B2, and B3), we can see that throughout the 
course of such a life the same body (or its neurological workings) combines, 
at different times, with at least three discrete psychological packages 
(probably more, since presumably there would be some connectivity at other 
times!). So the psychological side of personhood would alter substantially 
enough that the resulting ‘whole person’ (consisting of both the physical and 
the psychological components) would alter, with physical structure A 
supporting B l, B2, and B3 at different times, such that the ‘person’ would 
change from AB1 to AB2 to AB3.
As such, ‘personhood’ might be viewed as a union -  a ‘marriage’ -  
between the physical and psychological components of an entity. Whereas the 
‘stuff of personhood’, what ‘matters’ about it, mainly consists in the relevant 
psychological states, these must be supported by neurological equipment, 
otherwise no person can exist. However, while it is possible to conceive of 
disembodied personhood (John Locke conceived of this, as do theological 
conceptions of the soul, and religious doctrines which hold that life continues 
after the death of the body), it is not only conceivable, but also arguably 
possible to have the relevant neurological equipment in place, yet lack the 
necessary psychological states for personhood (e.g. conscious fetuses, 
neonates and infants). In most cases of the personhood ‘marriage’, the 
neurological and psychological aspects mate for life; however, the physical
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body can be a ‘serial monogamist’ as in the cases o f disconnectivity described 
above. It is potentially-possible (although highly unlikely) that the same body 
(or more accurately, the same part of the same brain) could support a plurality 
of ‘persons’ or ‘selves’ consecutively. If a disconnecting event or process 
occurs whereby one psychological package is replaced by another 
sufficiently-disconnected one, the neurological ‘seat’ of personhood can be 
said to have been simultaneously ‘widowed’ and ‘remarried’. In the case of a 
final, person-extinguishing event or process, like the progress of dementia, the 
body may be regarded as having been widowed once-and-for-all, since no 
new personality can form to replace that which has been extinguished.
Neither A (physical) nor B (psychological) or any B-variant (B l, B2, 
etc.) is the person on this account, only AB or AB1, or some such 
combination of the physical and psychological elements. Of course, this 
depends upon our taking a contributory or ‘constitutive’ view of the body (a 
view that physical elements help make up or constitute personhood) rather 
than a supportive view (a view that physical structures support personhood- 
relevant psychological states without themselves forming constituent parts of 
‘the person’). If we take a supportive view, then ‘the person’ is B, B l, B2 or 
B3.
From the above, we can identify at least 3 possible approaches to the 
role of the body in personhood: purely psychological approaches, which suffer 
from the problem of circularity; constitutive approaches, which avoid the 
circularity problem; and supporting approaches, which accept that 
embodiment is a necessary support to personhood, but is not constitutive of it.
An important distinction can be made at this point between theories of 
general personhood (theories that ask what makes an entity ‘a person’) and 
theories of particular personhood (theories that try to discover the criteria for 
what makes a particular individual who they are, for their personal identity). 
With this distinction in mind, it should now be possible to identify Kant, 
Frankfurt, Fletcher and Rawls as concerned with general personhood, and 
Parfit and Perry as concerned with particular personhood. Both senses of 
‘personhood’ are relevant to the present discussion. General personhood has 
obvious relevance, since if we can establish criteria for full moral status and
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take the term ‘person’ to signify a particular level o f moral status, then this 
will have implications in the maternal/foetal context. Theories about particular 
personhood are salient here too, insofar as they are concerned with 
establishing the criteria for continuing personal identity over time; such 
theories may be able to shed light on whether persons are sufficiently 
connected, in a morally-relevant way, to their predecessor-selves in the early 
stages of human development, that we can extend their current personhood. 
Since the most robust theories of particular personhood build on Parfit’s 
contention that the criterion for continuing personal identity is psychological 
connectivity, and since, on this analysis, it is unlikely that we could establish 
sufficient connectivity between an adult and the foetus it developed from to 
call the foetus ‘the same person’ as the adult, any attempt to claim that the 
foetus is a ‘person’ would have to overcome this difficulty, as well as 
successfully arguing against the criteria for general personhood which would 
exclude the foetus.
Even if we decide ultimately that personhood is inadequate as a basic 
sortal term and unable to determine the moral status of beings, and even if we 
conclude that anyway, the foetus cannot qualify as a ‘person’ in any 
meaningful sense, these two senses of ‘personhood’ are helpful nonetheless in 
focusing our attention on questions which help us arrive at a better 
understanding of how helpful the concept of personhood really is, and what 
function it is capable of performing in our analysis of moral status issues.
3.4.1.3. Personhood-relevant properties and the concept o f  a ‘life worth 
living ’
The question of whether and how the body is significant in personhood theory 
hints at another, related question: the question of the relationship between 
persons and their lives. As we have seen, most proponents o f personhood as a 
determinant of full moral status posit rationality, autonomy, self-awareness, or 
consciousness (by which they usually mean something more than mere 
sentience) as ‘personhood-relevant properties’. It is possible to reveal the 
circularity of such concepts now, by considering a familiar question involving
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personhood at the end of life: does a terminally-ill patient who is still rational, 
autonomous and self-aware have the right to voluntary euthanasia?
According to personhood theory itself, anyone who still possesses the 
qualities o f rationality, autonomy and self-awareness is unequivocally ‘a 
person’; to suggest otherwise would constitute what Warren would term a 
‘personhood plus’ position -  a departure from the thesis that possession o f the 
‘personhood-relevant properties’ alone is sufficient to endow an entity with 
ultimate value. Accordingly, then, personhood proponents are obliged to 
recognize the ultimate moral value of the entity in the situation described 
above. Is that entity’s wish to exercise a ‘right’ that will cause her death a 
reasonable position? More specifically, is the right claimed a morally- 
defensible one? On the face of it, it would seem that an entity which is 
rational, autonomous and self-aware is unreasonable in wishing for its own 
demise, since (according to personhood theory at least) in wishing for this it is 
wishing for the destruction of something of ultimate value. It would appear 
objectively-unreasonable, then, that anyone who could reasonably be 
considered a ‘locus of rights’ would wish to die, and to claim that such a 
desire could be the subject of a ‘right’ would appear equally unreasonable, 
since such a ‘right’ is incapable of moral justification.
Nevertheless, personhood theorists often do talk of a ‘right to die’, 
apparently without perceiving any incoherence or contradiction in the 
juxtaposition of the rationality and autonomy inherent in the very notion o f a 
‘right’ with the idea of a ‘life not worth living’. One possible explanation is 
that personhood theorists are assuming the conceptual separability o f persons 
and their lives. Although personhood theorists do not offer explicit arguments 
for this dualism, it seems to underlie the very notion of a ‘right to die’, which 
simultaneously accords the status of rights-bearer in recognition o f the 
ultimate value o f the person, and acknowledges as reasonable that person’s 
belief that their life is significantly lacking in value. A conceptual dualism 
between the person and their life could achieve this without incoherence; 
however, the question remains of whether such a conceptual separation can be 
sustained.
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The renowned case of Mrs. Dianne Pretty260 is a particularly pertinent case in 
point. Mrs. Pretty was terminally ill with a neurological illness (motor 
neurone disease) which left her rationality and mental acuity unaffected, yet 
claimed a right to assistance in ending her life based upon other, admittedly 
severe, impairments to her quality of life. Personhood-based approaches to 
moral status cite a variety of factors, usually any or a combination of 
rationality, autonomy and self-awareness, as the characteristics that demarcate 
the category of beings to whom we may accord the ultimate level of moral 
status, that of person. That Dianne Pretty possessed all of these characteristics 
was not in question. Any claim that her life was not worth living was obliged 
accordingly to cite other criteria as sine qua non for a life worth living. It is 
probably safe to assume that no one would claim that someone in Dianne 
Pretty’s position lacks moral status, or even ultimate moral status; indeed, 
claims like those about Mrs. Pretty’s right to die frequently appeal for their 
justification to the notion that a person in her position must be allowed to be 
master of his or her own destiny by virtue o f  their ultimate moral status. So 
far, then, we can say that on a ‘personhood only’ account of moral status, 
Dianne Pretty qualified as a person. If such a life may be ended, then, it is not 
for lack of moral value. Perhaps we may even say that the converse is true. 
But this position is contradictory and gives rise to what I will term ‘the 
personhood paradox’, consisting of two distinct contradictions.
The first contradiction can be summarised as follows: can we say that 
if  a being possesses criteria x, y, and z, it is of ultimate value and deserves the 
utmost protection, yet simultaneously claim that we ought not to interfere if  
such a being wishes to destroy itself? First, I will examine the problems this 
question poses for voluntary euthanasia (and assisted suicide) and then I will 
consider what it may mean in cases where a competent adult patient wishes to 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Voluntary euthanasia cannot avoid the first contradiction, since 
authentic voluntariness cannot exist in the absence of rationality, autonomy 
and self-awareness, and the presence of these characteristics is sufficient, on 
most accounts, to denote personhood, or ultimate value. What if we attempt to
260 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 2 F.L.R. 45
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circumvent the problem using the rationale that a being of ultimate value 
ought to have complete freedom to determine the parameters o f his or her own 
existence, including the authority to determine the conditions under which it 
deems life to be intolerable? This must also fail, for the following reasons.
First, none of us has such absolute and unfettered freedom. Even on a 
day-to-day basis we are forced to compromise regularly and frequently upon a 
range of issues ranging from the mundane (we cannot purchase the brand of 
toothpaste we prefer because the local supermarket has run out, or cannot 
express ourselves as we would wish to because the clothes we want to wear 
are too expensive for us to afford) to the more serious (we may oppose 
abortion vehemently on moral grounds, but be forced, nonetheless, to 
facilitate its provision through payment of our taxes because we live in a 
democracy).
Second, there is a circularity involved in defining what qualifies as 
‘rational choice’. Certain choices which an adult of otherwise sound mind 
may wish to make will be deemed irrational, and the adult’s freedom may 
even be curtailed on the grounds that he or she is not competent to choose. As 
such, rationality is a fragile state, and, should it produce an unwelcome or 
unpopular choice, may instantly be revoked, the ‘undesirability’ of the choice 
in question weighing as evidence that rationality was absent in the first place. 
In the context of legalised voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide, this may 
mean that, where judges agreed that the patient’s quality of life was truly 
intolerable, the request would be granted; conversely, where the court 
disagreed with the patient’s subjective valuing of his or her own quality of 
life, the request would be denied.
It may of course be argued that all of this is mere speculation, since 
neither voluntary euthanasia nor assisted suicide is yet lawful in the United 
Kingdom, and indeed it is speculation; however, suspicions that courts would 
resort to ‘objective’ judgments about quality of life in adjudicating requests 
for voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide are substantiated when we look at 
the case law regarding the rights of patients to refuse medical treatment.261
2611 describe value-judgments by the courts about quality o f life as ‘objective’ only in the 
sense that they are not value-judgments made by patients themselves about the quality o f  their
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The comparatively recent case of ‘Ms. B’ seems to clarify and confirm the 
legal position regarding refusals of life-sustaining treatment. In that case, a 
woman who was left tetraplegic and unable to breathe independently 
following a spinal haemorrhage, and who wished effect to be given to her 
withdrawal o f consent to the artificial ventilation which was keeping her alive, 
won the right to have her wishes enacted. In that case, the patient had lost 
none of her mental acuity -  she was clearly ‘a person’ in the sense that she 
was rational, self-aware, and capable of making and expressing decisions 
autonomously. The judge in the case, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, said of 
Ms. B:
‘Her wishes were clear and well-expressed. She had clearly done a 
considerable amount of investigation and was extremely well- 
informed about her condition. She has ... a considerable degree of 
insight into the problems caused to the Hospital clinicians and nursing 
staff by her decision not to remain on artificial ventilation. She is, in 
my judgment, an exceptionally impressive witness. Subject to the 
crucial evidence of the consultant psychiatrists, she appears to me to 
demonstrate a very high standard o f mental competence, intelligence 
and ability.,263
Under the present law, then, it may seem that we can and do say, in some 
circumstances -  certainly with regard to the refusal of medical treatment - that 
we ought not to interfere if a being of ultimate value wishes to destroy itself. 
Ms. B was clearly such a being, yet her subjective valuing of her quality of 
life as ‘intolerable’ was given effect by the court. The crucial question is why: 
was it simply because the court, irrespective of its own value judgment, was 
determined to respect the autonomous wishes of a competent adult patient? If 
so, then we could expect the court to give effect to any life-threatening 
treatment decision taken by a competent adult patient. A reading of the case- 
law, however, reveals that, although courts purport to enshrine patient
lives to them; I do not mean to imply that there is necessarily anything qualitatively 
‘objective’ about such value-judgments by the courts.
262 B v An NHS Hospital Trust (2002) 2 All E.R. 449
263 Per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss at paragraph 53, emphasis added.
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autonomy as a central value in medical law -  capable o f trumping even the 
privileged ‘sanctity of life’ doctrine264 - in practice, the fact that autonomy 
depends necessarily upon the concept of capacity allows the courts to avoid 
‘undesirable’ outcomes.
Despite Lord Donaldson’s ringing endorsement of patient autonomy in
'yf.c
the case of Re T (Adult: Refusal o f Medical Treatment) , where he upheld 
the ‘absolute right’ of adult patients to refuse consent to medical treatment 
irrespective of ‘whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, or 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent’ , the right to refuse treatment is 
contingent, inevitably, on the crucial concept of capacity, and subsequent case 
law has demonstrated the willingness of the courts to manipulate this concept 
in order to avoid giving effect to decisions which are felt to be too irrational. 
In the now-notorious ‘enforced caesarian section’ cases of the 1990s, the 
courts showed themselves to be alarmingly willing to order caesareans despite 
a patient’s refusal to consent267. This often involved questioning the mental 
capacity of the women involved.
Although the case of St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S268 appears 
to resolve the controversy in favour of patient autonomy by holding that 
‘while pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of the pregnant 
woman it does not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to 
undergo medical treatment’ , this is still assuming that the patient in 
question possesses the capacity to give or refuse her consent. In Re MB , where 
the rhetoric in support of patient autonomy was equally strong, the caesarian 
was ordered anyway on the grounds that this patient lacked the necessary 
capacity. As Margaret Brazier has observed, ‘[i]n practice the temptation to 
seek grounds to find her capacity to be impaired is great...In Re MB  Butler- 
Sloss LJ suggested a woman might suffer temporary incapacity induced by 
fear, confusion, shock, pain or drugs. Finding any of these factors in childbirth
264 Hoffmann L.J.’s judgment in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 at 827-827 
suggests that, in a conflict between the two principles (sanctity o f life and patient autonomy), 
patient autonomy ought to prevail.
265 [1993] Fam. 95
266 Ibid. at 113
267 See, in particular, Re S  [1992] 4 All ER 671, and Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 
FLR 426
268 See supra note 62
269 Ibid. at 692
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will not be hard.’270 I would suggest that the same, or similar, could be said of 
the end-of-life context. Patients who are terminally ill, in chronic pain, or 
facing a life o f vastly reduced quality -  the circumstances in which requests 
for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are most likely to be made -  we 
are also likely to find one or all of fear, confusion, pain or drugs. Moreover, 
we may be more likely to encounter certain additional factors affecting 
capacity, such as depression, in the end-of-life context than in the context of 
childbirth.
What all o f this suggests is that, despite the rhetoric of patient choice, 
autonomy and self-determination which characterises personhood proponents’ 
advocacy of voluntary euthanasia, the rights which are theoretically ascribed 
to persons are, in practice, either observed or withheld on the basis of 
‘objective’ judgments about quality of life. In adjudicating end-of-life cases 
involving either refusal of treatment, or (in the future) voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, such ‘objective’ judgments are inevitable. We may 
therefore wish to consider whether it is desirable to have court-endorsed views 
about quality of life. What might the impact of this be for those who have the 
same or similar quality of life to patients whose subjective valuing o f their 
lives as ‘intolerable’ has been objectively ‘approved’ by the courts? To have a 
quality of life which the courts have declared it is reasonable not to value, and 
yet to wish the continuation of one’s own existence, might prove a dangerous 
position to occupy. Faced with treating patients who have ‘lives that it is 
reasonable not to value’, is it not likely that hospital trusts might raise 
questions regarding the rationing of scarce resources and the desirability of 
expending them on the maintenance of such lives? If one is actually living an 
‘objectively’ valueless life, is it far-fetched to suppose that one may 
experience this as a kind of pressure tantamount to a ‘duty to die’?
The second contradiction is the erroneous assumption of the 
conceptual separability of a subject and his or her life. Personhood-only 
accounts of moral status can support Dianne Pretty’s ‘right-to-die’ only by 
separating the value of the person from the value of the life she wishes to end. 
This is so because, as shown above, Dianne Pretty’s personhood could be
270 Margaret Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law  (3rd edn.) (London: Penguin, 2003) at 
395
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established clearly by reference to all o f the central criteria of mainstream 
personhood models; but more than this, her personhood was presumed by the 
very notion that she could be the bearer of a right which depends on the 
autonomous exercise of a deliberate and informed choice. As such, unless we 
abandon ‘personhood only’ and progress to some form o f ‘personhood plus’ 
model, we are faced with a schism -  a dichotomy between the value of a 
being and the value o f that being’s life. Is this dichotomy supportable?
3.4.1.4. Persons and their lives
The attempt at separation implicit in the concept of a ‘right to die’ seems 
inherently problematic, since it seems unlikely that a person can exist except 
in the context of a biological life. As we have seen, John Locke’s conception 
of personhood as a purely psychological construct has been superseded by the 
work of Parfit, Perry and others, since purely-psychological theories of 
personhood encounter grave problems of circularity which are solved only by 
conceiving of persons as essentially embodied. In any case, notions that the 
‘person’ could survive the end of the physical body’s biological life occur 
only in the context of theological theories of ensoulment, and religious 
doctrines of life-after-death; it is doubtful that any contemporary proponent of 
personhood as a purely-psychological phenomenon could advance any claim 
that biological life is not necessary for the survival of ‘the person’, without 
recourse to ensoulment and related concepts. As such, therefore, all 
mainstream theories of personhood accept that the person depends, for its 
survival, upon the persistence of biological life, and this is true whether such 
theories regard the body as constituent, or merely supportive, of personhood.
If we accept that persons cannot exist outwith the context o f their 
lives, then we can proceed to ask: what are the implications o f the ultimate 
value of the person for the value of the life on which it depends for existence? 
I propose that if  (as personhood theory claims) the person has ultimate 
intrinsic value, then the life of a person must have ultimate instrumental 
value, even if  it has minimal intrinsic value. Thus, although the circumstances 
of living may be painful, difficult, unhappy, or even miserable, the life itself
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must as a matter of logical consistency be o f ultimate value if the person is of 
ultimate value. Unless personhood proponents accept this, they commit 
themselves to scalar version of personhood. We will see, under heading 3.5. 
below, that some personhood theorists argue for degrees or gradations of 
personhood. This position usually proceeds from the basis that ‘personhood- 
relevant properties’, whatever we take these to be, themselves admit of 
degrees, such that ‘threshold’ approaches to personhood will inevitably be 
arbitrary. But scalar notions of personhood make sense only when they argue 
for recognizing differing degrees of personhood according to the presence of 
personhood-relevant properties in differing degrees.
Unless proponents of personhood are prepared to argue for the 
conceptual separability of persons and their lives -  an argument which will be 
very difficult to make convincingly, for the reasons set out above -  they are 
forced to make the claim that a life which possesses all of the ‘personhood- 
relevant properties’ might nonetheless be reasonably judged to be valueless 
by the person whose life it is. This is what I have termed the ‘personhood 
paradox’. That the courts are equally susceptible to the paradox is illustrated 
in the case of Ms. B. The only way to defend the decision in that case against 
the charge that it is paradoxical is to cast the net more widely so that the 
process of valuing life takes into account not only the personhood-relevant 
properties themselves, but other, extrinsic ‘quality of life’ considerations -  in 
other words, to adopt a ‘personhood plus’ approach to moral status.
To argue that we ought to regard some persons as more intrinsically- 
valuable than others on the basis of non-intrinsic properties like quality o f life, 
rather than on the basis of the degree to which such entities possess 
rationality, autonomy, self-awareness, or whatever the personhood-relevant 
properties are taken to be, is not only bad philosophy (ascribing intrinsic value 
on the basis of extrinsic factors), it is also at odds with personhood theory 
itself. Moreover, it may make for dangerous jurisprudence. It may well be 
argued that these are not reasons to resist moves to legalise euthanasia or 
assisted suicide. Rather, it may be claimed, they are reasons to take such 
decision-making out of the hands of the judiciary, by enacting legislation 
which sets clear parameters within which the ‘right to die’ can operate, rather 
than leaving the courts to set such limits.
84
I would respond by saying that the ‘personhood paradox’ is as relevant 
a consideration in legislating such issues as it is in adjudicating them. Any 
statutory right to voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide must avoid the 
paradox in one of the only two ways possible: either by making the highly 
problematic claim that persons and their lives can be evaluated separately, or 
by claiming that ‘personhood’ is not sufficient to establish that a life has 
ultimate value, but that other, extrinsic factors are also necessary before it 
would be unreasonable to regard a life as being of minimal value, or no value 
at all. I have already indicated that it would be dangerous (in the sense that it 
would be difficult to avoid arbitrary line-drawing), and incompatible with 
personhood theory itself, to introduce ‘extra’ criteria for an ‘ultimately 
valuable life’ over and above the personhood-relevant properties themselves. 
If judicially-endorsed conceptions of what counts as a ‘life worth living’ are 
undesirable, then conceptions endorsed by the legislature can hardly be less 
so. But there is also a practical problem: since no legislation, however well- 
drafted, could possibly anticipate all o f the various circumstances that the end- 
of-life context can yield, it would inevitably fall to the courts to interpret the 
legislation in ‘hard cases’, o f which there would undoubtedly be many. As 
such, legislation would not alter the fact that much of the job of deciding 
whether or not a particular person was reasonable in wishing an end to his or 
her life would still be undertaken by the courts.
3.4.1.5. Rights and non-persons
Any being that does not possess personhood-relevant properties is not an 
appropriate bearer of rights, including the ‘right to die’, according to 
personhood theory. It would therefore be inappropriate to withdraw or 
withhold treatment, or indeed to intervene deliberately to end life, on the basis 
of any ‘rights’ - to respect, dignity, or suchlike. Personhood theory provides 
that non-persons are not the kind of entities to which such terms can properly 
be applied. Although transitivity of respect for the feelings and moral beliefs 
of relatives and loved ones might be morally-significant in such cases, it is 
unlikely that such concerns could be sufficiently weighty to justify the 
continued use of resources which might otherwise be redirected toward the
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care and treatment of persons. Admittedly, it is unclear how all of the various 
morally-relevant considerations which pertain in such a case ought to be 
calculated and weighed; however, the one thing which does seem clear 
according to theories of personhood is that the value of a person’s life 
outweighs the needs and interests of non-persons in the case o f conflict.
As such, there should be no agonizing about whether to withhold or 
withdraw treatment from non-persons; according to personhood proponents’ 
own moral schema, treatment should routinely and habitually be refused or 
discontinued, since medical staff have a moral duty to those patients who are 
still persons not to waste scarce resources on non-persons. Moreover, if 
intervention to end life is more cost-effective than ending life ‘passively’, and 
if it causes less suffering to patients who, although non-persons, are still 
sentient to some degree, then there is also a moral duty to end life deliberately 
and actively. Such action is not only morally-permissible, but morally- 
obligatory.
3.4.1.6. Implications o f  the inseparability ofpersons and their lives
The interrelatedness of persons and their lives, as well as their bodies, lends 
appeal to what may be termed situated-agency theories; theories which attach 
ultimate moral status, not to persons, but to ‘subjects-of-a-life’ (Tom Regan), 
‘biographical life’ (James Rachels), ‘authors of a narrative’ (Alasdair 
MacIntyre), and so on. Such theories do not idolise a group o f mental 
capacities in isolation, but emphasize the continuity of the personal and social 
context as inextricable from the value of the entity it contextualizes. The 
‘subject’ or ‘author’ is unimaginable without the ‘life’ or ‘narrative’. One 
advantage of such an approach might be continuity, since the 
life/narrative/biography is ongoing even when the entity is not 
rational/autonomous/ self-aware. Disadvantages might include that some of 
these categories expand the moral community in a way that is impractical and 
intuitively unacceptable; subjecthood-of-a-life could include not only ‘higher 
mammals’, but probably all mammals and perhaps even lower vertebrates! 
Authorship-of-a-narrative, on the other hand, seems to imply personhood­
relevant qualities, and might offer a more ‘situated’ version of personhood
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theory, a middle ground between personhood and subjecthood-of-a-life. 
However, all such accounts may, like personhood, be open to criticisms of 
functionalism (failure to separate the ontological status o f ‘being’ from the 
activity o f functioning-as).
I do not wish at this point to advocate any particular situated-agency 
theory as an approach to answering important questions o f moral status (many 
such notions, such as MacIntyre’s concept of authorship, were not expounded 
as such). I mean only to suggest that such approaches may be on the right 
vector insofar as they provide a basis for theorizing the moral status o f entities 
in the context of the lives such entities inhabit.
3.5. Degrees of Personhood
Both the general and particular senses of personhood can be shown to be 
scalar in nature, in other words, they admit of degrees. With regard to general 
personhood, many commentators have noted that the various properties taken 
by personhood theorists to be ‘personhood-relevant’ are all scalar properties. 
As David DeGrazia says: ‘At least most personhood-relevant properties are 
not all-or-nothing; indeed some of them (e.g., self-awareness) admit not only 
of different degrees, but also of different kinds. Many nonpersons possess 
some personhood-relevant properties to some extent.’271 Specifically, ‘self- 
awareness... is multidimensional and gradational. In other words, there are 
different kinds of self-awareness, and they come in degrees.’272 Similarly, 
‘other personhood-relevant properties that are no plausibly regarded as all-or- 
nothing are rationality, sociability, and the capacity for language; I would also 
add, more debatably, moral agency.’273
Although DeGrazia obviously regards moral agency as less clearly a 
scalar concept than other personhood-relevant properties, we can find 
evidence elsewhere that it is regarded as such. John Rawls, for example, posits 
criteria for personhood which are undeniably Kantian, describing persons as
271 DeGrazia, op. cit., at 316
272 Ibid. at 305
273 Ibid.
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• • 274rational beings with their own ends and a sense of justice. It is difficult to 
find any point on which this description differs from the ‘moral agency’ 
envisaged by Kant, yet Rawls has no hesitation in identifying his own criteria 
as scalar, or as he says, ‘range properties’.
Christian Perring also acknowledges that ‘rationality, capacity for 
language, and the possession of personality or emotions all admit of 
degrees.’275 He considers that of all the personhood-relevant properties, it is 
most difficult to demonstrate scalarity in the case of self-consciousness: ‘there
97 f \is some plausibility in the idea that it is an all-or-nothing category.’ 
Nevertheless, he recognises different kinds of self-consciousness. ‘Some 
notions equate self-consciousness with an almost sensory ability to perceive 
one’s self, as if one’s self were some kind of internal entity to be perceived 
with the mind’s eye. Other notions are richer, demanding an ability to reflect 
on one’s character and interactions with others.’277 He concludes that 
‘whatever version of the criterion one adopts, the amount of self-knowledge 
that one is capable of will vary with insight, experience and intellectual 
abilities. It is very hard to see how anyone might argue that the capacity for 
self-knowledge or self-awareness is all-or-nothing.’278
Given that none o f the relevant qualities can reasonably regarded as 
categorical, Perring argues, it makes no sense to continue treating personhood 
as an all-or-nothing status; we would do better to think about degrees of 
personhood. He reasons that ‘if  we were to insist that general personhood is 
all-or-nothing, and that there is some point in the spectrum which separates 
the two sides, with all cases on one side involving full personhood, and all 
cases on the other side involving zero personhood, then there are familiar 
problems with selecting where in the spectrum that transition point must be. I 
have already argued that all the plausible criteria of general personhood admit 
of degrees, so these will not provide any way to make the choice of the 
threshold any less arbitrary. So using an all-or-nothing concept of general
274 Rawls, op. cit.
275 Perring, op. cit., at 181
276 Ibid. at 182
277 Ibid.
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personhood would require inevitable arbitrariness. We can avoid such 
problems if we instead move to a graded notion of general personhood.’279
So how useful is this notion of scalar, or graded personhood? Perring 
argues that it revitalises the concept of personhood altogether by enabling it to 
avoid the problem of arbitrary thresholds. This avoidance is only achieved, 
however, if  we ring-fence the whole spectrum o f personhood for protection, 
granting moral status and the protections it brings with it to every entity which 
rates more than zero on the continuum of general personhood. We are 
accordingly on the horns of a dilemma: either we must decide when zero 
personhood evolves or crosses into minimal personhood, avoiding 
arbitrariness as we do so (for example, birth simply will not do as the point of 
transition, according to Perring, because it has nothing to do with the intrinsic 
properties of the entity in question), or we extend ‘full moral status’ to ‘full 
persons’ and lesser status (and less protection) to those entities with less 
general personhood (which could mean any of a number of things, from 
possession of fewer indicators, to possession of many of the relevant 
characteristics at a lower level than some other people -  how restricted the 
scope or level of personhood-relevant properties would have to be before 
lesser moral status was granted remains cloudy).
However, each of these alternatives involves simply relocating, not 
eliminating, the problem of arbitrariness. If the difference between full and 
partial personhood demarcates differences in moral status, and ultimately in 
rights and treatment, then what difference will it make to a being whether it 
lacks rights and status because it is ‘not a person’ or because it is ‘not enough 
of a person’? Here, the case of the foetus is illuminating. Given that there are 
those who currently argue for foetal personhood from the conception 
argument or some such, it is at least conceivable -  indeed, highly likely - that 
there would be plenty of commentators minded to place the foetus somewhere 
(i.e. above zero) on any continuum of graded personhood. Indeed, those 
writers who advocate according respect or even rights to the foetus would 
undoubtedly find it easier to argue that the foetus has some o f the relevant 
characteristics or qualities relevant to personhood, to some extent, than to
279 Ibid. at 185
89
argue what they currently do -  namely, that the foetus has enough in common 
with the human adult that it ought to be regarded as belonging to the same 
moral category, or moral community. Finding vestiges of personhood, 
precursors of full personhood, early human qualities, organic human 
individuality, genetic distinctiveness and so on, is undoubtedly an easier 
project, and while such findings frequently fail to persuade political and 
philosophical opponents that these characteristics render the foetus a ‘person’ 
in the all-or-nothing sense, they would undoubtedly succeed in propelling the 
foetus ‘onto the moral spectrum’ as it were; onto the continuum of 
personhood.
What would this success really accomplish, however? What rights or 
protections would ‘partial personhood’ afford? Even the sentient foetus has 
very little scope to suffer harm or enjoy benefit. Even if we construe ‘benefit’ 
to include long-term benefit rather than immediate pleasure or enjoyment, and 
‘harm’ to mean something not restricted to immediate pain, suffering, or 
feeling of loss, then the only way the foetus can receive benefit is to avoid 
physical harm or injury (other ‘benefits’ to the foetus such as reading stories 
and playing music to the foetus in utero are disputed, and the results cannot be 
observed until after birth, although when observed they may point to Parfitian 
connectivity between foetus and child). As such, many rights and protections 
would be meaningless to the foetus -  democratic rights, for example, or the 
right to refuse medical treatment. Based upon the limited capacity for benefit 
and harm described above, the only ‘rights’ appropriate to the foetus in any 
meaningful sense are rights not to be killed or injured, expressed positively as 
the right to life and the right to bodily integrity respectively.
It would seem that a scalar approach to personhood would lead, 
therefore, to a right to life for the foetus, either if  the line-drawing involves 
ring-fencing the whole continuum of personhood (which seems at odds with 
the very notion of -  and indeed, the point of - scalar personhood), or if  we 
take ‘partial persons’ to have ‘partial moral status’. To do otherwise would be 
to ignore whatever moral status a ‘partial person’ has. If the right to life is not 
extended to the foetus under a scalar model of personhood, then this calls into 
question the validity of grading personhood at all, as it would appear that 
there are no implications for practice. But the recognition of such a right need
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not mean that the life of the foetus is inviolable. Perring tells us that ‘almost 
no deontologists think that a right to life is absolute. There are circumstances 
under which the right can be trumped... I would claim that a way to factor in 
the degree of personhood is the circumstances under which the right can be 
trumped. The higher the degree of personhood, the more demanding those 
circumstances should be.’280 The adoption of a deliberately graded concept of 
personhood may help both to illuminate and to codify these circumstances, 
enabling us better to understand the nature of the right itself and its operation.
In the matemal/foetal context, this might mean turning our attention to 
determining which are the permissible reasons for terminating the life of a 
foetus. However, this gives the intrinsic properties of the foetus at best an 
indirect role in determining what may and may not be done to it. This seems 
to offend our intuitions about moral status in the same way as attempts to treat 
birth and viability as the criteria for personhood offend them; how can 
external factors such as reasons or motivations in the mind of the mother be 
central in determining what may or may not be done to another being, any 
more than other extrinsic factors such as the location of the foetus or the state 
of advancement of medical technology can determine such issues?
In the final analysis, therefore, even a scalar concept of personhood 
cannot seem to avoid the pitfall of arbitrary thresholds which dogs the all-or- 
nothing version of the concept. The two routes to implementing the gradation 
-  ring-fencing or graduated status -  each bring their own arbitrary thresholds, 
as the example of the foetus demonstrates. Ring-fencing the entire spectrum 
of personhood is philosophically incoherent within a scalar approach to 
personhood, as in reality it resembles nothing so much as a ridiculously wide 
all-or-nothing version of personhood. A gradation o f entitlements and 
immunities in line with the differing grades of moral status is the only 
alternative. Although it does not suffer from the philosophical incoherence of 
the former approach, it is problematic nonetheless. Moreover, in the context 
of the matemal/foetal relationship and termination o f pregnancy, it is hardly 
advancing the debate to claim that termination is morally-permissible because
280 Ibid. at 190-191
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the foetus is not enough of a person rather than making the familiar claim that 
it is not a person at all.
3.6. Additional Problems with the Concept of Personhood
We have already encountered several difficulties with the concept of 
personhood: the arbitrariness of all-or-nothing versions o f the concept; the 
inability of ‘scalar’ models to avoid this pitfall; also, the problems inherent in 
particular applications of the concept, such as ‘right to die’ cases, and in the 
notional separability of persons and their lives generally. Now, I consider 
some of the other familiar criticisms of the concept, beginning with three of 
the main criticisms levelled by David DeGrazia.
3.6.1. The concept of personhood is arbitrary and unanalysable
This is the problem at which Peter Kreeft hints when he asks, ‘[w]hich 
features count as proof of personhood? Why? How do we decide? Who 
decides? What gives them that right? And how much of each feature is 
necessary for personhood? And who decides that, and why?’281
DeGrazia claims that the concept of personhood resists any kind of 
classical analysis: ‘Personhood is a vague concept that is not analyzable into 
necessary and sufficient conditions.’282 Singling out one quality for centrality
283 jin a unicriterial account of personhood ‘seems arbitrary’ to DeGrazia , and 
also to Clarke, who writes that ‘seemingly, singular concepts of “what is a 
person” are implausible.’284 Nevertheless, DeGrazia considers the possibility 
that one ‘superproperty’ may be able to draw together everything that matters 
about persons. If any property has this ability, he ponders, it is autonomy, 
which incorporates notions of self-awareness, free will and intentional agency. 
DeGrazia goes on to reject the pre-eminence accorded to autonomy in Kantian 
theories of personhood which emphasis autonomous (moral) agency: 
‘Autonomy does not seem necessary. No-one in the presence of a normal two
281 Kreeft, op. cit. at 15
282 DeGrazia, op. cit. at 301
283 Ibid. at 303
284 Clarke, op. cit. at 43
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or three year old human doubts their status as persons, but presumably many 
of them lack the sort of critical self-reflection needed for autonomy. Humans 
with moderate mental retardation also impress us as being persons but may 
well lack autonomy.’285
Given the failure to discover a satisfactory unicriterial account of 
personhood, how ought we to analyse a multicriterial version o f the concept? 
DeGrazia identifies three options. ‘Another strategy within the traditional 
spirit is to state a small number of allegedly necessary and sufficient 
conditions. But this approach also invites the charge of arbitrariness, for no 
short list of conditions seems authoritative. An alternative move would be to 
require all o f these [personhood relevant] properties. But this is surely too 
strong a requirement...At the other extreme, we might hold that having any 
one of these traits suffices for personhood. But this is far too inclusive.’286 
Following from these conclusions, DeGrazia decides, ultimately, that 
personhood is a Wittgensteinian cluster concept: ‘One might hold that a 
cluster of properties...are closely associated with personhood, but that the 
content of this concept is too imprecise for us to say that all, or some specified 
set, of them are strictly necessary.’287 But how does this help us to decide 
issues of moral status? DeGrazia considers the merits of a ‘pluralistic 
approach’ to using the cluster concept of personhood to decide such issues: ‘A 
pluralistic approach would be to require most of these properties for 
personhood (pluralistic because it allows each of several different clusters of 
properties to count as jointly sufficient). The idea driving this approach is that 
although personhood is unanalyzable, it is determinate in that there is an 
answer in every case as to whether someone is a person. This strategy quickly 
leads to trouble. For again, many of the properties in question admit of 
degrees and some even admit of different kinds.’288 The issue of the 
personhood-relevant properties as range properties, admitting of degrees, is 
something I will explore presently, but it is clear for now that DeGrazia 
regards the concept of personhood not only as unanalyzable, but as fatally 
indeterminate.
285 DeGrazia, op. cit. at 303
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3.6.2. The concept is vague and indeterminate
Another problem is the problem of deciding just how to apply the cluster 
concept pluralistically, yet in a deterministic way: ‘how should we understand 
the idea that a being must satisfy most of the conditions in the cluster? More 
than half? That would feel as ad hoc as any other possible interpretation....It 
is difficult to imagine a satisfactory interpretation of satisfying most of the 
conditions.’289 In another attempt to render personhood deterministic, 
DeGrazia considers Mary Midgley’s proposal that we adopt an ordinary- 
language approach. Midgley claims that in ‘ordinary’, i.e. unreflective, 
linguistic usage, the term ‘person’ is used coextensively with ‘human 
being’.290 To attempt to stretch the concept beyond this ordinary meaning, 
Midgley argues, is to rob it of much of its force. DeGrazia regards this as 
regressive, a ‘philosophical backpedal’, and resists such a move. ‘Even if  it is 
true that most people use the term “person” only in referring to human beings, 
it does not follow that “person” means “human”; this usage might reflect the 
limited real-life contexts in which one has applied the concept, rather than the 
concept’s boundaries.’291
In support of this, DeGrazia offers examples of non-human beings to 
whom the term ‘person’ might be applied without robbing it of meaning. The 
examples he gives include Spock from Star Trek, the apes in Planet o f  the 
Apes, the extraterrestrial in E.T., and supernatural beings like God, the Devil, 
angels, and so on. Not all of his examples of non-humans who might 
reasonably be regarded as persons are fictional or supernatural, however; he 
points out that:
it is beyond dispute that there have existed some very human-like 
individuals who were not members of our species -  most obviously, 
members of the hominid species Homo erectus. Whether they were 
(definite) persons or instead borderline persons intuitively seems to be
289 Ibid. at 306-307
290 Mary Midgley, ‘Bom Free, but Everywhere in Zoos’ (review o f  Paola Cavalieri and Peter 
Singer (eds.) The Great Ape Project (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), New York Times 
Book Review, 6/2/94 at 33
291 DeGrazia, op. cit. at 307
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a matter of what they were like, not a matter of which side of the 
species line they fell on... ‘Person’ cannot mean ‘human’ for at least 
the reason that some logically possible -  and perhaps some actual -
This is, at first glance, a very persuasive set o f counterarguments to Midgley’s 
ordinary-language approach to personhood. Note, however, that all of 
DeGrazia’s rebuttals could simply be interpreted as evidence that our ordinary 
usage of the word ‘person’ is wider than Midgley claims it is. It is not unlikely 
that people already speak quite ordinarily of Spock, God, and the Devil as 
‘persons’, and think of them as such. If we accept this, then DeGrazia has 
failed to show that the ordinary language use of ‘person’ is incapable of 
recognising personhood-relevant properties in non-human beings. He has, 
however, achieved something even better -  he has inadvertently shown that 
the ordinary language use of ‘person’ is not restricted to human beings, 
although it may place great emphasis on ‘human-like’ qualities and features. 
As such, it offers no greater determinism than any other version o f the 
concept, and indeed it may be said to embody an unreflective speciesism that 
more deliberative accounts would either avoid or seek to justify.
This finding of indeterminacy corroborates DeGrazia’s earlier 
argument that our ordinary use of ‘person’ tells us only about the term’s usual 
application, and not about the boundaries of the concept of personhood. We 
have no reason, therefore, to believe that Midgley’s account of personhood as 
coextensive with humanness would help us to determine the answers in 
borderline cases. We might well ask what the point would be in adopting as 
our moral standard a concept which is of no practical help precisely when we 
need guidance.
Furthermore, Midgley’s approach seems unconcerned with ‘what 
really matters’, morally, about ourselves and other beings. However difficult 
and unwieldy the concept of personhood might seem at times, it is surely no 
solution simply to conflate the troublesome concept of personhood with a 
more familiar, more accessible one, despite strong arguments that the two are
persons are not humans.292
292 Ibid. at 308
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conceptually quite different? If Midgley believes that it is humanity, and not 
personhood, which is morally-relevant, then surely she must hold that the term 
‘person’ has no moral significance other than that o f ‘human being’ and 
present her arguments in favour of restricting the moral community to 
humankind. It is difficult to see how, in the context o f such a theory, the 
concept o f personhood could have any independent moral significance at all, 
or could perform any role other than as an honorific term, or a synonym. As 
such, Midgley’s theory cannot properly be understood as a theory of 
personhood at all, and DeGrazia is right not to treat it as a realistic solution to 
the indeterminacy of personhood.
Next, DeGrazia considers S. F. Sapontzis’s contention that we can 
distinguish between a descriptive use of ‘person’ -  denoting all and only 
humans -  and a prescriptive sense which ‘identifies beings whose interests 
matter morally in their own right’293. Sapontzis argues that all sentient beings 
are ‘persons’ in the prescriptive sense, including fish. For Sapontzis, 
therefore, the concept of personhood does not denote a category of being with 
full, or superior, moral status; rather, all beings with any moral status are 
persons on his account.294 Since Sapontzis takes the prescriptive use of 
‘person’ to identify beings with ‘moral rights’, his account draws the moral 
community very widely indeed. DeGrazia agrees with Sapontzis that 
sentience entails some amount of moral status, but ultimately denies that the 
descriptive and prescriptive uses of the term ‘person’ are separable, as 
Sapontzis claims:
Even if the term ‘person’ is often used prescriptively, it is also at the 
same time used descriptively — to designate a certain kind o f being. If 
so, then we cannot tear apart the descriptive and prescriptive functions 
of this word as radically as Sapontzis does when he allows that 
metaphysical persons are just humans whereas moral persons are the 
entire set of sentient beings. To speak o f actual fish or snakes...as 
persons just seems incorrect, regardless o f our views about these
293 DeGrazia, op. cit. at 309
294 S. F. Sapontzis, ‘A Critique of Personhood’, Ethics 91 (1981) 608
96
animals’ moral status. This suggests that there is no purely prescriptive
sense of the term ‘person’.295
Just as Midgley’s thesis really takes humanity, not personhood, as the basis 
for ascribing moral status, Sapontzis’s is really a sentience-only, not a 
personhood-only, approach. I have already examined the merits of a 
sentience-based approach to moral status, and all of the same considerations 
apply. It is difficult not to agree with Kreeft’s opinion that ‘all the 
performance-qualifications adduced for personhood are difficult to measure 
objectively and with certainty. To use the unclear, not universally accepted, 
functionalist concept of personhood to decide the sharply controversial issue 
of who is a person and who may be killed is to try to clarify the obscure by the 
more obscure, obscuram per obscurius.’296
3.6.3. Personhood is descriptively redundant
DeGrazia contends that the concept of personhood performs no meaningful 
descriptive function. ‘Because personhood is closely associated with a cluster 
of properties the assertion that X is a person adds no descriptive content to the 
assertion that X has certain properties (to a sufficient degree); that is, 
personhood is descriptively redundant.’297 Although he regards the concept of 
personhood as vague, DeGrazia acknowledges that there may nevertheless be 
‘clear cases’ in which personhood is present unequivocally. Referring to 
personhood in such cases is not problematic, according to DeGrazia, but in 
borderline, or problematic cases, where the issue of the moral status o f the 
entity in question is controversial, he urges us to abandon the idea that 
references to personhood will help to solve the controversy, and instead refer 
to those properties which are taken to be constitutive of personhood: ‘In 
confronting moral issues regarding borderline persons -  such as apes,
295 Ibid.
296 Kreeft, op. cit. at 15
297 DeGrazia, op. cit. at 316
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dolphins and certain humans -  appealing to personhood is unhelpful; often it 
is helpful instead to appeal to specific personhood-relevant properties.’298
3.6.4. Personhood is functionalistic
Peter Kreeft defines functionalism as ‘defining a person by his or her 
functioning, or behavior.’299 Kreeft seems to suggest that the mistake of 
functionalism stems from an erroneous attempt to capture the essence of what 
makes us valuable by reference to the characteristics or qualities we possess. 
These characteristics and qualities may be significant insofar as they reveal us 
to be ultimately or intrinsically valuable beings, but it is a mistake to go on, on 
the basis of this observation, to attempt to construct a descriptive moral 
schema on the basis of them; to treat them as capable of sustaining a system of 
sorting and categorising beings’ moral status:
Common sense distinguishes between what one is and what one does, 
between being and functioning, thus between ‘being a person’ and 
‘functioning as a person’...Functioning as a person is a sign and an 
effect of being a person. It is because of what we are, because of our 
nature or essence or being, that we can and do function in these 
ways.300
On this argument, personhood is a sign of our moral status rather than a 
determinant of it; it is something we can observe rather than something we 
can establish, case-by-case, by the systematic application of criteria.
3.6.5. Personhood is relativistic
One of the criticisms levelled against sentience-based theories is Albert 
Schweitzer’s charge that human beings cannot be objective in their 
deliberations about the moral status of other species. Is personhood really any
299 Kreeft, op. cit. at 12
300 Ibid.
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more of an objective standard than sentience? An animal rights proponent 
might well complain that requirements for features like rationality, self- 
awareness, and autonomous agency simply reflect human beings valuing our 
own characteristics above all others, and practising speciesism. The fact that 
many proponents o f personhood (most famously Peter Singer) are keen to 
ascribe personhood also to nonhuman animals does not necessarily refute this 
charge; a possible response could be that there is nothing overly-objectivistic 
about ascribing status and value to those nonhuman animals who are closest to 
human beings in behaviour and characteristics, because and insofar as they 
resemble us in some way(s). This kind of relativism can lead to dangerous 
narcissism, as Kreeft warns: ‘When it is in the self-interest of certain people to 
kill certain other people...the killers will simply define their victims as non­
persons by pointing out that they do not meet certain criteria. Who determines 
the criteria? Those in power, of course. Whenever personhood is defined 
functionally, the dividing line between persons and non-persons will be based 
on a decision by those in power, a decision of will. Such a decision, given the 
fallennness of human nature, will inevitably be based on self-interest. Where 
there is an interest in killing persons, they will be defined as non-persons.’301
3.6.6. Personhood is abstract and overly-rationalistic
The concept of personhood is open to criticism from those who claim that it is 
too heavily dependent on rationality, at the expense of intuitive, relational and 
emotional dimensions of morality. Feminists, for example, may claim that 
personhood embodies the masculinist ‘ethic of right’ rather than the feminine 
‘ethic of care’. Kantian notions of ‘rational, autonomous agency’ are 
particularly vulnerable to this claim. An associated claims might be that 
personhood is isolated not only from ‘moral sense’, the intuitive and 
emotional dimension of morality, but it is also abstracted in the sense that it 
fails to correspond to ordinary moral situations, debated largely in terms of 
far-fetched thought experiments, and as such is more an academic fetish than 
a reliable source of normative guidance.
301 Ibid. at 7
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3.6.7. Personhood accounts of moral status restrict the membership of the
moral community too severely
Warren objects to Kant’s maximalist theory o f personhood on the basis that, 
‘If we take literally Kant’s claim that only rational beings are ends in 
themselves, then it would seem to follow that human beings who are not
• 'JA ')moral agents are not ends in themselves, and do not have moral rights.’ On 
a strict interpretation, Kant’s community of moral equals would exclude all 
nonhuman animals, infants and young children, and severely mentally- 
disabled human beings. Warren concludes, therefore, that “rational moral 
agency is unsatisfactory in practice as the sole criterion for full moral status, 
because it can all too readily be used to deny moral status to persons whom 
others consider less than fully rational.”
Many similar objections revolve around the exclusion o f infants, 
young children and human beings with mental impairment from the moral 
community: “The person argument makes difficult the question o f why it 
would be wrong to kill newborn babies; yet, without quite knowing why, 
somehow the idea of injuring the newborn is not acceptable.’303
3.7. Peter Singer: personhood and preference utilitarianism
Peter Singer is one theorist for whom the idea of injuring a newborn human 
being is not necessarily morally repugnant. Singer takes ‘person’ to mean 
something other than ‘human being’, insisting that the two terms are not 
coextensive. ‘There could be a person who is not a member o f our species. 
There could also be members of our species who are not persons. The word 
“person” has its origin in the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in 
classical drama. By putting on masks the actor signified that they were acting 
a role. Subsequently “person” came to mean one who plays a role in life, one 
who is an agent. According to the Oxford Dictionary, one of the current 
meanings of the term is “a self-conscious or rational being”. This sense has
302 Warren, op. cit. at 101
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impeccable philosophical precedents. John Locke defines a person as “A 
thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.” This 
definition makes “person” close to what Fletcher meant by “human”, except 
that it selects two crucial characteristics -  rationality and self-consciousness -  
as the core o f the concept.’304
Singer goes on to ask, ‘is there special value in the life o f a rational
o n e
and self-conscious being, as distinct from a being that is merely sentient?’
He answers his own question in the affirmative: ‘For preference utilitarians, 
taking the life of a person will normally be worse than taking the life of some 
other being, since persons are highly future-oriented in their preferences. To 
kill a person is therefore, normally, to violate not just one, but a wide range of 
the most central and significant preferences a being can have. Very often, it 
will make nonsense of everything that the victim has been trying to do in the 
past days, months, or even years. In contrast, beings who cannot see 
themselves as entities with a future cannot have any preferences about their 
own future existence.’
Later, Singer distinguishes his own position, preference utilitarianism, 
from other theories that value the lives of persons. He seeks in particular to 
distinguish between his own theory, which values preferences, and Kantian 
theories of personhood, which value autonomy: ‘There is a strand o f ethical 
thought, associated with Kant but including many modem writers who are not 
Kantians, according to which respect for autonomy is a basic moral principle. 
By “autonomy” is meant the capacity to choose, to make and act on one’s own 
decisions. Rational and self-conscious beings presumably have this ability, 
whereas beings who cannot consider the alternatives open to them are not 
capable o f choosing in the required sense and hence cannot be
107autonomous.’
Singer makes clear that autonomy is not the deciding criterion in his 
own ethical framework: ‘Not everyone agrees that respect for autonomy is a 
basic moral principle or a valid moral principle at all. Utilitarians do not
304 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, at 87
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respect autonomy for its own sake, although they might give great weight to a 
person’s desire to go on living, either in a preference utilitarian way, or as 
evidence that the person’s life was on the whole a happy one. But if  we are 
preference utilitarians we must allow that a desire to go on living can be 
outweighed by other desires, and if we are classical utilitarians we must 
recognise that people may be utterly mistaken in their expectations of 
happiness. So a utilitarian, in objecting to the killing of a person, cannot place 
the same stress on autonomy as those who take respect for autonomy as an 
independent moral principle.’308
Upon analysis, these passages reveal the tension at the heart of 
Singer’s exposition of personhood. As the name suggests, preference 
utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical system. The concept of personhood, 
on the other hand, is inescapably objectivistic, and as such is arguably more at 
home in deontological frameworks like those of Kant and his heirs. There is a 
difficulty inherent in Singer’s attempt to marry the objectivism of personhood 
with preference utilitarian-consequentialism, and this becomes compelling 
when we come to examine the precise role of personhood, and its operation, 
within Singer’s theory.
The tension derives from Singer’s attempt to utilise the concept of 
personhood to include some entities, and exclude others, from the community 
of moral equals, and to found this appeal to personhood on interests, rather 
than on the usual values of autonomy, rationality, and self-awareness/self- 
consciousness. Although Singer does not say so explicitly, his regard for 
personhood seems to derive from the view that only persons can have the 
strongest type of interests in his particular utilitarian framework, namely 
preferences. Highly sentient non-persons may also be more or less capable of 
holding preferences, but it seems clear that the preferences o f persons will be 
given the most weight, since these preferences generally reflect subtler and 
more reasoned interests.
In any case, Singer does not conceive of personhood as anything other 
than an objective value; this can be deduced from his insistence upon ‘the 
notion of universality’: ‘When we are reasoning about ethics, we are using
308 Ibid. at 99-100
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concepts that...take us beyond our own personal interest, or even the interest 
of some sectional group.’309 Elsewhere, he tells us that: ‘[ejthics takes a 
universal point o f view...Ethics requires us to go beyond “I” and “you” to the 
universal law, the universalizable judgment, the standpoint of the impartial
310spectator or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it.’ If  personhood 
has any moral significance for Singer at all, then (and he claims that it does), 
it has the significance of an objective and universal status-marker, deduced (in 
Singer’s philosophy) from the strength of the preferences o f highly- or 
maximally-sentient beings, and our according moral obligation not to interfere 
with such beings’ attempts at preference-satisfaction.
Singer gives an example to illustrate his support o f euthanasia for 
some very severely-disabled infants. In it, he argues that parents may be 
justified in killing a neonate or infant bom with haemophilia, if  the child’s 
death would mean that the parents were more likely to bear another, healthier 
child, bom without haemophilia, which would live a less limited life and 
would thus have the potential for greater overall preference satisfaction than 
would the haemophiliac. A couple of points arise from this. First, however, it 
is worth considering the following: if it could somehow be demonstrated that 
the act of euthanasia proposed in this example would (or would be 
significantly likely to) substantially increase overall preference satisfaction in 
the manner described, then surely the killing would be required, not merely 
justified, by the morality of preference utilitarianism, since it takes overall 
preference-satisfaction to be the ultimate moral value?
Singer is arguing, in effect, that the life of an existing human being 
(albeit a non-person incapable of preferences) should (although admittedly he 
only says can) be sacrificed in order to advance the interests o f another, as yet 
nonexistent, being. The justification is said to be the achievement of greater 
overall preference-satisfaction. However, what we are really dealing with in 
this example is the potential for greater preference-satisfaction, since the 
individual whose preferences might better be satisfied is not yet conceived, so 
is arguably not even a ‘potential person’ -  surely a ‘future person’ at best. In 
any case, since it has no physical existence we are not dealing with a being-
309 Ibid. at 79
310 Ibid. at 11-12
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with-potential-for-personhood, as in the case of the cytoblast, conceptus, 
embryo, or foetus; the ‘future person’ whose interests Singer seems to be 
regarding as prematurely morally-significant has no existence yet at all, 
except in the imagination of a preference utilitarian. This is problematic for a 
couple of reasons.
First, Singer’s treatment of prebom human life does not attach moral 
relevance to potential/future personhood. This is not simply because prebom 
human entities are presumed to lack the level of consciousness necessary for 
inferences of ‘interest’, or even because the ‘interests’ o f a conscious foetus 
may conflict with those o f an adult human female whose personhood is 
unquestionable. Rather, Singer’s treatment of prebom entities proceeds upon 
the insistence, central to all mainstream theories of personhood, that 
ascriptions of moral status must refer to an entity’s current nature in terms of 
its current features and/or capabilities, and not rely upon projections or 
predictions about future characteristics or capacities. Is not this widely- 
accepted intuition even more compelling in the above example, where we are 
discussing an imagined entity which has no present existence of any kind?
Second, future children may never be bom. All kinds of external 
factors may come into play, affecting the possibility of future conception and 
birth. For example, what if future children are also bom haemophiliac (the 
condition is hereditary, after all)? Should the parents continue killing their 
children until they get a healthy one? Or does the possibility that they might 
bear haemophiliac children and be morally-obliged to kill them oblige them to 
avoid producing children at all? Does it matter whether any o f these factors 
are mere possibilities, or real likelihoods?
Preference utilitarianism suffers from some of the same difficulties as 
other brands of utilitarianism, among these being lack o f moral guidance 
(perhaps the point most graphically-illustrated by the above example) and lack 
of applicability to real life because of a failure to take account of 
emotional/intuitive dimensions of morality. The latter is poignantly illustrated 
in an example from Singer’s own life; his elderly mother developed 
Alzheimer’s disease and, in Singerian terms, gradually moved out of 
personhood. Despite the demands of his avowed preference utilitarianism, 
Singer could not bring himself to treat his mother as a non-person and arrange
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the painless death which would enable the resources wasted on her personal 
care to be redirected, as his morality required. Singer regarded this as a 
failure, his prejudice in favour of a (former?) family member representing 
moral weakness. Other philosophers might welcome the introduction of 
normal caring responses into Singer’s experience, and hope that he 
incorporates such experience into his future philosophising on ethical matters, 
considering that it improves preference utilitarianism’s chances o f real-life 
applicability by providing a hitherto missing ingredient of moral sentiment.
Another difficulty with preference utilitarianism is its apparently 
contradictory conclusions. Singer, a vegetarian, believes that even those 
animals which are non-persons (he proposes that great apes and other higher 
mammals are persons) have interests in not being caged and slaughtered 
(irrespective of additional cruelty, or the nature of the slaughtering method) 
which are sufficiently strong to generate an obligation on persons not to use 
them in this way (for food, clothing, etcetera). So whereas these interests of 
non-persons are sufficient to place moral obligations on persons which 
undoubtedly conflict with certain preferences of persons for eating meat or 
wearing fur or leather, the interests of other non-persons, for example, the 
interest of a haemophiliac infant in not being killed, are not, in Singer’s 
opinion, sufficient to obligate parents who would prefer not to raise such a 
child, or who would prefer another, healthier child. This notwithstanding, as 
we have seen, the projected, potential interests of as yet unconceived (i.e. 
nonexistent) ‘future children’ are cited in the preference utilitarian ‘calculus’ 
(a calculus at least as unscientific as the ‘greatest happiness’ calculus of 
classical utilitarianism), and may even be considered sufficient to justify (or 
oblige) the killing of an existing human being.
Surely this is a profound inconsistency — perhaps even a fatal one? It 
might even be considered justification-after-the-fact, designed to 
accommodate whichever preference suits the parents. Surely ‘preference 
utilitarianism’, if it is to qualify as an ethical theory at all, must mean 
something more than simply ‘do whatever you prefer’? If an entity is a 
person, all of his or her preferences would seem to be morally-relevant, as we 
might expect. However, the interest of non-persons in life itself is only 
occasionally capable of placing obligations on persons. All of this hints at an
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inequality in Singer’s theory -  a form of ‘reverse speciesism’ wherein 
nonhuman non-persons are treated preferentially to human non-persons!
Although the subject will be addressed comprehensively in the 
chapters to follow, it is interesting to ask at this stage how the Singerian 
position would deal with the claim that wide-ranging access to abortion is a 
necessary part o f a woman’s right to control over their own bodies. Such 
claims hold that women, as persons with rationality and autonomy, ought to 
be able to make choices about their bodies and to control their own fertility 
and reproduction without being curtailed by the supposed interests of foetuses, 
embryos, or products of conception. Singer, as we have seen, is not committed 
to valuing autonomy as an independent moral value. With regard to bodily 
integrity, he holds that persons ought not to be free to wear or eat anything 
which has necessitated the killing of nonhuman animals, destroying lives in 
which (Singer believes) the beings killed had some kind of interest. Singer is 
prepared, therefore, to recognize some limits to the premise that we can do 
whatever we want with our own bodies -  but on what basis? Perhaps the basis 
is the belief that the sheer numbers of animals destroyed by the meat and 
fashion industries is such as to generate interests of a quantity (although not of 
a quality) sufficient to impose moral obligations on persons. Since Singer 
believes there is nothing morally wrong in killing an infant (so long as the 
killing advances the cause of overall preference-satisfaction), it is 
unsurprising to learn that he also sees nothing wrong in the destruction of an 
embryo or foetus (even a healthy, late-term foetus) providing that precautions 
appropriate to the likelihood of sentience are in place (for example, to render 
the procedure as painless as possible for a sentient foetus), and once again, 
that overall preference-satisfaction will be advanced (or is reasonably likely to 
be advanced).
3.8. ‘Person’ as an honorific term
In Brainstorms31 \  Daniel Dennett ponders: ‘It might turn out...that the 
concept of a person is only a free floating honorific that we are all happy to
311 Dennett, op. cit.
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apply to ourselves, and to others as the spirit moves us, guided by our
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emotions, aesthetic sensibilities, considerations of policy and the like.’ 
Ultimately, Dennett dismisses the notion of ‘person’ as an honorific title, but 
other philosophers have pursued it. We know that there are many problems 
with the notion of personhood as a sortal term, able to resolve difficult 
questions of moral status. For this reason, some commentators have wondered 
whether we ought to abandon the idea that the concept can provide right 
answers in hard cases, and use the term ‘person’ only in cases where it applies 
clearly and uncontroversially. David DeGrazia, for example, writes: ‘I suggest 
that we drop the concept of personhood, except where who counts as a person
'j  i  i
is not in question.’ DeGrazia advocates abandoning personhood as a sortal
concept, instead appealing directly to the relevant properties or qualities in 
borderline cases where moral status is an issue. However, he says, ‘there is a 
use of “person” that is helpful or at least innocuous: the equation of persons 
with humans for real-life situations where who counts as persons is not in
, 3 1 4question.
In The Achievement o f Personhood, Goodenough explains the 
rationale for the use of ‘person’ as an honorific: ‘To regard a candidate entity 
as a person is to regard it as a participant in the “network o f rights and duties” 
on a par with oneself. Dennettian notions of rationality, linguistic ability, etc. 
could support or justify the admission of a candidate into our community but 
are not themselves strictly definitional in the matter. One way of viewing this 
use of “person” is indeed to see it as a kind o f honorific. Perhaps it might 
more accurately be regarded as a status- or achievement-term, a kind of 
confirmation of membership. ’315
This treats personhood as a term of confirmation or validation, applied 
a posteriori, with rights, moral status etc. already established, rather than as a 
basic sortal term describing a basis upon which status and rights are ascribed. 
This honorific, or confirmatory sense of ‘person’ would avoid many of the 
problems associated with personhood as a sortal; ‘if  person is not a genuine 
sortal then we have no need to look for any exact sets of necessary and
312 Ibid. at 268
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sufficient conditions. Conditions for the application of a membership- or 
achievement-term can be much looser without the term ceasing to have any 
practical use.’ This honorific use also acknowledges that when we call 
another being a person, we are recognising their similarity to ourselves in 
terms of shared characteristics or relationships. Although this might be 
regarded as undesirable narcissism if it were being taken as a basis for 
ascribing or withholding moral status, it is rendered benign in the context of 
the honorific use of ‘person’, since no being will suffer as a result of its lack 
of similarity. ‘Most of us intuitively reach for examples o f our fellow human- 
beings when we consider the notion of personhood. This intuition is respected 
without being allowed to define our usage here.’317
Moreover, although the traditional connection between personhood 
and humanity is accommodated, and although use of the honorific inevitably 
entails recognition of some similarity between oneself and the entity under 
consideration, Goodenough claims that ‘person’, in the honorific sense, can be 
applied to non-humans, providing that they are ‘sufficiently like us’, and 
exhibit ‘forms of behaviour that we can sensibly regard as intentional and 
which manifest some sense of regarding us and our behaviour in the same
318 •way.’ Certain creatures may, of course, fail to meet whatever criteria are 
employed for determining moral status, but this will have nothing to do with 
the honorific use of ‘person’.
Goodenough explains how the honorific sense o f ‘person’ would 
operate by referring to another familiar honorific term, that o f ‘genius’:
‘[PJerson’ may be applied to that entity which satisfies personhood- 
conditions (in paradigm cases, a human being) or more loosely to the 
set of properties, the psychology or personality, which in some sense 
defines or makes obvious of something that it is a person. It does not 
follow that ‘person’.. .has any kind of ontological independence, any
Ibid. at 154316
317 Ibid. at 155
318 Ibid.
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more than a genius for musical composition could exist independently 
of someone or something being or having such a genius.319
A possible response to this might be the following: if  a person produces one 
(or a few) examples of genius, but cannot do so consistently, then we may be 
reluctant to call that person a genius, saying instead that what they had done 
or produced was genius, or an example of it. As such, genius would be an 
activity rather than an honorific. Could personhood be viewed similarly?
The notion of ‘person’ as an honorific title also helps to clarify the 
issue of embodiment. We know that, following Locke, many proponents of 
personhood regard the person as an essentially-psychological entity, and view 
the physical body as supportive, rather than constitutive of personhood. In its 
honorific sense, at least, personhood is necessarily embodied, as Goodenough 
acknowledges:
if ‘person’ denotes a status like ‘genius’ then we cannot grant it 
separate identity-conditions. Whatever has separate identity-conditions 
has a separate ontological status, and personhood cannot exist without 
that which is a person any more than geniushood could exist without 
that which is a genius. Whatever ontological status persons have is
• 320entirely parasitic upon the ontological status of human beings.
In a fascinating article entitled Paradigms and Personhood321, Edmund Erde 
adopts a highly illuminating alternative to both the sortal and the honorific 
uses of ‘person’. Adopting a Wittgensteinian analysis, he distinguishes 
between different uses o f the term ‘person’ in different ‘language games’ -  
law, psychology and medicine. This enables him to explain why there are so 
many different accounts of personhood, why we are concerned with both 
general and particular personhood, and why ‘person’ has different meanings 
in different contexts. The ‘legal model’ of personhood identified by Erde most
319 Ibid. at 149
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321 Edmund Erde, ‘Paradigms and Personhood: A Deepening o f  the Dilemmas in Ethics and 
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closely resembles Kantian ‘rational autonomous agency’. The ‘psychological 
model’ turns out, unsurprisingly, to be concerned with particular personhood, 
and with the subjective psychological states o f individuals. Erde’s analysis 
does not treat personhood as a mere honorific or achievement-marker -  rather, 
it acknowledges that the term has real descriptive meanings particular to the 
contexts in which it is used. Neither does he treat personhood as a basic sortal 
term, or expect it to carry the normative burden o f resolving controversies 
about moral status. The language-game analysis has intuitive appeal, at least 
for me. It manages to reconcile the intuition that ‘person’ means something 
with the awareness that it is woefully inadequate as the basis for a theory of 
moral status. It allows us to say that a ‘person’ is different things in different 
contexts, and that this plurality of meanings does not rob it o f its descriptive 
force.
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4. The Consent Model of Pregnancy
4.1. Introduction
In the first chapter, I identified the need for a new legal paradigm of 
pregnancy and examined the problems inherent in the current orthodox view 
of pregnancy as a ‘matemal/foetal conflict’. The second and third chapters 
looked behind the rhetoric of conflict to the conflict model’s philosophical 
foundations, demonstrating that the model’s dependence on issues of intrinsic 
moral status -  and particularly, theories of ‘personhood’ -  renders it incapable 
of providing a coherent approach to adjudication of pregnancy issues. In this 
chapter, I examine the most comprehensive attempt so far to discover an 
alternative to the orthodox conflict model. Eileen McDonagh’s ‘consent 
model’ is essentially a refined version of the orthodox model, but it is 
remarkable in that it claims to provide a legal justification for abortion rights 
while conceding the issue of foetal personhood.
Having claimed, in previous chapters, that attempts to adjudicate 
matemal/foetal issues by referring to moral and metaphysical notions of status 
and personhood are bound to result in inconsistency and contradiction, I now 
ask whether it is possible, as McDonagh claims it is, to adopt a purely legal 
approach to ‘foetal personhood’ which is capable o f sustaining a framework 
for adjudication without collapsing into metaphysics and all of the problems 
that would entail.
4.2. Eileen McDonagh’s consent-based approach
In her groundbreaking book, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice 
to Consent?22 Eileen McDonagh claims that the analysis of abortion rights 
which she proposes is able to resolve the troublesome question of the moral 
status of the foetus by focusing not on what the foetus is, but rather on what 
the foetus does in pregnancy.323 McDonagh’s first major claim is that the
322 Eileen L. McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent (New 
York: OUP, 1996)
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foetus causes pregnancy when it implants in the woman’s uterus.324 
McDonagh uses this a starting point from which to claim that the right to 
abortion is not, as has traditionally been thought, simply an example of a 
woman’s right to decisional autonomy; while decisional autonomy is certainly 
an element of the right, McDonagh claims, the key element in abortion rights 
is the right to bodily integrity.325 Thus, for McDonagh, abortion rights are 
important not only because they are an example o f a woman’s right to make 
autonomous decisions about her life, but also, and more centrally, because the 
right to seek an abortion is essential in order to protect women’s bodily 
integrity -  the control they have over what happens to their bodies. In other 
words, for McDonagh, the abortion issue is not only about choice, it is 
primarily an issue of consent.
The fatal error which has dogged the abortion debate so far, according 
to McDonagh, has been a failure to identify the foetus as the coercer in
326pregnancy. It is the foetus that actually makes the woman pregnant when it 
implants itself in her uterus. Abortion is not, therefore, about expelling the 
coercive imposition of masculine force on the body of a woman; rather, what 
is rejected and expelled in the act of abortion is foetal force, since the foetus is 
the coercive agent:
A woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy does not wish to expel 
the coercive imposition of a man on her body. On the contrary, she 
seeks to expel the coercive imposition o f the one and only agent
327capable of making her pregnant: the fetus.
McDonagh claims that the foetus is the direct cause o f pregnancy, whether or 
not the act of sexual intercourse which preceded the pregnancy was 
consensual. In other words, if  a woman consents to have sexual intercourse 
with a man and subsequently becomes pregnant, the direct and immediate 
cause of pregnancy is not the act of sexual intercourse but the foetus’ 
implantation in her uterus. Accordingly, neither the woman nor the man can
324
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be said to have ‘caused’ her to become pregnant. Similarly, if pregnancy 
occurs subsequent to an act of nonconsensual intercourse (a rape), the rapist 
has not caused the woman’s pregnancy on McDonagh’s model -  he has 
inflicted a grave harm on her, but the additional harm of any resulting 
pregnancy is not his responsibility, but that o f the foetus. Clearly, in such 
circumstances, the woman cannot be held responsible at any stage of the 
sequence of events from conception to implantation; certainly not on 
McDonagh’s model and arguably not on any other. McDonagh writes:
Founding abortion rights on the conditions under which sexual 
intercourse occurs prior to pregnancy misses the point. The fetus is the 
direct cause of pregnancy, and if it makes a woman pregnant without 
her consent, it severely violates her bodily integrity and liberty.328
McDonagh’s second and third major claims are (i) that pregnancy constitutes 
a massive intrusion on a woman’s body, even where the pregnancy is 
‘medically normal’ (i.e. not subject to any of the additional medical risks 
which may accompany pregnancy), and (ii) that woman have a right to state 
assistance in exercising their right to refuse consent to such an invasion of 
their bodies.
Even in a medically normal pregnancy, the fetus massively intrudes on 
a woman’s body and expropriates her liberty. If a woman does not 
consent to this transformation and use of her body, the fetus’s 
imposition constitutes injuries sufficient to justify the use of deadly 
force to stop it.329
Of paramount importance here is the point McDonagh makes about the use of 
‘deadly force’. The severity and scale of the intrusion which pregnancy 
represents entitles women to take extreme measures to bring it to an end, even 
where the only way to do so is by killing the foetus-intruder. McDonagh
claims that in so arguing, she is simply regarding the foetus the way any other 
intruder would be regarded, even those intruders who are, irrefutably, persons.
Since no bom people have a right to intrude massively on the body of 
another...to the extent that the state stops people from harming others 
by intruding on their bodies and liberty, including the mentally 
incompetent or those in dire need o f the body parts o f others, similarly 
the state must stop fetuses that intmde on women’s bodies without 
their consent.330
This, according to McDonagh, is how her thesis is able to ‘break the abortion 
deadlock’; she is prepared to concede the issue of foetal personhood to the 
anti-abortion lobby, believing that she can construct an argument for abortion 
rights which holds good even i f  we accept, for the sake of argument, that 
foetuses are persons and ought to be treated by the law in the same way that 
bom persons are treated. ‘Even if the fetus were a person’, she writes, ‘a 
woman is justified in killing it because of what it does to her when it imposes 
wrongful pregnancy’.331 This is so because ‘even if  the fetus is constmcted to 
be a person, it gains no right to take over a woman’s body against her will. 
And if and when it does, she has a right to say no, whatever might be her 
reasons for activating that right.’332
Throughout, McDonagh’s focus is on what the foetus does, not what 
the foetus z‘s.333 It is the foetus’s action in causing pregnancy which justifies 
the right of a woman to terminate its life in order to terminate its intrusion/ 
violence.334 The ‘fundamental liberty’ at stake in all o f this, according to 
McDonagh, is the right of a woman to consent to any pregnancy relationship 
she might become involved in.335 McDonagh suggests that the reason this 
right has been ignored, both historically and more recently in the legal and 
political debates over abortion right, is that our culture has traditionally 
reserved norms o f self-defence for men, while simultaneously ascribing norms
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of self-sacrifice to women, such that the extreme physical subjugation and 
coercion that pregnancy represents has been ‘normalised’ and has not been 
recognised for what it is -  a massive violence justifying the use of deadly 
force in self-defence.
Having introduced McDonagh’s arguments briefly, I now propose to 
draw out certain strands in order to subject her claims, and the counter-claims 
of her critics, to critical analysis. Despite the use o f these headings for the 
purpose of analysis, however, it is helpful to observe here that McDonagh’s 
argument is reducible to two broad stages: in the first stage, she claims that 
women have a right to consent to the pregnancy relationship; in the second 
stage, she claims that the state should intervene to protect women from the 
massive intrusion of non-consensual pregnancy. These stages provide the 
basis for McDonagh to argue that not only do women have a fundamental 
right to abortion, based on the right to bodily integrity; they also have a 
fundamental right to state assistance (primarily in the form of funding) to 
enable them to exercise the first right, and this second fundamental right is 
based upon (indeed, is an example of) the right to self-defence.
In the meantime, however, the main headings under which I will 
conduct the main body of my examination are: causation & the separation of 
pregnancy from sexual intercourse; consent; wrongful pregnancy and self- 
defence; and finally what McDonagh calls the ‘politics of consent’. It will 
then be possible to consider the main advantages and disadvantages of the 
consent-based approach, as articulated by McDonagh and her critics.
4.2.1. Causation and the separation of pregnancy from sexual intercourse
McDonagh describes the association between pregnancy and sexual 
intercourse as ‘virtually a cultural icon’,337 implying that it is a mere construct 
bom of our traditional ways o f thinking about gender and reproduction. She 
notes that the Supreme Court has maintained the view that sex causes 
pregnancy, ‘or more specifically, that a man’s impregnation of a woman
336 Ibid. at 19
337 Ibid. at 26
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causes her pregnant condition’338 -  a view which, as we know, McDonagh 
wishes to challenge and replace with her own view that the ‘direct cause’ of 
pregnancy is the foetus, the ‘agent’ which causes a woman to become 
pregnant when it implants itself in her body.
Whereas a man can cause a woman to engage in a sexual relationship 
with him, a man cannot cause a woman’s body to change from a 
nonpregnant to a pregnant condition; the only entity that can do that is 
a fertilized ovum when it implants itself in a woman’s uterus.
The action of the man in ‘moving sperm into a woman’s body’ during the act 
of intercourse, McDonagh says, certainly represents one o f the ‘factual 
sequential links’ leading to pregnancy.340 However, she maintains, this action 
‘is not the legal, or most important, cause of a woman’s pregnant condition. It 
is merely a preceding factual cause that puts her at risk for becoming 
pregnant.’341 This is so because ‘pregnancy is a condition that follows 
absolutely from the presence of a fertilized ovum in a woman’s body’342. This 
being the case, she continues, ‘we can identify the fertilized ovum to be the 
cause of the woman’s pregnancy state.’343 In the eyes of the law, too, 
therefore, ‘the fertilized ovum should be the legal cause o f a woman’s
>344pregnancy.
One of the most striking features o f McDonagh’s model is her 
extensive use of analogy to illustrate and support her claims, and she makes 
one such analogy when she remarks that ‘men and women who contribute to a 
situation in which it is foreseeable that a fertilized ovum might be conceived 
and make a woman pregnant against her will contribute no more to the 
woman’s harm than does a woman who walks down a street late at night 
contribute to her own rape...m en and women who engage in sexual 
intercourse, therefore, cannot be held as contributing to the harm imposed on
338 Ibid. at 27
339 Ibid. at 40
340 Ibid. at 42
341 Ibid., emphasis added.
342 Ibid. at 41
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid. at 43
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a woman by a fertilized ovum making her pregnant without consent.’ 345 
However, it is clear that this likening o f pregnancy to rape is more than just a 
useful analogy for McDonagh. She clearly regards the two scenarios, rape and 
pregnancy, as sharing significant factual and legal similarities when she writes 
that ‘a fetus making a woman pregnant without consent is similar to a rapist 
intruding upon and taking another’s body in pursuit o f his own interest, to the 
detriment of the woman’s interests... ’346
McDonagh believes that one of the strengths o f this approach is that it 
treats the foetus as an agent, an individual with an existence separate from that 
of the pregnant woman -  a point over which advocates and opponents of 
abortion rights have traditionally clashed:
Many advocates for abortion rights stoutly claim that there is no body 
other than the woman’s to consider in the abortion issue. They 
adamantly reject depictions of the fertilized ovum as an entity separate 
from the woman, much less as an entity with the full status of a 
person. Their assumption is that such a construction of the fetus 
undermines women’s autonomy by implying that fetuses have interests 
separate from their mothers and that those interests are grounds for 
restricting abortion, which destroys the fetus.347
McDonagh points out, however, that ‘the view of the fetus as an entity 
separate from its mother, with its own interests, already is solidly embedded 
in Supreme Court reasoning about abortion rights.’348 She cites the case of 
Roe v Wade,349 in which the Court ruled that the foetus is not a born person 
(but not that it is not a person at all) and that when a woman becomes 
pregnant, her privacy is ‘no longer sole’, thus granting the foetus ‘an identity
350and body separate from the pregnant woman’s’ , and also the case of
351Planned Parenthood o f Southeast Pennsylvania v Casey , in which it was
345 Ibid. at 44
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid. at 47
348 Ibid.
349 410 U.S. 113(1973)
350 McDonagh, op. cit. at 47, citing Roe at 159
351 112 S. Ct 2791 (1992)
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held that the state has ‘legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting the life of the fetus’.352
The case law shows, according to McDonagh, that insofar as the 
consent model countenances the possibility o f foetal personhood, it does 
nothing new constitutionally, since a strong argument could be advanced, on 
the basis o f existing authority, that a foetus is already effectively a person 
under the Constitution. As I shall discuss when I come to consider criticisms 
of the consent-based model, McDonagh may have difficulty convincing 
abortion-rights advocates that her model does not compound what most of 
them would presumably regard as the jurisprudential ‘mistake’ o f treating the 
foetus as a person, thereby threatening to entrench a legal view o f the foetus 
which may damage the ‘fundamental liberty’ at stake in the abortion debate.
McDonagh will also face challenges from others who claim that her 
approach treats the foetus merely as a cipher which is burdened with all the 
negative features and consequences o f personality and individuality, without 
attracting any of the positive entitlements or protections which ought to 
accompany personhood. Still more criticism will centre on the fact that, by 
separating pregnancy from the sexual act, McDonagh severs the connection 
between men and reproduction, thereby removing any legal basis for holding 
them socially or financially responsible for the children that are genetically 
‘theirs’. But, as I will show, causation is far from the only controversial part 
of McDonagh’s thesis.
4.2.2. Consent
McDonagh complains that the persistent failure o f commentators and judges 
to identify the foetus as the cause o f pregnancy has meant that the right of a 
woman to consent to a pregnancy relationship with a fertilized ovum is ‘the 
one type of consent that is completely missing from the abortion debate’. 353 
Since the notion of ‘consent to pregnancy’ is so new to the debate, it requires 
a definition, and McDonagh obliges with the following:
352 McDonagh, op. cit. at 47, citing Casey at 2804
353 McDonagh, op. cit. at 60
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In the context of pregnancy, consent means a woman’s explicit 
willingness, based on her choice between resistance and assent, for the 
fertilized ovum to implant itself and cause her body to change from a 
nonpregnant to a pregnant condition.354
One major difference between a consent-based approach and the traditional, 
choice-based approach to abortion rights is that ‘whereas choice refers to only 
one individual, consent necessarily refers to a relationship between two 
entities, both of whom have at least some attributes of a person.’355 However, 
choice and consent are complementary, not rival elements in the justification 
of abortion rights, as McDonagh acknowledges, saying that ‘consent is...built 
on choice. There can be no valid consent unless there is valid choice; when 
choices are undermined, so, too, is the value of consent.’356 In other words, 
consent must be authentic, and not coerced, if  it is really to protect bodily 
integrity and sovereignty in the way McDonagh envisages.
So how is ‘consent to pregnancy’ to be constituted? We must be able 
to distinguish between consensual and nonconsenual (‘wrongful’) pregnancy 
in order to know when the use of deadly force is justified, so it will be 
necessary to have a definition not only of consent, as seen above, but also of 
its expression. This definition will be crucial, since without it there is no way 
to distinguish between justified and wrongful uses o f deadly force in abortion. 
McDonagh tells us that ‘the act of seeking abortion stands for a woman’s lack 
of consent to be pregnant since abortion is a procedure that terminates 
pregnancy. A woman who chooses abortion, therefore, is not submitting to a 
pregnancy caused by a fetus. To the contrary, she is stopping a fetus from 
making her pregnant by having an abortion.’357 On McDonagh’s analysis, 
then, we need no other evidence than that a woman is seeking an abortion in 
order to reach the conclusion that the pregnancy is ‘wrongful’ and the use of 
deadly force is justified. Definitionally, the wish to abort equals lack of 
consent, which in turn equals the right to abort. The wish to abort and the 
right to abort are the same thing for McDonagh, therefore, because of the way
356 Ibid. at 64
357 Ibid.
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the concept of consent operates in her analysis. She justifies this by reprising 
her likening o f pregnancy to rape:
A woman must have a right to consent to the way in which a man 
necessarily intrudes on her body and liberty when he has a sexual 
relationship with her, and so, too, must she have a comparable right to 
consent to how a fetus necessarily intrudes on her body and liberty 
when it has a pregnancy relationship with her.358
Developing her earlier argument that the foetus, and not the act o f sexual 
intercourse, is the real, ‘direct’ cause of pregnancy, McDonagh explains what 
this discovery means in the context of consent:
Sexual intercourse merely causes the risk that pregnancy will occur, 
and consent to engage in sexual intercourse with a man, for any and all 
fertile women, implies consent to expose oneself to that risk. Consent 
to expose oneself to the risk that one will be injuredby a private party, 
however, is not a legal proxy for consent to the actual 
injuries...consent to jog alone in Central Park does not stand as a 
proxy for consent to be mugged and raped, should others so attack
359you.
The view that women who have sex ‘cause’ their own subsequent 
pregnancies, and thereby consent to them, is not only factually wrong, 
according to McDonagh; it is also pernicious, a reflection o f ‘our Puritan 
heritage or our dominant, bourgeois middle-class morality’ within which the 
notion of purely recreational sex is anathema.360 On such a view, she explains, 
‘enabling a woman who has consented to sexual intercourse to have an 
abortion does nothing more than facilitate her escape from the utterly just 
punishment of a subsequent pregnancy.’361 Among the advantages of the
358 Ibid. at 64
359 Ibid. at 66
360 Ibid. at 65
361 Ibid.
1 2 0
consent-based model is that it allows us to free ourselves from this oppressive, 
patriarchal view of sexuality.
The nature o f the foetal ‘attack’ in pregnancy is also relevant to the 
notion o f consent, since McDonagh’s approach depends not only on 
establishing the need for consent, but also on justifying the use of the kind of 
deadly force which the law permits us to use in order to repel an attack by a 
bom person. On pages 69-73, McDonagh describes in some detail the 
‘aggression’ perpetrated by the foetus upon the woman during pregnancy, and 
the extent to which the presence of the foetus alters and debilitates her body, 
which is of course compounded if the pregnancy is medically complicated or 
abnormal. This ‘quantitative intrusion’ would in itself justify the use o f deadly 
force, since the law would permit citizens to refuse to submit their bodies to 
such intmsion by a bom person, even where refusal would mean that person’s 
death.362
However, McDonagh also identifies what she calls ‘qualitative 
intmsion’363, the way in which even a medically-normal pregnancy curtails 
the freedom of the pregnant woman, arguing, in effect, that even without the 
transformations and intmsions that occur internally, causing medical risk to 
the woman, the ‘intmsion’ constituted by the curtailment of the woman’s 
freedom would suffice equally well to justify the use of deadly force. 
‘Qualitative intmsion’ means that the foetus ‘wholly controls her body, her 
freedom of movement, and her reproductive services. When a woman is 
pregnant, as the Court noted [in Roe], her privacy is no longer sole. She can 
go nowhere without the fetus; every action she takes necessarily includes the 
fetus. The circulation of her blood, her endocrine system, and her menstmal 
cycles are now controlled by the fetus. As long as it maintains a pregnant 
condition in her body, for up to nine months she is decidedly not let alone, and 
she is anything but free.’364 McDonagh explains what she sees as the legal 
significance of this feature o f pregnancy by way of another analogy:
362 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense o f  Abortion’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 
(1971) 47-66. This is the celebrated ‘violinist’ article in which Thomson argues that just as we 
have the right to be ‘bad Samaritans’ and refuse to donate our bodies to sustain other bom  
individuals, women have a similar right to refuse to sustain a foetus.
363 McDonagh, op. cit. at 73
364 Ibid. at 74-75
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If a woman does not consent to pregnancy, the fetus has intruded on 
her liberty in a way similar to that o f a kidnapper or slave-master.365
Continuing the slavery analogy, McDonagh tells us that ‘without consent, the 
totality of the fetus’s appropriation of a woman’s body is...involuntary 
servitude if  not enslavement.. .it becomes the master o f her body and her 
liberty, putting her in the position of its slave.’
Because the ‘harms’ / ‘intrusions’ inherent in pregnancy are ongoing 
throughout the gestation of the foetus, the consent required to render 
pregnancy benign, rather than wrongful, must also be ongoing. Thus, on the 
consent-based account of abortion rights, not only does the right to consent 
enable a woman to refuse consent upon the initial discovery that she is 
pregnant; it also entails an ongoing right to withdraw her consent at any stage 
during the pregnancy:
Pregnancy is an ongoing condition, defined by a series of ways in 
which the implanted, fertilized ovum initiates and maintains massive 
bodily changes in the woman. As such, it requires not just a woman’s 
initial consent but also her ongoing consent in tandem with the 
ongoing bodily changes involved.367
The many criticisms of McDonagh’s analysis of consent, her contrasting of 
consensual/benign and non-consensual/wrongful pregnancy, and her various 
analogies will be discussed fully later in this chapter. At this point I will 
address only the problem which McDonagh herself has anticipated with the 
operation of consent in her model, namely the claim that the woman’s right to 
withhold or withdraw her consent to the pregnancy relationship is undermined 
by the existence of a duty o f care owed to the foetus. Her pre-emptive 
response begins with the persuasive point that, ‘though parents do have a duty 
to care for their children, that duty does not include the use, or taking, of a
365 Ibid. at 75
366 Ibid. at 76
367 Ibid. at 79
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parent’s body.’ For example, a parent could not be compelled by law, on 
the basis of his or her parental duty, to donate a kidney -  or even to give blood 
- in order to save the life of one of her children. Such an intrusion on the 
parent’s body could not be both coercive and legitimate, even for such a 
worthy cause. Accordingly, McDonagh argues, ‘a woman is thus not bound 
by parental duty to give the kind of care that includes donating her body to a 
fertilized ovum, as its parent, even if the fertilized ovum is thought to have the 
same status as a bom child.’ McDonagh concludes from all this analogising 
that, ‘rather than a duty o f care, [a woman] has a right to defend herself 
against the fetus’s serious injury.’370
It is worth noting here, almost as an aside, that McDonagh complicates 
her argument unnecessarily when she writes that ‘before assessing a woman’s 
duty of care, we must first assess whether she has consented to the pregnancy
' * ? 371initially’. This is a somewhat anomalous statement, given that McDonagh 
has already posited the right of a woman to withdraw her consent at any stage 
during pregnancy. This is corroborated later, when she tells us that ‘a woman 
who initially consents to be pregnant might change her mind as the pregnancy 
progresses and she experiences its bodily alterations.’372 If she does change 
her mind, she can exercise the right to withdraw her consent at that point, 
since ‘even if a woman has consented to be pregnant at one time, this does not 
bind her to continue to consent in the future, given the changing conditions 
defining the experience of pregnancy.’373
As McDonagh formulates the right to consent, therefore, the existence 
of prior consent would seem to be completely irrelevant to the question of 
ongoing consensuality; if  prior consent might imply a duty o f care, then the 
right to withdraw consent at any time is undermined, inevitably. Since the 
problematic statement is anomalous, I will take McDonagh’s authentic 
meaning to be that which is overwhelmingly suggested by the vast majority of 
her argument; namely, that pregnancy imposes no duty of care, and that a 
previously-consenting pregnant woman need only seek an abortion in order
368 Ibid. at 78
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
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for the withdrawal of consent to be established and for the right to abortion as 
self-defence to be justified.
4.2.3. Wrongful pregnancy and self-defence
The term ‘wrongful pregnancy’ is not an invention o f McDonagh’s; it is 
already a well-established legal concept, which usually refers to the 
imposition of pregnancy on a woman against her will -  although the 
defending party is usually a rapist, sometimes a doctor who has performed a 
failed sterilisation procedure, and never a foetus. Nonetheless, the U.S. case 
law on wrongful pregnancy seems to support McDonagh’s claim that the law 
ought to regard pregnancy as an injury. In the case o f Stressel v Stroup374,
which involved a failed sterilisation, pregnancy was held to be a legal injury.
A Wisconsin rape statute lists pregnancy along with disease as a factor 
indicative of the ‘extent of injury’ suffered as a result o f rape.375 Most notably, 
a series of Californian cases upholds the idea that a medically-normal 
pregnancy is sufficiently harmful to a woman’s interests to be regarded as a 
legal injury if it occurs as a consequence of rape. These cases describe 
pregnancy variously as ‘great bodily injury’376, ‘a high level of injury’377, 
‘significant and substantial bodily injury or damage’378, and ‘injury 
significantly and substantially beyond that necessarily present in the 
commission of an act of [rape]’379. Elsewhere, pregnancy has been included in 
a category of ‘personal injury’ alongside pain, disease, and disfigurement.380
As mentioned above, all o f this case law blames a man, not a foetus, 
for inflicting the injury o f nonconsensual pregnancy. According to 
McDonagh’s argument on causation, the law has failed for a long time to 
identify the foetus as a cause o f pregnancy at all, let alone the direct cause, or 
the cause of wrongful pregnancy in particular. McDonagh uses the language 
of coercion to emphasise the culpability of the foetus in wrongful pregnancy,
374 316, S.E. 2d 155 (Ga. 1984) at 85-86
375 Wisconsin Rape Shield Law, § 972.11
376 People v Mcllvain 130 P. 2d 131 (1942) at 137
377 People v Caudillo 146 Cal Rptr. 859 (1978) at 870-871
378 People v Sargent 150 cal Rptr. 113 (1978) at 115
379 People v Superior Court (Duval) 244 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1988) at 527
380 People v Brown 495 N.W. 2d 812 (1992) at 814
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referring to ‘what the fetus does to a woman when it coerces her to be 
pregnant’, and talking of the foetus ‘forcing pregnancy on her against her 
will’.381 Repeatedly, she describes lack of consent as ‘the key component of 
all injuries’ and the ‘defining component o f all injuries within human 
relationships’382, adding that, from the legal point o f view, the important 
factor in defining an ‘injury’ is not so much what is done to one party by 
another, but ‘whether the other person consents to it.’383
Seeking to justify the use of deadly force in self-defence against the 
intrusion of a foetus, McDonagh begins by distinguishing between two 
different types of privacy. First, there is privacy as decisional autonomy, or 
freedom from state interference.
As established in Roe, a woman’s right o f personal privacy as defined 
by her decisional autonomy is governed and limited by what the fetus 
is, not by what it does. As long as the fetus is previable, justification 
for a woman’s right to an abortion rests simply on whether she 
chooses to have one or not. Once the fetus is viable, however, a 
woman no longer has the right to exercise personal privacy by 
choosing an abortion, and a state may prohibit her right to choose
384one.
There is another form of privacy, also acknowledged by the Roe Court, 
namely privacy as self-defence. McDonagh explains this type of privacy as 
follows:
The law also recognizes the right of people to use deadly force when 
threatened with qualitative injuries that intrude on their basic liberty or 
bodily integrity even while threatening no objective physical injuries 
per se, much less threatening their lives. Thirty-six states explicitly 
affirm a person’s right to use deadly force when threatened with 
forcible rape, even when that rape is not aggravated by physical
381 McDonagh, op. cit. at 89
382 Ibid. at 90
383 Ibid., emphasis added.
384 Ibid. at 92
125
injuries. Thirty-five states legislatively recognize the right to use 
deadly force against kidnapping.385
Whereas the first form of privacy recognised in Roe is limited by the 
burgeoning state interest in the foetus as an individual with emerging 
interests, the second form o f privacy is not.
By contrast [with decisional autonomy], a woman’s right of self- 
defense in relation to the fetus as established in Roe is governed and 
limited by what the fetus does, not by what it is. At any point in 
pregnancy, regardless of whether the fetus is or is not viable, if  what it 
does imposes a sufficient amount of injury on the woman, no state 
may prohibit her from using deadly force to stop it, even if  the state 
has a compelling interest to protect [the foetus].386
This leads McDonagh to conclude that ‘women have always had a right to 
defend themselves with deadly force when sufficiently threatened by the 
intrusion of a fetus.’387 The operative phrase here is ‘sufficiently threatened’; 
although Roe sets a precedent for a right to abortion based upon what the 
foetus does to a woman’s body, the Court in Roe only applies this self-defence 
privacy right to medically-abnormal pregnancy. McDonagh would extend the 
right to cover all cases of pregnancy, whether medically-abnormal or not, 
since she believes that even ‘normal’ pregnancy constitutes a ‘sufficient 
threat’ to women’s qualitative freedom insofar as it enslaves them, or at least 
commits them to involuntary servitude, as we have seen.
By basing abortion rights primarily on consent and the right to defend 
oneself against attack, McDonagh believes she has discovered a more secure 
basis for such rights than those who would ground them in the ideology of 
choice/autonomy and freedom from state interference. This is because the 
right to be free from state interference is far from being an absolute right. 
Although some state interventions have been deemed excessive by U.S. courts
385 Ibid. at 93
386 Ibid. at 92-93
387 Ibid. at 96
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(for example, forcible stomach-pumping)388, McDonagh reminds us that ‘it is 
constitutional for the state to prohibit one’s choice to engage in homosexual 
activity, to contract for prostitution services, and to sell one’s organs. In 
additional, it is constitutional for the state to require people to obtain 
vaccinations in order to prevent the spread o f disease and to be conscripted for
”5 O Q
military service.’ These examples apply equally to the United Kingdom 
context. On the other hand, ‘courts affirm that the right o f a person to be free 
from intrusion by another person is absolute. There are no exceptions.’390 
Thus, while the state may have limited power to intrude on a person’s body, 
no private party has such power. Privacy, in the form of self-defence, ‘defines 
a sphere of individual dominion into which private parties may not intrude 
without consent.’391
Privacy-as-self-defence is addressed not to the state, but to other 
private individuals, and so it is more wide-ranging in character. As such, 
basing abortion rights on the right to freedom from the intrusion of a private 
party (the foetus) is preferable to basing them on the more limited right to be 
free from interference by the state. Following Roe, there is already a limited 
element of self-defence in abortion rights, but it applies only to pregnancies 
that are medically abnormal. If McDonagh can successfully extend the self- 
defence justification to cover all cases of pregnancy, she would appear to have 
placed abortion rights beyond the reach of their opponents by elevating them 
to the private sphere, and removing the ‘state interest’ factor, with all its 
erosive potential.
In order to establish the right to abortion throughout pregnancy and the 
right to state assistance, however, citing the right to self-defence alone will 
not suffice; as McDonagh explains, ‘it is the job of the state to protect victims 
of wrongful private acts by stopping the perpetrators. The right o f self-defense 
is meant to be a fall-back option for those times when the state cannot do its 
job...it is not a policy preference.’392 She continues, ‘to the degree that it is 
the job of the state to protect the fetus as human life, it becomes the job of the
388 Rochin v People o f  California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
389 McDonagh, op. cit. at 100
390 Ibid. at 103, emphasis added.
391 Ibid. at 101
392 Ibid. at 105, emphasis added.
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state to restrict the fetus as human life from intruding on the bodily integrity
• '3 Q '3and liberty of others.’ The Court in Roe, while acknowledging a woman’s 
right to seek abortion in order to defend herself against the risks and harms of 
medically-abnormal pregnancy, affirmed only her individual right of self 
defence, not any right to assistance from the state.394 This quest for state 
assistance takes us into the area of what McDonagh terms ‘the politics of 
consent’395, where I will examine the basis on which she demands state 
assistance for women who seek to exercise abortion rights.
4.2.4. The politics of consent
The argument over state funding for abortion has, according to McDonagh, 
been complicated and misleading -  once again, the problem is the failure to 
identify the foetus as the ‘cause’ of pregnancy, coercing women to be 
pregnant against their will:
Failure to identify what the fetus does to a woman when it causes 
pregnancy has resulted in rulings that undermine women’s rights by 
allowing the state to establish repressive regulations, such as twenty- 
four-hour waiting periods, and most serious o f all, prohibitions against 
the use of all public funds, facilities, and personnel for the 
performance of abortions.396
Until now, advocates of abortion rights have been unable to justify their 
demands for state funding. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous ‘violinist’ 
scenario397 attempted to establish that, ‘even if the fetus is a person, and even 
if its life hangs in the balance as a needy recipient of a woman’s body, a 
woman still has the right to be a bad Samaritan by refusing to give her body to 
the fetus. This ‘bad Samaritan’ argument for abortion rights still does not go
393 Ibid. at 106
394 Ibid. at 163
395 Ibid., Chapter 9 (title).
396 Ibid. at 176
397 See supra, note 362
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far enough. It claims only that women have a right to refuse to donate their 
bodies to a fetus.’398
For McDonagh, ‘the issue is not merely that women have the right to 
be bad Samaritans by refusing to give their bodies to a fetus. Rather, if  a 
woman does not consent to pregnancy, the issue is that the fetus has made her 
its captive Samaritan by intruding on her body and liberty against her will, 
and thus on the woman’s right to be free from that status.’399 The problem is 
that the ‘masculinized’ norm of self-defence is supported by equally 
masculinised notions of how self-defence ought to be achieved, i.e. without 
external help.400 A ‘real man’, a ‘good provider’ is one who can provide 
adequate protection for himself and his property (including his sexual 
partner(s) and their children?) without recourse to outside agencies. Partly as a 
result of this masculine ideal, ‘current abortion funding policies...strand 
women in a state of nature, at the mercy of fetal intrusion of their bodies 
without the assistance of the state to stop the fetus on women’s behalf from 
imposing wrongful pregnancy.’401 The problem with abortion funding policy, 
according to McDonagh, is not that the state is too involved; rather, ‘it is not 
involved enough. The state stands by in order to protect the fetus as human 
life while it imposes serious injury on the woman.’402
McDonagh’s argument about self-defence can be summarised as 
follows: (i) we need to get beyond the masculine notion of privacy as ‘the 
right to be left alone’. Roe is an example of legal authority for the view that 
privacy also includes the right to self-defence, and specifically, for the view 
that abortion rights are based at least in part on this second ‘type’ of privacy; 
(ii) when considering privacy-as-self-defence, we must be aware that that 
right, too, is commonly understood in masculinised way, as the right to defend 
oneself without assistance. Establishing an ideological basis for state funding 
of abortion requires us to understand that self-defence includes the state duty 
to intervene positively to prevent or diffuse attacks by one private party upon 
another. McDonagh explains this point in the following way:
399
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If a man is raping a woman or a mugger is inflicting a severe beating 
on someone or one private party is killing another, of course the 
victims have a right of self-defense to try to stop that injury 
themselves, but they also have a right to state assistance to stop the 
private parties on their behalf....when a fetus seriously injures a 
woman by imposing a wrongful pregnancy, therefore, of course she 
has a right to stop it from injuring her, but she also has a right to state 
assistance in stopping it on her behalf.403
4.3. Advantages of the consent-based approach
The consent model accommodates the widely-held notion that the foetus is a 
morally-valuable entity, and allows us to acknowledge the narratives of 
women who experience trauma or grief over their abortions. As such, this 
approach can be said to be more consonant with the actual experiences of real 
women.
Moreover, by contrast with the individualistic notion of ‘choice’, 
consent is relational,; it focuses on both the woman and the foetus (although 
as will be seen when I come to consider the disadvantages of the approach, it 
excludes the possibility that relationships between men and pregnant women, 
or even men and ‘their’ foetuses, may be relevant). A relational approach is 
better able to avoid criticisms that it is too individualistic or atomistic, 
criticisms often levelled at the ‘rights talk’ so prevalent in the rhetoric of 
choice. By focusing not only on individual rights (important as these are for 
the consent-based approach) but also on relationships, accounts like 
McDonagh’s can accommodate notions such as caring, hospitality and 
community, which are often regarded either as being irrelevant or even 
threatening to a right- or choice-based argument. According to McDonagh’s 
model, abortion does not contravene the ‘ethic o f care’ - the notion that 
women are, by nature, nurturers and care-givers -  since what abortion
403 Ibid. at 105
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prevents is not the giving or bestowing o f care by women, but the taking of 
women’s bodies, their freedom and their care without their consent.
Another advantage of McDonagh’s approach is that it no longer treats 
the issue o f moral status as decisive, as the Roe Court did, so that McDonagh 
is able to avoid dehumanising the foetus. For those who claim the right to 
abortion on the basis of autonomy and choice, a necessary element of the 
justification for the right is the contrasting o f the fact that the woman is a 
person whose freedom of choice ought to be protected, with the claim that the 
foetus is a non-person who has no legal rights. While McDonagh also claims 
that the foetus has no legal rights, she justifies her claim without needing to 
resort to claims about the moral status of the foetus. This means that we can 
acknowledge and protect abortion rights without having to regard the foetus as 
something other than human, a view which would run contrary to common 
sense and would require us either to ignore, or to dismiss as mere fantasy, the 
feelings of those women who felt that, in having an abortion, they had lost 
something of value, or even killed a human being.
McDonagh acknowledges that her model is at odds with current social 
assumptions about abortion; for most people, to contemplate foetal 
personhood (even just for the sake of argument) is to throw grave doubt on the 
moral and legal validity of the practice o f abortion. However, McDonagh does 
not take this discrepancy to be indicative o f any problem with her argument; 
rather, she is confident that it arises because our current social norms, 
particularly those relating to women and reproduction, derive from our 
cultural heritage of patriarchy, and in particular, from a combination of 
Puritanical and bourgeois morality which reserves norms o f self-defence for 
men while imposing norms of self-sacrifice on women.
4.4. Difficulties for the consent-based approach
There are many criticisms o f McDonagh’s consent-based justification of 
abortion rights, and it will be helpful to categorise them under several 
headings. First, I will consider problems with the notion of self-defence as it 
operates in M cDonagh’s account. Then I will consider those criticisms which
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challenge her use of the concepts of causation and consent respectively. 
Finally I will address some ‘miscellaneous' criticisms and difficulties.
4.4.1. Self-defence
4.4.1.1. Is pregnancy an invited attack?
Neville Cox points out that McDonagh has been challenged on the basis that 
‘consent to sex constitutes an implicit consent to all the natural and 
foreseeable consequences thereof including pregnancy’404, and that as such, a 
woman who becomes pregnant following consensual sexual intercourse has 
‘invited’ pregnancy, or to borrow McDonagh’s terminology, she has ‘invited 
the foetus to make her pregnant’. Cox disagrees with this criticism, saying:
This argument is, however, rather strained. In the case, for example of 
a woman who has used birth control yet through some mischance has 
become pregnant and seeks an abortion as soon as she becomes aware 
o f her condition, everything in her actions indicates that she does not 
consent to pregnancy and any presumption to this effect has been 
thoroughly rebutted.405
McDonagh would also reject the argument that pregnancy is an ‘invited 
attack’; as we have seen, she regards the action o f a woman having consensual 
sexual intercourse merely as ‘putting oneself at risk’ of pregnancy, and insists 
that the acceptance of a risk does not necessarily entail any acceptance of the 
actual injuries, should they occur. Just as a jogger who chooses to run alone 
through Central Park accepts a degree of risk but does not consent, by any 
stretch of the imagination (or the law) to be mugged or raped, a woman who 
engages in consensual sexual intercourse accepts the risk of pregnancy but 
does not consent to the actual attack of a foetus or the injury it perpetrates by 
invading her body and later, by effecting ever more drastic changes upon it
404 Neville Cox, ‘Causation, Responsibility and Foetal Personhood’, (2000) 51 Northern
Ireland Legal Quarterly 579 at 581
405 Ibid. at 581-582
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throughout the gestational process. It is unlikely that the fact of contraceptive 
use would have any relevance for McDonagh. Although whether or not 
someone uses contraception may hint at their intentions regarding pregnancy, 
or indicate that they are willing to accept a greater or lesser degree of risk, 
McDonagh would argue that, whatever degree o f risk they accept, they are not 
consenting to the actual injury of pregnancy itself.
This is problematic, because the concept of ‘risk’ covers a wide 
spectrum of possibility. At one end we have the situation where it is possible, 
although unlikely in the extreme, that certain consequences will occur if a 
certain action or course of action is undertaken. At the opposite end o f the 
spectrum of risk, we have the scenario whereby, if  a person behaves in a 
particular way, certain consequences will follow almost inevitably. For 
example, if a man walks along a pavement, it is possible, although highly 
unlikely, that a car will mount the pavement and kill or injure him. If  he 
crosses a busy road using a designated crossing-place and paying reasonable 
attention to the traffic, it is more likely, but still w«likely, that he will come to 
harm. There are of course varying degrees o f risk associated with walking on 
or near roads. If the same man were to jump out on a major motorway in front 
of a car approaching at seventy miles per hour, we can say with some 
confidence that he is likely to be hurt or killed. It is still not a certainty, for 
any number of outlandish events could intervene to remove the danger. He is 
still only ‘at risk’ of harm. But on McDonagh’s analysis, we must say, 
nonetheless, that he has not consented to the actual harm he will almost 
inevitably sustain.
This is a philosophical point; o f course, the law would take a quite 
different view on who was responsible for the harm in such a case. What 
about a man who steps in front of an express train with the intention of 
committing suicide? His death is not guaranteed; again, unlikely events could 
intervene to thwart his plan. According to McDonagh, he would still be 
‘putting himself at risk’ of injury and death, and would not have consented to 
any injury he sustains as a result o f his actions. Moreover, if  he clearly 
intended to bring about his own death, yet survived, horribly injured, he could 
claim quite plausibly, on McDonagh’s logic, that he certainly did not consent 
to be so injured.
133
The differences between these examples and the pregnancy scenario are clear. 
First, pregnancy can be undone, which makes it more meaningful to talk about 
consent or lack o f consent in the pregnancy context than to argue about 
consent in the context of an action whose consequences are irreversible. If I 
become pregnant despite my intention to avoid pregnancy, I can invoke the 
language of consent, or cite the absence o f consent, in support o f my claim 
that I ought to be able to remedy my pregnant state. I cannot seek to return to 
a living or intact state if  I have been killed or maimed as a result o f  my risk- 
taking. Another difference is that, at least according to McDonagh, pregnancy 
involves the commission of a ‘wrongful act’ by another party, whereas my 
examples do not; is this difference relevant to the way we treat the issue of 
risk?
I would argue that it is possible to separate the actions o f the two 
agents in McDonagh’s model - the first party’s assumption of risk, and the 
second party’s wrongful act -  since although the wrongfulness or harmfulness 
of the foetal ‘attack’ becomes relevant when we come to consider other issues 
under the heading of self-defence, it is not really important to the question of 
whether the pregnant woman has ‘invited’ the foetus into her body. If we 
accept this, we can use the above analogies to argue that one weakness of 
McDonagh’s theory is her view of how an assumption of risk relates to 
responsibility for subsequent injury. In the above examples, McDonagh would 
be compelled to absolve both the man on the motorway and the man who 
steps in front of a speeding train o f any responsibility for their subsequent 
injury or death. She is unable, on the basis of what she proposes in Breaking 
The Abortion Deadlock, to distinguish between different degrees o f risk, and 
thus she is unable to ascribe responsibility to those who assume the level of 
risk found at one end of the spectrum while admitting that some levels of risk 
are very low and ought to entail no legal responsibility for consequences. It is 
very difficult to imagine a scenario in which a human agent, in performing an 
action, could actually guarantee a particular result, since almost nothing is 
certain and there is always the possibility, however slight, that unplanned 
events will intervene and alter the outcome. This being the case, all we can 
ever do is ‘place ourselves at risk’ o f outcomes, so that if  risk and outcome are
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separated as they are in McDonagh’s model, we could never hold anyone even 
partly responsible for any wrongs or injuries that they suffered.
Regarding McDonagh’s discussion o f risk and responsibility, Robin 
West asks, ‘is it really the case that consent to the risk of pregnancy does not 
entail consent to the pregnancy?’406 Clearly, Robin West believes that the 
matter is by no means settled:
In contract law, clearly, consent to an assumed risk does imply consent 
to the risked event; if  it didn’t, no contract would be secure...[i]n 
criminal contexts, by contrast, McDonagh’s argument looks sound; 
consent to a risked criminal event does not by any means imply 
consent to the crime...[i]n tort, the situation is complicated and 
conflicted; consent to a risk might or might not constitute assumption 
of the risk and hence consent to the risked event.407
Obviously, if  we could categorise abortion under one o f these headings, we 
would have a clearer idea of how the law would treat the assumption of risk 
inherent in the abortion context. Unfortunately, none o f these areas of law 
seems completely to accommodate the circumstances o f pregnancy and 
abortion. Clearly, it would make no sense to categorise the ‘attack’ of 
pregnancy - even wrongful, non-consensual pregnancy - as a criminal offence, 
since the foetus (the direct cause o f pregnancy, according to McDonagh) 
cannot be held criminally responsible. Moreover, as West notes, ‘an attack by 
a bom person threatens the peace -  and hence threatens the state -  in a way 
that the invasion of a woman by an unwanted fetus does not.’408 This being so, 
another reason for criminalising certain kinds of behaviour, namely the state’s 
duty to maintain public order and deter offenders has no application in the 
context of wrongful pregnancy, since the foetus does not threaten public order 
(although it threatens the pregnant woman’s internal physical, and 
psychological order and the order o f her social functioning) and cannot be 
deterred from causing pregnancy by the threat of sanctions.
406 Robin West, ‘Liberalism and Abortion’, 87 Georgetown Law Journal (1999) 2117, at 2130
407 Ibid. at 2130-2131
408 Ibid. at 2126
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Any attempt to regard pregnancy as a contract, for example a contract for 
services between the pregnant woman and the foetus, would founder on the 
absence -  indeed, the impossibility -  o f  mutuality.409 By a process of 
elimination, we arrive at tort -  and this area o f law does seem to bear the 
closest resemblance to McDonagh’s account of pregnancy, since she 
characterises pregnancy as a harm, but not a criminal assault. As West 
comments, the relationship between risk and responsibility is unclear; consent 
to a risk ‘might or might not’ imply consent to the risked harm. At the very 
least, then, we can say that it is by no means clear, in law, that consent to risk 
does not imply consent to be harmed. This raises serious doubts about one of 
the main premises on which the consent model of abortion rights is built.
4.4.1.2. Is pregnancy a sufficient attack to justify the use o f  deadly force?
As Robin West observes, ‘pregnancy, even when non-consensual, does not 
typically threaten death, lasting bodily injury, or even an immediate disruption 
o f the woman’s life plans and projects the way a violent assault by a bom 
person does.’410 Because of this, some commentators have raised the issue of 
whether the attack represented by pregnancy is sufficiently serious to justify 
the use of deadly force in self-defence. Neville Cox writes:
It has been suggested that the defence o f self-defence cannot apply 
because of the nature o f the ‘attack’ within pregnancy. In order to 
justify the use of self-defence it must generally be shown that an attack 
was immediate and threatening.. .Hence, because pregnancy does not 
have the appearance o f an immediate threat, the use o f self-defence 
principles does not apply to this situation. This argument may be 
rejected, however, both because McDonagh would say that pregnancy 
is a nine month immediate threat, and also because the inexorable
409 Although pregnancy may be the subject o f a surrogacy contract, such contracts are 
currently unenforceable in law, and are anyway contracts between the pregnant woman and 
the ‘commissioning couple (or individual)’; at any rate, contract cannot apply to ‘wrongful 
pregnancy’.
410 West, op. cit. at 2127
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nature of the harm involved means that requirements of immediacy 
may be dispensed with.411
As Cox points out, moreover, McDonagh cites rape and kidnap as examples 
of instances where deadly force may be used in self defence even where there 
is no immediate threat to life. For Robin West, however, the seriousness o f the 
attack inherent in pregnancy does not consist solely in the threat o f physical 
harm, either immediate or remote, or even in actual physical harm. She 
remarks that, although McDonagh catalogues in elaborate detail the physical 
effects of both medically normal and abnormal pregnancies, she ‘risks missing 
entirely the psychic harms such pregnancies occasion.’412 West tells us that 
‘the non-consensual pregnancy, unlike the non-consensual assault, threatens 
not so much to end your life “from the outside”, so to speak, but to “take 
over” your life from the inside. The fear is not that my life will end, but that 
my control over its course will end.’413
This constitutes an immediate threat, not to a woman’s life, but to 
what is often regarded as being important about her life, the women’s 
personhood. This should be of particular concern to those states which regard 
themselves as (or aspire to be) modem liberal democracies since, as West 
reminds us, one of the central lessons o f liberalism has been to establish the 
notion of ‘a free moral person.. .[as] someone who freely decides to undertake 
moral action. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the woman who has no 
choice but to remain pregnant against her will is, from a liberal perspective, 
something considerably less than human.’ In other words, our ‘moral 
personhood’, on the liberal account, depends upon our capacity to exercise 
moral autonomy in our relationships with other moral agents. To be forced 
into a moral relationship seems to contravene this ideal:
411 Cox, op. cit. at 582
412 West, op. cit. at 2128
413 Ibid.
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The woman who is pregnant against her will embodies nonfreedom 
because she embodies the very act -  unwilled sacrifice of one’s body 
for the life o f others -  that is freedom’s antithesis.414
As such, we can (and it would seem that liberals must) take wrongful 
pregnancy seriously enough to warrant deadly force in self defence even 
where the pregnancy poses no immediate threat to life or health. However, 
this argument is unlikely to persuade nonliberals (many o f whom ascribe 
moral value to unchosen projects and relationships)415, and will not 
necessarily persuade those liberals whose liberal beliefs are grounded in 
consequentialist, rather than Kantian, philosophies.
4.4.1.3. Is pregnancy really an attack at all?
This criticism centres on the claim that McDonagh’s characterisation of 
pregnancy as a ‘foetal attack’ is mistaken, for several reasons. First, the 
foetus, far from perpetrating a deliberate attack, is innocent, both in the sense 
that it is innocent of any wrongful intention and in the sense that it is not 
criminally competent. Second, and more important, is the claim that it is 
impossible to separate what the foetus is from what the foetus does.
Remember that McDonagh has claimed that one of the main 
advantages of her thesis is that it corrects the previous error of attempting to 
decide what the foetus is (usually by debating its moral status) and focusing, 
instead, on what the foetus does to a woman when it makes her pregnant 
without her consent. If it is impossible to separate the two conceptually, two 
things flow: first, if  McDonagh wishes to maintain her claim that previous 
commentators and judges were in error, she must find something else to 
accuse them of; second, and related to the first point, McDonagh has achieved
415 See, for example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Second Edition) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. at 154-64, and Michael Sandel, 
D em ocracy’s Discontent (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1996), esp. at 17. 
Sandel, like other writers who can broadly be termed ‘communitarian’, complains that the 
Rawlsian liberal conception o f  the se lf is overly individualistic and denies the value o f  
unchosen projects, and argues that an ‘unchosen’ background framework is a precondition of 
choice.
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nothing by ‘refocusing’ the debate away from the nature of the foetus and 
onto its behaviour, except perhaps to invent a false and confusing distinction.
Is it possible, therefore, to separate foetal nature from foetal 
behaviour? Cox tells us that:
Whatever the impact o f pregnancy, the foetus is doing nothing apart 
from involuntarily staying alive in the ordinary way and hence the 
‘attack’ for self defence purposes comes in the form o f simple foetal 
existence. But self defence law does not entitle me to kill another if 
my health or life or bodily integrity is threatened by his or her simple
416existence.
This last point about self defence law is somewhat precarious, since the 
situation rarely, if  ever arises whereby one person’s health, life, or bodily 
integrity is threatened by the mere existence of another.417 It is for precisely 
this reason that pregnancy is so often described as being a completely unique
418condition. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Judith Thomson wrote a 
famous article which claimed exactly the opposite of what Cox is saying, 
namely that if my life or bodily integrity is threatened by another bom person, 
even in the course of doing what he or she must do simply to continue to exist, 
then the law ought to allow me to be a ‘bad Samaritan’ and defend myself by 
withdrawing the support on which that person depends for his or her survival.
Cox anticipates this comparison, and responds by pointing out that 
‘Thomson accepts the personhood o f the foetus for the purposes of argument 
while insisting that a foetal right to life does not include a right to use its 
mother’s body for support through the vehicle of pregnancy. But without such 
a ‘sub-right’, the principle right becomes illusory.’419 He puts the point 
slightly differently elsewhere when he says that, ‘when the law recognises 
rights it does so in the context in which they will operate. Thus it would not 
recognise a foetal right to live while rendering the act of breathing or eating a
416 Cox, op. cit. at 582
417 Although the case o f  Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All 
ER 961 might be considered analogous; see the discussion infra at para. 4.4.1.6
418 See the discussion infra at para. 4.4.1.5., where I consider the claim that the genuine 
uniqueness o f  pregnancy invalidates much o f  McDonagh’s heavily-analogical approach.
419 Cox, op. cit. at 586
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criminal offence, because the latter rule would render the former right 
meaningless.’420
One obvious problem with this response is that McDonagh is not 
proposing a foetal right-to-life; although her model tolerates the notion of 
foetal personhood for argument’s sake, she does not regard it as entailing any 
positive legal right to continue existing. This is so because the brand of 
personhood she ascribes is comparable to the kind o f purely legal personhood 
which companies and other such entities possess, without having any right to 
exist. The difficulties inherent in this purely-legal notion o f foetal personhood 
will become even more apparent during consideration o f the next question.
4.4.1.4. Is the foetus entitled to legal due process?
Judith Scully points out that, ‘if  a fetus is a human being, it might be entitled 
to a legal hearing and legal counsel prior to being aborted.’421 If, as 
McDonagh is prepared to assume for the purposes of her model, the foetus 
can be regarded as an agent or a legal person, then it could indeed be claimed 
that such an entity ought to be entitled to due process of law -  a least where 
the pregnancy is medically-normal (i.e. where it poses no immediate threat to 
a woman’s life or health). Failing to recognise such an entitlement, it may be 
argued, is to treat the foetus as a ‘legal person’ only in the negative sense.
It is helpful here to distinguish between two possible understandings 
o f foetal personhood in McDonagh’s model. They can be summarised as 
follows: (i) ‘The foetus has no capacity to possess rights or owe 
responsibilities; nevertheless, it can be an agent of injury and cause harm to 
women in the pregnancy context. ’ This understanding treats the foetus as the 
legal equivalent of an animal, and if  this is all McDonagh means by ‘foetal 
personhood’, it is difficult to see how her model improves upon traditional 
discourse about abortion. Such an understanding of ‘foetal personhood’ would 
hardly be capable of ‘breaking the abortion deadlock’! (ii) ‘The foetus is a 
person, involved in a private pregnancy relationship with the pregnant
420 Ibid. at 583
421 Judith A. M. Scully, ‘Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent by Eileen 
McDonagh’ (Review) 8 UCLA Women’s Law Journal (1997) 125, at 145
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woman. If the relationship is non-consensual, it constitutes “wrongful 
pregnancy” and the woman is entitled to use deadly force to defend herself 
against the unwanted intrusion. This understanding does not differentiate 
between the foetus and a bom person.’ This is a stronger version of ‘foetal 
personhood’, and on the face of it, much more promising. This seems to be 
closer to what McDonagh really means when she analogises the foetus to a 
rapist, and claims that deadly force is permitted in self-defence even where the 
attacker is a person.
However, the second, more promising way o f understanding what 
McDonagh means by ‘foetal personhood’ is also fundamentally flawed. Use 
of deadly force against ‘bom persons’ is only authorised in emergency 
situations; otherwise, the person presenting the alleged threat is entitled to due 
process of law. With regard to pregnancy, medically-normal pregnancy is not 
a ‘gunman situation’ where deadly force may be used without due process. 
However great the intmsion which any pregnancy represents, ‘emergency’ 
usually implies some immediate threat to life or health, so that where 
pregnancy is medically-normal and there is no immediate threat it seems 
inappropriate to speak of an emergency situation. Where pregnancy is 
medically-abnormal, and places the life or health of the woman in danger, this 
is already regarded as an emergency and abortion is provided in such cases as 
a matter of medical necessity. There is no need to resort to the legal right to 
self-defence.
This is a key problem for McDonagh’s thesis: ultimately, it fails to 
‘break the abortion deadlock’ because what opponents of abortion advocate is 
the ascription of moral personhood to the foetus, and McDonagh, by offering 
this purely legal notion o f personhood, is debating at cross-purposes rather 
than proving why their argument fails even if the issue o f foetal personhood is 
‘conceded’. The foetus is treated as a ‘person’ only as a heuristic device, in 
order that concepts such as assault and self-defence can be applied without 
obvious absurdity; on examination, the ‘personhood’ of the foetus is revealed 
to be a mere cipher.
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4.4.1.5. Is pregnancy too unique a case?
In the course of her argument, McDonagh draws many analogies between 
pregnancy and other events or conditions:
The fetus... is analogised to a bom person for the purposes of making 
out the original right to self-defense, to a natural phenomenon to 
highlight the irrelevance of the arguable assumption o f risk involved in 
the original act of intercourse to the right to self-defense, and then, 
finally, to a criminally insane assailant to illustrate the irrelevance of 
the fetus’s lack o f agency to the woman’s right to state assistance.422
‘At some point’, Robin West says, ‘the multiplicity of analogies start to work 
against each other.’423 Furthermore, as McDonagh herself acknowledges, ‘a 
possible objection to situating women who suffer harm resulting from a fetus 
with other victims of harm is that pregnancy is a unique condition; thus, when 
a fetus attacks a woman’s body, it does not situate her similarly with anyone 
else whom the state protects from harm.’424
Such an objection is raised by Nancy Davis, who argues that the 
uniqueness of pregnancy as a condition is such that it is impossible even to 
characterise the issue as one where competing rights are being balanced 425 
Davis writes, ‘If the relationship between the woman and the foetus is thought 
to be a special one, then this undercuts the force of arguments by analogy.’426 
This is, potentially, a very damaging criticism, given the centrality of 
analogical reasoning in McDonagh’s model. McDonagh’s response is as 
follows:
The flaw in this objection is the assumption that any one situation can 
be wholly different from another; all situations involve some
422 West, op. cit. at 2130
423 Ibid.
424 Eileen L. McDonagh, ‘My Body, My Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to 
Abortion Funding’ 62 Albany Law Review  1057 at 1110.
425 Nancy Davis, ‘Abortion and Self-defense’ 13(3) Journal o f  Philosophy & Public Affairs 
(1984)175, at 183-185.
426 Ibid. at 181
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similarities and some differences. It is a matter of judgment, therefore, 
to what degree situations should be considered similar or different in 
relation to each other.427
She continues,
If the fetus were considered a person, for example, its location within 
and attachment to the body of another person might be considered 
unique to fetus’s [sic] as a class, but the harm resulting from the fetus 
is not unique, since harm often results from one person’s effect on 
another person. Under state protection, if the fetus is considered to be 
a living entity that is not a person, then harm resulting from it also is 
not unique, since harm often results from living entities that are not 
people. Thus, whether the fetus is a person or a nonperson, it similarly 
situates a woman with others who are harmed.428
This is, in my opinion, a disappointing and somewhat clumsy response, which 
fails to get to the heart of the ‘uniqueness’ objection. When critics claim that 
pregnancy is unique, they are not claiming, necessarily, that it is unique on the 
basis of the status o f the fetus as a person or a non-person. Rather, they are 
making the claim that the whole set o f circumstances associated with 
pregnancy is unique, particularly with regard to the operation and exercise of 
individual rights. While I agree, ultimately, with McDonagh that the objection 
from uniqueness must fail, I prefer Robin West’s explanation o f why this must 
be so.
Although West notes that ‘McDonagh’s liberal insistence on the 
analogical similarity between the nonconsensually pregnant woman and the 
assaulted victim misses the substantial payoff o f a pregnancy...a healthy 
human baby’429 , she also observes that ‘equality and liberty both, from a 
liberal perspective, are dependent upon the recognition and equal treatment
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid. at 1110-1111
429 West, op. cit. at 2128-2129
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accorded our universality.’430 As West explains, ‘liberal legalism requires a 
rule of law that...treats likes alike. Thus, the overpowering need for 
analogical thinking.’ In other words, before we can promote equality, a key 
value in liberal social and legal systems, we must have some method of 
determining which cases are ‘alike’ in the relevant sense(s), so we can then 
treat like cases alike. As such,
Equal regard -  the heart of liberalism -  requires that pregnant women 
be treated similarly to those with whom they are similarly situated. 
The imperative of equal treatment at the heart o f liberal legalism 
animates the need to locate those to whom she is similarly situated 
and, therefore, the search for analogous conditions.431
According to West, then, although it may be difficult to find situations which 
are Tike’ pregnancy, it is necessary to draw parallels whenever possible, in 
order to be able to attain, insofar as is possible, the liberal ideal of treating like 
cases alike. As McDonagh points out, the practical implementation of this 
ideal will inevitably involve subjectivity, since judgments will require to be 
made about the degree to which certain sets of circumstances possess relevant 
similarities. The fact that ‘treating like cases alike’ will be necessarily and 
intrinsically subjective in practice, however, does not mean that we should not 
attempt to find as close an approximation to the ideal as we are able for any 
given case. The most basic tenets of liberal legal theory demand as much.
4.4.1.6. A better analogy?
Vanessa Munro has identified parallels between pregnancy and the 
comparatively recent case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical 
Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961.432 In this case, the English Court of Appeal 
was set the unenviable task o f determining the interdependent fates of
430 Ibid. at 2124
431 Ibid. at 2125
432 Vanessa Munro, ‘Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Dilemma o f Conjoined Twins and 
Individual Rights’ (2001) Social & Legal Studies 10(4) 459-482
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conjoined twins ‘Jodie’ and ‘Mary’. Having referred to Re A , Munro writes 
that:
Matemal-foetal relations represent another relational context 
characterized by ambiguous bodily boundaries within which the law’s 
attempt to super-impose the highly abstract and individualist 
framework o f rights analysis has proven manifestly inadequate.433
The ‘conjoined twins’ case corresponds to McDonagh’s model of non- 
consensual pregnancy in a number of important respects. Jodie (the stronger 
twin) was involved in a non-consensual physical relationship with the weaker 
twin, Mary; Jodie was suffering physical harm and facing certain death as a 
result of Mary’s physical dependence on her body; and Jodie’s only possible 
defence against the harm would be the removal o f Mary, which would end the 
non-consensual relationship and inevitably cause Mary’s death. The 
relationship was beneficial only to Mary, and harmful only to Jodie, making it 
more similar to McDonagh’s pregnancy model than to other more ‘symbiotic’ 
twin conjoinments. Another similarity to McDonagh’s model is that both of 
the twins in Re A were deemed to be ‘persons’ in law. As such, it is instructive 
to examine the case for evidence of how the UK courts might approach a right 
to abortion based upon the right to self-defence
The Court in Re A decided to allow the surgical separation to proceed. 
The rationale for this decision was complex, but can be summarised by saying 
that the judges, faced with a choice between saving the life of one twin or 
losing both, preferred the option that saved the greater number o f lives -  a 
‘quantity of life’ calculus, in effect. By this logic, if  both twins would have 
survived in their conjoined state, it would seem that the Court would not have 
sanctioned the deliberate killing of Mary. While such killing was considered 
permissible in order to save one life instead o f none, it would not appear, on 
the logic of Re A , to be justified if the choice is between one life of high 
quality or two lives o f inferior quality. The implication of this for the model 
proposed by McDonagh is that, unless the life of the pregnant woman was
433 Ibid. at 472
145
actually threatened by the pregnancy, the killing of the foetus (viewed as a 
legal person) would be impermissible.
O f course, the facts of Re A do not represent a perfect analogy with 
pregnancy, although this is not in itself a reason to dismiss it as irrelevant; it 
seems to be at least as strong as any o f the interchangeable analogies offered 
by McDonagh herself, and as noted above under heading 4.4.1.5, analogies 
(even if  imperfect) are necessary, since to treat pregnancy as completely 
legally unique is to embrace a kind of particularism which is incompatible 
with coherent legal regulation and with the philosophical justifications 
underpinning the liberal legal system itself (such as non-discrimination and 
legitimate expectation).
4.4.2. Causation
4.4.2.1. Is the foetus really the cause ofpregnancy?
In his article, Causation, Responsibility and Foetal Personhood, Neville Cox 
presents a compelling challenge to the notion that the foetus ought to be 
regarded as the ‘only cause of pregnancy’. He begins by pointing out that:
[A]s the American Supreme Court noted in the seminal case Roe v 
Wade, there is no clear consensus as to when life or indeed pregnancy 
begins. If  it begins at implantation or later then McDonagh’s argument 
that the fertilised ovum causes pregnancy may stand a chance of 
working. If on the other hand it is seen to begin at the point of 
fertilisation then her arguments fail immediately because unless she 
aims to imbue sperm with personhood (and the anti-abortion 
movement does not make this argument) then she would have to 
accept that pregnancy is caused by the sexual act which led to 
fertilisation.434
434 Cox, op. cit. at 587
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In other words, if  we take pregnancy to begin at fertilisation or conception, as 
many do, then the foetus cannot be regarded as the cause of pregnancy, since 
it cannot be the cause of an event at which it comes into being. So for those 
who take pregnancy to begin at this earliest o f stages, then, McDonagh’s 
arguments about causation are a non-starter. Logic precludes the possibility 
that the foetus is the cause of pregnancy unless we take pregnancy to begin at 
a point, such as implantation, when the foetus is already in existence. 
McDonagh herself seems to take implantation as the onset o f pregnancy, 
stating as she does that the fertilised ovum causes pregnancy ‘when it 
implants itself in a woman’s uterus’,435 although her position is not always 
crystal-clear, since on the very next page she describes pregnancy as ‘a 
condition that follows absolutely from the presence of a fertilized ovum in a 
woman’s body’436, thereby implying that as soon as the foetus exists, the 
woman is pregnant (the view which precludes the foetus as a cause of 
pregnancy).
Leaving aside this apparent confusion in McDonagh’s definition of 
when pregnancy begins, however, it is obvious that we must address the 
possibility that pregnancy begins with implantation in the uterus, and that it is 
logically possible, therefore, that the foetus can be considered to be the cause. 
Cox observes:
McDonagh is so concerned to find a generic cause of pregnancy that 
she fails to recognise that what is actually relevant for legal purposes 
is the cause of the particular pregnancy in any case...M ost sexual acts 
may not result in pregnancy, and pregnancy may result from actions 
other than sex. But for most women seeking abortions, their specific 
individual pregnancies did result from a sexual a c t437
This is a problematic point, since it seems to suggest that when pregnancy has 
not resulted from sexual intercourse, McDonagh’s causation argument may 
hold good. But I am certain that this is not what Cox means to imply, since the
435 McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock , at 40
436 Ibid. at 41
437 Cox, op. cit. at 589
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non-sexual means by which pregnancy can occur -  artificial insemination and 
embryo transfer -  are, if  anything, more deliberately aimed at bringing about a 
pregnancy than is the act of sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse may be 
engaged in for recreation, as an act o f intimacy, or for procreation, but people 
engaging in artificial insemination and embryo transfer are invariably doing 
so for the purpose o f reproduction, not pleasure. As such, in cases where 
pregnancy does not follow from intercourse, the claim that pregnancy has 
been ‘caused’ by the actions of the parents is an even stronger one, since 
intention can be established with much less difficulty.
Much more convincing is Cox’s argument that McDonagh has erred in 
failing to distinguish between the factual cause(s), and the legal or 
‘proximate’ cause of pregnancy. 438 He tells us that the first step in 
determining legal cause is to ask what is (are) the factual cause(s) o f the event. 
This is done by asking ‘but for X, would the event have occurred?’ If the 
answer is no, then X is a factual cause. This process is of course limited by the 
doctrine of novus actus interveniens (‘new intervening act’). Then, the law 
decides to which of the factual causes it will attach responsibility. Cox tells us 
that at this stage, the test is ‘a commonsense-based analysis of whether a 
particular factual cause has contributed appreciably to the coming about of the 
events in question.’439 The problem with McDonagh’s model, he says, is that 
she ‘looks for the legal cause of a result with the implication that at law there 
can be only one such cause. This is incorrect.’440
Even if we leave aside the question o f the point at when pregnancy 
begins, then, and accept that the foetus comes into existence before that point, 
the foetus can only be regarded as one o f  the factual causes o f pregnancy; 
even on this construction of the beginning of pregnancy, all pregnancies are 
caused by the implantation of a foetus in the uterus in the same way that ‘all 
human deaths are ultimately caused (in the most proximate, scientific sense) 
by lack of oxygen to the brain’. This certainly does not necessarily mean that 
it is this ‘cause’ to which the law will attach responsibility, however. When 
deciding the cause of death, the law will not merely conclude that the relevant
Ibid. at 590
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cause is lack o f oxygen to the brain; rather, the legal cause of death will look 
beyond the immediate, scientific cause to the surrounding circumstances, to 
factors such as dangerous driving, assault, and so on.441
Cox offers his own view of the causes o f pregnancy, claiming that ‘the 
move of the foetus to implantation is an involuntary reaction to an earlier 
action of its parents.’442 His argument runs as follows:
On normal causation rules, if  A causes B to do something in 
involuntary fashion (for example when A throws B with such force 
that B strikes C) then A ’s action is still the cause o f the harm to 
C...Hart and Honore suggest that in such circumstances when we 
speak of B’s behaviour, we can hardly speak o f  an act at all... if  A 
causes B to move in such a way that B collides with him, then A will 
be deemed to be the cause of his own injuries.443
Applying this principle to pregnancy, Cox continues:
The parents have caused the foetus involuntarily to implant itself, 
therefore the chain of causation between their act and the result 
(pregnancy) is not broken 444
Here, Cox means to establish, (i) that the foetus’s actions, so far as they are 
‘actions’ at all, are involuntary, and (ii) that the actions of the parents in 
having intercourse (or otherwise mixing gametes) create the foetus and so 
‘cause’ its involuntary and inevitable effect on the woman’s body . However, 
I think this is a poor way of going about it; it suffers from the same 
chronological problem as the assertion that the foetus ‘causes’ pregnancy 
where pregnancy is taken to begin at fertilisation, since it is doubtful whether 
we can really regard the parents as having ‘caused’ a foetus (which did not 
exist at the time o f their actions) to do anything at all. Could not the coming- 
into-existence o f a foetus constitute the kind o f new intervening act which
441 Ibid. at 588
442 Ibid. at 591
443 Ibid. at 591-2
444 Ibid. at 592
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would break the chain of causation? Cox wants to answer in the negative, 
saying that the chain of causation between the parents’ act o f intercourse and 
the foetus’s act o f implantation remains intact. In terms o f the example he has 
given, the parents’ behaviour simultaneously creates the foetus and throws it 
into the woman’s uterus. This is a rather strained way o f looking at the facts, 
however. I believe that everything Cox wants to say here is adequately 
accomplished by making the claim that it is impossible to separate what the 
foetus is from what it does; this enables us to proceed to the next claim, 
namely that when the parents engage in an act that can foreseeably create a 
foetus, they are engaging in an act which can foreseeably cause a foetus to 
implant (since what it ‘is’ and what it ‘does’ are conceptually inseparable).
All this theorising about the concept of causation notwithstanding, 
then, how would the courts actually decide on the legal cause(s) o f pregnancy 
in practice? Cox says that ‘questions of causation are answered substantially 
by policy considerations’445, and identifies ‘two reasons for assuming that the 
sexual act...could be deemed to be the legal cause of pregnancy. First, 
because the result is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the action 
(whether or not the mother consents to it) and secondly, because it is likely to 
be seen as good policy in the legal order to which McDonagh refers, namely 
one in which the personhood of the foetus is afforded legal recognition.’ 446
So, what about a legal order that did not afford legal recognition to the 
personhood of the foetus? This is an important question in the context of the 
present discussion, since what I am envisaging, in proposing a model within 
which the foetus is treated as the property o f the pregnant woman, is just such 
a legal order. There is no reason to suppose that the whole basis upon which 
legal causation is determined would be any different; therefore, we can 
assume that the question of legal cause would still be ‘answered substantially 
by policy’.
I believe that the most valuable part of Cox’s analysis of causation and 
the way it operates in McDonagh’s model is his account of the difference 
between legal and factual causes, and in particular, the analogy he draws 
between legal causes of death, which are never taken to be simply the most
445 Ibid. at 591
446 Ibid. at 593
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precise and immediate scientific cause (lack of oxygen to the brain), and the 
legal cause(s) of pregnancy, making the associated claim that the law would 
not treat what is arguably the biological definition o f pregnancy 
(implantation) as being its legal cause. In my view, this is a compelling 
analogy, and one that would be equally applicable within the kind of property- 
based analysis o f pregnancy that I propose.
4.4.2.2. Fathers ’ rights and responsibilities
Many feminist commentators have complained, rightly in my view, that 
traditionally, theorising about pregnancy, and in particular, the rhetoric o f the 
foetal-rights debate, has marginalised women to the point of invisibility. Such 
has been the focus on the emerging ‘person’ o f the foetus and its welfare that 
the pregnant woman and her interests can be forgotten, or at least ‘suspended’ 
until after she has given birth.447
One of McDonagh’s aims in Breaking the Abortion Deadlock is to 
redress this injustice by providing a framework for theorising, legislating and 
adjudicating about abortion rights which places the pregnant woman squarely 
at its centre. While she certainly succeeds in refocusing attention and concern 
upon the experience and interests of women, McDonagh achieves this mainly 
by eliminating men from the landscape of pregnancy and childbirth. 
McDonagh, o f course, would argue that men ought not to be regarded as being 
involved in the pregnancy relationship anyway, since it is, by definition, a 
relationship between the pregnant woman and the foetus. Indeed, she argues 
that it is precisely because we have failed, in the past, to characterise 
pregnancy in this way (as a bilateral relationship between a woman and a 
foetus) that policymakers and judges have allowed external interests (for 
example, the interest of the state in the continuation of foetal life) to limit the 
right of a woman to terminate an unwanted — or to use McDonagh’s term, 
‘nonconsensual’- pregnancy. By re-characterising pregnancy as a bilateral
447 See, for example, Rachel Roth, Making Women Pay: the Hidden Costs o f  Fetal Rights 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2000); Cynthia R. Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State 
Power and the Politics o f  Fetal Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Lynn 
M. Morgan & Meredith W. Michaels (eds.), Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions (Philadelphia, 
University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
151
relationship, according to McDonagh, we are able to resist such limits on the 
right.
There is another, less welcome outcome of this bilateralism, however. 
As discussed above, in order to regard pregnancy as an attack to which 
consent may be given or withheld (an understanding pivotal to McDonagh’s 
thesis as a whole), it is necessary first to sever the connection, both in cultural 
iconography and in the law, between an act of sexual intercourse and any 
subsequent (‘resulting’) pregnancy. Unless we abandon the notion that sex 
causes pregnancy, we cannot embrace the proposition that the cause of 
pregnancy is the foetus, exercising its coercive influence to change a woman’s 
body from a nonpregnant to a pregnant state in pursuit o f its own self-interest. 
I have already identified some ontological and epistemological problems with 
the notion that the foetus can plausibly be regarded as causing pregnancy, but 
this element of McDonagh’s theory also encounters a much more practical 
problem; namely, that treating pregnancy as anything other than a 
consequence of sexual intercourse impairs (perhaps fatally) the ability o f the 
law to attribute responsibility for the pregnancy, and even more importantly, 
for the resulting child, to the genetic father:
By separating the man/woman ‘sex relationship’ from the 
foetus/woman pregnancy relationship, she is drawn to the inexorable 
conclusion that the man has no legal responsibility for pregnancy, not 
having ‘caused’ it in the legal sense. Despite this, however, she is 
prepared to require that a man owe a duty to the foetus in the sense of 
being required to provide financial and other assistance.448
I suspect that, in fact, McDonagh regards the duty of the man as existing not 
toward the foetus, but rather toward the bom child. To understand why, it is 
necessary to be aware that McDonagh recognises three different sorts of 
parenthood: genetic parenthood, pregnancy parenthood or ‘gestational 
parenthood’, and social parenthood.449 She argues that, ‘while men are critical
Cox, op. cit. at 588
449 McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock  at 58-59
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to reproduction, their role does not extend over all phases.’450 So, although 
men cannot be gestational parents, they can be genetic and social parents, and 
are not therefore excluded from the parenting function on her model. The 
problem, she says, is that ‘the law is prone to elevate genetic parenthood 
above all other types of parenting’,451 whereas in her own view ‘[of] all the 
ways to be a parent, none is more significant and important that producing the 
social bonds of care and nurturing, or social parenthood.’452 Since men share 
this ability with women, ‘separating sex from pregnancy in no way impinges 
upon men’s interest in their empowerment as progenitors.’453 Rather than 
undermining the parental responsibility of men, therefore, ‘separating sex 
from pregnancy puts the reproductive picture in focus by highlighting men’s 
roles as genetic and social parents and underscoring the relationship between 
the fetus and the woman during pregnancy parenthood.’454
For McDonagh, the necessity of separating sex from pregnancy arises 
from the need for a woman to be able to say that, although she may have 
consented to the act of sexual intercourse which preceded her pregnancy, she 
nonetheless refuses to consent to the presence of the foetus in her body. 
Turning this on its head, however, a man could invoke the language of 
consent and the separation of sex form pregnancy to claim that, while he 
consented to engage in sexual intercourse with a woman, he did not consent to 
become either a genetic, or a social parent. If having sex should not lead to 
legal obligations for a woman, why should it for a man? Why should a man be 
obliged by law to provide financial or other support for a child that, on 
McDonagh’s analysis, he did not ‘cause’ or ‘create’? Why should a woman, 
by consenting to a pregnancy relationship with a foetus, be able thus to 
impose legal obligations on a man, regardless o f his consent to parenthood? 
McDonagh responds to this objection rather weakly, saying that:
450 Ibid. at 59
451 Ibid. at 58; see the case o f  Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v M r & Mrs A [2003] 1 
FLR 412 for evidence that this is equally true in the UK.
452 Ibid. at 59
453 Ibid.
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The flaw here is the failure to recognize that the Constitution allows 
the state to intrude upon a person’s economic assets with greater 
latitude than upon a person’s bodily integrity and liberty.455
This is wholly unsatisfactory as an answer, however, since state intrusion 
must always have some form of justification in a liberal democracy, and 
McDonagh’s insistence that the foetus is the only legal cause o f pregnancy 
divorces the father’s sexual act from any subsequent pregnancy and child, 
thereby denying the state any justification for impinging on his finances, since 
no legal link exists between the man and the pregnancy, or between the man 
and any child that may eventually be bom.
Why insist, then, that a woman’s consent is necessary before her legal 
relationship with the foetus (and later the child) can be established, if  a foetus, 
by implanting itself in the uterus of a woman, may coerce a man into a legal 
relationship with it? The problem here is that, whereas McDonagh identifies 
three types of parenthood, she only recognises the relevance o f consent in the 
context of pregnancy, or gestational parenthood. Consent is not an issue in the 
two sorts of parenthood which may apply to men. Following an act of 
consensual sexual intercourse, on McDonagh’s model, women have the 
ongoing ability to withdraw their consent and avoid the responsibilities of 
parenthood. Men, on the other hand, have no corresponding opportunity to 
consent, or refuse to consent, to become a parent. As such, McDonagh’s 
model is discriminatory and endows women with the power to decide, for 
men, whether or not they will become parents. This power incorporates both 
the right to prevent a man from developing a relationship with a child he 
wants, and the right to force parenthood on a man who does not wish to be a 
father.
Reviewing McDonagh’s claim that the law ‘elevates’ genetic 
parenthood above gestational and social parenthood, it is now possible to 
respond that, at least for the purposes of attaching parental responsibility, 
genetic parenthood is the only stage at which both men and women can be 
held to have consented to become parents, without discriminating unfairly
455 McDonagh, M y Body, My Consent at 1107
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between the genders by endowing women with power over men’s parental 
identity.
4.4.2.3. Implications fo r  wrongful pregnancy
At present, actions for wrongful pregnancy can be brought against ‘either a 
physician who incompetently sterilizes a person or a man who rapes a 
woman.’456 One consequence of McDonagh’s approach is that the current 
grounds for wrongful pregnancy actions would be undermined, or even 
disappear; neither a man nor a surgeon can be held responsible, legally, for a 
pregnancy that occurs subsequent to rape or incompetent sterilisation if the 
foetus alone ‘causes’ the pregnancy in the legal sense. It is not available to 
McDonagh to appeal to the fact that, in each o f these scenarios, the woman 
has not consented to expose herself to the risk o f pregnancy, since McDonagh 
contends, elsewhere, that the fact that a woman has chosen to expose herself 
to such a risk is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing wrongfulness of 
pregnancy. As such, while the rapist may be held criminally responsible for 
the act of rape, and the surgeon may be liable in civil law for medical 
negligence, the ground of ‘wrongful pregnancy’ will not be available as a 
basis for any civil action against either of them, and nor will pregnancy be 
able to be considered as a factor aggravating the crime of rape. Indeed, no-one 
can be held liable for any instance o f wrongful / nonconsensual pregnancy on 
McDonagh’s account, since the agent which causes every pregnancy -  the 
foetus -  lacks mental competence. The foetus may be destroyed, therefore, but 
not held responsible. This extinction of responsibility should give cause for 
concern, since McDonagh is, on her own analysis, identifying a significant 
harm, suffered exclusively by women, for which no party may ever be held 
responsible.
456 Ibid. at 1096.
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4.4.3. Consent
4.4.3.1. Is pregnancy the kind o f intrusion to which the law would permit 
consent?
As shown earlier, McDonagh discusses at length the nature of foetal 
aggression and the justification of deadly force in self-defence. She does not, 
however, devote much o f her discussion to the question of the nature of 
consent, what form it might take, and why consent to pregnancy ought to be 
possible despite her characterisation of pregnancy as analogous with assault, 
rape or slavery.
As McDonagh describes it, pregnancy is an horrific attack. Given that 
she characterises it as an assault, and given the severity that she ascribes to it, 
we are entitled to ask whether the law would in fact regard consent to such an 
‘act’ as valid under any circumstances. If consent is necessary in the context 
of sexual intercourse, McDonagh’s argument runs, then it must be all the 
more necessary in the context of pregnancy, since pregnancy is even more 
invasive than intercourse in a number of ways. The physical impact is much 
more prolonged, the physical changes effected upon the body of the woman 
are extensive, and the woman is placed, potentially, in a health- or life- 
threatening situation. However, it is precisely this seriousness and enormity of 
effect which raises doubts about whether pregnancy, as described by 
McDonagh, is the kind o f thing to which consent could reasonably be given.
If, as I will suggest presently, it is possible to treat all pregnancy, at 
least initially, as non-consensual, and therefore ‘wrongful’, on McDonagh’s 
model,457 then it follows that all foetuses are inescapably ‘rapists’, albeit 
without mens rea. Can an attack analogous to rape really be validated by post 
factum  consent? If pregnancy begins as an uninvited, intrusive ‘rape’, how can 
the addition o f consent transform it into something benign, even wonderful?
457 See infra, para. 4.4.3.2
156
In Scots criminal law, for example, courts have held that consent is no defence 
to a charge of assault. In Scotland, in the case of Smart v HM Advocate458 
Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley held that:
If  there is an attack on the other person and it does done with evil 
intent, that is, intent to injure and do bodily harm, then, in our view, 
the fact that the person attacked was willing to undergo the risk of that 
attack does not prevent it from being the crime of assault.459
O f course McDonagh recognises that the foetus possesses no ‘evil intent’ (as 
she puts it, ‘the fetus is innocent.. .of conscious intentions’) and does not 
suggest for a moment that we are dealing with criminal conduct.460 
Nevertheless, since pregnancy is characterised in her model as a massive 
intrusion, it is pertinent to ask whether it is the type of intrusion which could 
be rendered benign by the presence of consent. McDonagh certainly does not 
consider her model to be incompatible with benign, ‘Good Samaritan’ 
pregnancy or with the moral ideals of nurturing, caring and relationships 
generally. She attempts to demonstrate this possibility of ‘consensual 
pregnancy’ by way o f yet another analogy, between pregnancy and live organ 
donation.
McDonagh points out that the law permits persons to consent to 
considerable physical intrusions which will leave them permanently 
physically depleted and which may also place their health in great future 
danger, in order to benefit another person. Although the emotional benefit of 
knowing one has helped either to save the life of another person or to improve 
their quality o f life dramatically cannot be ignored, nonetheless donating 
one’s kidney to a patient in need of a transplant is, unquestionably, of no 
physical benefit to the donor. Indeed, such a donor has endangered him or 
herself quite considerably in that any future disease or failure of the remaining 
kidney will now pose a much greater threat than it might have done had he or 
she not donated. This analogy is potentially very promising as a support for
458 1 97 5 SL T 65
459 Ibid. at 66
460 McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock at 96
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the idea that pregnancy can be consensual despite its intrinsically invasive and 
physically-dangerous nature.
Certainly, if  the law permits us, under certain circumstances, to 
consent to have our bodies massively invaded and permanently depleted or 
endangered in order to provide sustenance to another, it seems likely also that 
the law will permit women to consent to donate their bodies to foetuses 
temporarily. However, this is where the analogy begins to break down. The 
law allows one person to consent to an invasion/harm (chiefly) for the benefit 
o f another person; however, as has already been shown, McDonagh has failed 
to establish that the foetus is really a ‘legal person’ in the relevant sense of 
having the status, rights, and dignity of a person under law. This is where her 
cipherous concept o f the legal personality of the foetus lets her down; she has 
concentrated only on the neutral aspects of foetal personality (how the 
personhood o f the foetus does not negate the right of the woman to defend 
herself) and the negative aspects (how the foetus may plausibly be regarded as 
an ‘attacker’, an agent o f harm). Ultimately, her accommodation of foetal 
personality has not been authentic, since the legal personhood of the foetus is 
not central to her thesis, and is not necessary for the application of the two 
main premises o f her model: the foetus as the cause of pregnancy; and the 
right o f  the woman to refuse her consent to a relationship with the foetus, and 
to back up her refusal by the use of deadly force.
A brief expansion of the organ-donation analogy demonstrates this 
quite clearly. A woman may undoubtedly give her consent to surgery to 
remove one o f her kidneys for donation to her daughter; however, could a 
childless woman with a family history of hereditary kidney disease opt to 
have a healthy kidney removed and kept in storage in case a future child 
required a transplant? It seems highly unlikely that such a procedure would be 
countenanced by medical practitioners, or that the woman’s informed consent 
would be sufficient to establish its permissibility. Why? It could be argued 
that in the former case, there is a known need for the organ, and compatibility 
has been established, while this is not the case in the latter scenario. However, 
even if  we expand the example of the childless woman such that she knows 
for certain that (i) she is fertile and intending to become pregnant, (ii) any 
child she bears will definitely be affected by the hereditary disease, and (iii)
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she would be a compatible donor, it is still difficult to imagine the law 
supporting her in her desire to have her healthy kidney removed, thereby 
debilitating herself and placing her life in danger.
I would suggest that the relevant difference between the two scenarios 
sketched above is that in the first scenario, the intended beneficiary is an 
existing person, whereas in the second scenario there is no person yet in 
existence who could benefit from the samaritanism being proposed. 
McDonagh’s account o f pregnancy is more analogous to the second scenario 
than the first, since the foetus is not (yet) a legal person in the relevant, 
positive senses; it is not recognised as a being with a life as valuable as that of 
the woman donating her body to it, and thus endangering herself for its 
benefit.
My claim here, then, is that, although the law will occasionally allow 
one person to volunteer to be endangered in order that another person may 
benefit, this permission is based upon assumptions about the equal value of 
human lives and the social valuing of samaritanism when practised between 
persons. If  persons attempt to practise purported acts o f ‘samaritanism’ by 
endangering or disadvantaging themselves for the benefit o f a creature that the 
law does not regard as the moral equivalent of a person, then it is doubtful 
whether this would be regarded as authentic samaritanism at all. Of course, 
the law cannot always intervene to prevent a human being from risking their 
life to save a pet; however, we can be reasonably sure that such behaviour 
would not be encouraged. It is likely that a person wishing to donate his or her 
kidney to an animal (were that biologically-viable), or to a child not yet in 
existence, would be dissuaded and ultimately thwarted by the refusal of the 
medical profession or the courts to support such a sacrifice, despite the 
presence o f clear and authentic consent. In short, samaritanism must benefit 
someone, and it is doubtful whether the foetus would count as ‘someone’ on 
McDonagh’s model, given the emptiness and negativity of the ‘personality’ 
she ascribes to it.
Although McDonagh fails in her own attempts to establish the 
possibility o f benign pregnancy, however, there are other reasons to suppose 
that, even if  pregnancy is a massive intrusion, it is the kind of intrusion which 
can be rendered benign and even valuable by consent. In the famous British
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case of R v Brown461 the issue under consideration was whether consent ought 
to be recognised as a defence to charges of assault in respect of injuries 
inflicted in the course of sado-masochistic sexual encounters. In his judgment, 
Lord Lowry opined that ‘it is not in the public interest that people should try 
to cause, or should cause, each other actual bodily harm for no good reason’462 
and that sado-masochistic activity ‘cannot be regarded as conducive to the 
enhancement or enjoyment of family life or conducive to the welfare of 
society.’463 However, as Lord Templeman noted, ‘the courts have accepted 
that consent is a defence to infliction of bodily harm in the course of some 
lawful activities.’464
In his article, Consent, Sado-Masochism and the English Common
Law ,465 Brian Bix discusses the kinds of activity to which, although
potentially-injurious, consent may nonetheless be given:
In England, there are a variety of types of physical attacks or
intrusions which, as a matter of common law, cannot constitute a 
criminal assault, usually because of some type of consent by the 
person being assaulted: boxing, “contact sports”, surgery, and rough 
horseplay.466
Bix analyses the ability o f consent to render intrusions lawful by reference to 
a number o f criteria, the last of which is ‘the moral or public value of the 
activity in question’. Although Bix cautions that this criterion is ‘susceptible 
to bias in its application’467 and should therefore ‘be considered only at the 
end, after the strong presumption in favor of liberty and autonomy have [sic] 
been considered’468, he concedes that it appears frequently ‘in one form or 
another, in the relevant judicial opinions.’469
461 [1994] 1 A.C. 212 (HL)
462 Ibid. at 254
463 Ibid. at 255
464 Ibid. at 234
465 1 7 Quinnipiac Law Review  157 (Summer 1997)
466 Ibid. at 164
467 Ibid. at 174
468 Ibid. at 175
469 Ibid.
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The ‘public value’ criterion does seem to go to the very heart of determining 
which behaviours will and will not be rendered lawful by the presence of 
consent, despite Bix’s insistence that other criteria should predominate. 
Monica Pa discusses how the consent defence operates to privilege certain 
‘valuable’ behaviours over other forms of activity which are not considered to 
have social value when she writes that:
If  actual bodily injury occurs, no consent defence is [normally] 
available, because a breach of the peace occurred, and the State has a 
compelling interest in punishing this behaviour. The individual cannot 
consent to an injury inflicted against the community. The consent 
defense is an exception to this general rule where public policy deems 
it worthy to protect a socially desirable activity.470
The key element in deciding whether or not something is the kind of activity 
to which consent is possible, then, would seem to be the value which society 
attaches to it. The judges in Brown regarded such determinations of value as 
matters o f policy which are for the legislature to decide.471 The implications 
for McDonagh’s model o f pregnancy are clear. First, consensual pregnancy 
would undeniably be regarded as ‘conducive to the enhancement or 
enjoyment o f family life’ and ‘conducive to the welfare of society’, in Lord 
Lowry’s words. Furthermore, it would certainly be considered to be ‘in the 
public interest’ for women to consent to pregnancy at least some of the time. 
Finally, given these considerations, we can conclude with some confidence 
that Parliament and the courts, having recognised the ‘moral and public value’ 
o f pregnancy and childbirth, would be willing to regard a woman’s consent to 
pregnancy as rendering the pregnancy relationship lawful. As such, it is 
finally possible to refute the objection that McDonagh’s model, in 
characterising pregnancy as an attack, leaves no scope for consensual, benign 
instances o f pregnancy.
470 Monica Pa, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle: The Criminalization o f Consensual 
Sadomasochistic Sex’ 11 Texas Journal o f  Women and the Law (Fall 2001) 51
471 See, for example, Lord Jauncey in Brown at 245-246
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However, all o f this means only that pregnancy could be benign i f  consent 
were actually possible, practically-speaking. I turn now to consider the 
possibility that this is not the case.
4.4.3.2. Is ‘consent to pregnancy ’ really possible?
The case o f R  v Olugboja established the difference between consent and 
‘mere submission’:
There is a difference between consent and submission; every consent 
involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere 
submission involves consent.473
Since, on McDonagh’s model, the woman can do nothing to prevent the 
foetus from attacking her by implanting itself in her uterus, ‘consent to 
pregnancy’ is only possible retrospectively, once the woman is already 
pregnant. She cannot consent to become pregnant, only to remaining pregnant. 
Even then, her right to withdraw consent at any moment remains, so that it 
will only be possible to describe a pregnancy as ‘consensual’ with any real 
confidence once the pregnancy is over. Moreover, no mutuality is possible. 
Since the foetus is characterised as an aggressor, we are not dealing with any 
kind of metaphorical ‘agreement’ or ‘arrangement’ between parties; we are 
being asked to understand pregnancy as a relationship between two parties 
wherein one party has the right to consent or refuse consent, but for the other 
party the issue o f consent never arises.
In other areas o f law, ‘consent’ means something more than merely 
submitting to a pre-existing situation; for example, in medical law the ideal of 
‘informed consent’ recognises the right of patients to agree to or refuse 
medical treatment, having been given all the relevant information and been 
allowed the chance to weigh it up and arrive at a decision before treatment 
commences. The patient’s right to consent entails a duty on the part of 
healthcare professionals to seek consent before attempting to provide
472 [1982] QB 320
473 Ibid. at 332
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treatment. In contract law, similarly, parties to an agreement consent to the 
contractual terms in order for the contract to be constituted; they do not 
merely submit to the terms and thus acknowledge the agreement 
retrospectively. In these examples, to say that someone has consented, either 
to medical treatment or to the terms of a contract, implies that they had the 
option not to consent.
By contrast, in the context of pregnancy as McDonagh construes it, the 
pregnant woman has never had the option to give prior consent -  she cannot 
prevent the foetal ‘attack’ and the resulting pregnancy by refusing to consent 
to it. In addition, ‘consent’ in the contexts of medical law and the law of 
contract refers to a relationship which, while not necessarily equal, has some 
possibility o f mutuality. There is more than one active ‘party’ with rights and / 
or responsibilities. In pregnancy, on the other hand, McDonagh asks us to 
regard as ‘consent’ a situation wherein one ‘person’ involuntarily imposes a 
condition upon another, who may, after the fact, choose either to submit to the 
condition or repel it by destroying the accidental ‘aggressor’. The woman’s 
‘right to consent’ is not reflected in any duty on the part of the foetus to seek 
her consent before implanting itself in her uterus -  the very idea is, of course, 
absurd. It is difficult, therefore, to see how this situation can be likened to 
‘consent’ as that concept normally operates in other areas of the law.
A related problem is the distinction between coercion and control 
which emerges from the slavery analogy McDonagh employs. The problem is 
that the legal definition o f slavery offered by McDonagh herself refers not to 
‘coercion’, but to ‘control’ -  there is no mention of the ‘will’ the slave, or of 
lack o f consent474. Under this definition, then, slavery is still slavery even if 
the slave ‘consents’ to it. This is so because, although coercion always entails 
an element o f control, the reverse is not the case; control need not necessarily 
be coercive. This distinction between coercion and control is essential to the 
relevance o f consent, a concept which is, o f course, fundamental to 
McDonagh’s model. McDonagh describes pregnancy as an attack; it always 
begins as coercion, but this element of coercion may subsequently be removed 
by the addition o f the woman’s consent. Control, on the other hand, is
474 McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion Deadlock at 74
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unaltered by consent, even taking into account the Rousseauean notion of 
‘agreeing to be bound’; one who agrees to be bound is bound -  is controlled -  
nonetheless.
So how apt is the slavery analogy? Could the willingness of a slave to 
be a slave render the ‘slavery relationship’ legally-benign on account of its 
consensuality? If  not, and if  the analogy between pregnancy and slavery is a 
fair one, then why is it that the consent of a woman to be pregnant can render 
the pregnancy relationship benign? In fact, the analogy with slavery threatens 
to undermine the power o f ‘consent’ in McDonagh’s model by casting doubt 
on the notion o f ‘benign, consensual pregnancy’ altogether. In Western legal 
systems, it is safe to say, slavery would never be recognised as a legitimate 
relationship between consenting parties. We are not permitted to ‘contract out’ 
of our fundamental human rights. If pregnancy were to involve a similar 
alienation o f personhood -  even a temporary one -  the law would struggle to 
recognise the possibility o f benign pregnancy.
These factors, taken in combination, mean that speaking about 
‘consent to pregnancy’ or about a particular pregnancy as ‘consensual’ or 
‘nonconsensual’ seems inappropriate. Rather, when the foetal ‘attack’ meets 
no resistance from the woman, it seems more appropriate to describe her lack 
of resistance as ‘submission’, not consent. This is problematic mainly because 
it undermines the possibility of consensual pregnancy. But it is also 
problematic in another way. If pregnancy cannot be described as ‘consensual’ 
until after it is complete, then all pregnancies are ‘voidable’ relationships 
which may be terminated at any point, should the woman’s feelings change. 
This may have serious social consequences for our understanding of the 
nature o f pregnancy. Pregnant women themselves, and society at large may 
become wary o f treating even a well-established and apparently consensual 
pregnancy as anything other than a ‘conditional’ good, with family, friends 
and the woman herself all reluctant to invest any emotional energy or 
expectation in something that may at any time be recharacterised as something 
coercive and therefore undesirable.
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4.4.3.3. The problem o f legitimation
A related criticism is that McDonagh’s model equates ‘consensual’ with 
‘good’, or ‘valuable’. I have already argued that her notion of ‘consent to 
pregnancy’ is closer to submission than to our ordinary understanding of 
consent. Some commentators have responded by asking: isn’t the authenticity 
o f consent what really matters?
Robin West notes that ‘liberalism rests heavily, and in some versions 
exclusively, on the moral significance of consent.’475 While she acknowledges 
that it is proper to condemn coercive and non-consensual transactions, West 
also notes the danger that ‘the consensuality of a transaction, transfer, event, 
distribution, or social system, in liberal societies, inexorably comes to be 
viewed as not only a necessary condition of its justice or value, but a 
sufficient condition as well.’476 The emphasis on consent above all else, she 
writes, means that ‘that which is consensual comes to be seen as both legal 
and good -  consent comes to be our moral marker of what we value and 
should value, as well as our legal marker of what we criminalize.’477 West is 
keen to show that consensual relationships can be damaging too:
Women consent to events and transactions and arrangements all the 
time -  day in and day out -  that do us considerable harm: from 
marriages, to love affairs, to one-night stands, to unequal pay for 
comparable work, to sexually-harassing work and school 
environments, to second shifts in the home, and to mommy tracks at 
work.478
We must therefore look beneath the consensual surface of relationships to 
discover whether the voluntariness they embody is authentic or not. West 
argues that caregiving such as that undertaken in pregnancy must be 
authentically-consensud! in order to be ‘good’ and not harmful; McDonagh’s 
model, she claims, is guilty of over-emphasis on the superficialities of
475 West, op. cit., at 2137
476 Ibid. at 2138
477 Ibid. at 2139
478 Ibid.
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consensuality at the expense of this need for real voluntariness in the giving of
479care.
These are powerful arguments. It is easy to imagine a number of 
reasons why women might submit to a pregnancy other than because they are 
undertaking the responsibility of caregiving with authentic voluntariness. The 
physical and emotional pressure exerted by the pregnancy itself can be 
tremendous. Hormonal fluctuations, feelings of responsibility or even guilt for 
causing the pregnancy (however misplaced McDonagh would regard these as 
being), social pressures and the influence of traditional norms of pregnancy, 
motherhood and femininity could combine quite powerfully to inhibit the 
ability o f a woman to say ‘no’ to the pregnancy relationship. As Monica Pa 
comments, ‘liberal formulations of consent ignore how patriarchal institutions 
create inequalities o f power that make voluntary consent impossible...the 
question is not whether consent existed, but rather, the hows and whys of 
consent.’480
4.4.4. Miscellaneous criticisms
4.4.4.1. Late abortions
‘[Another] problem with McDonagh’s theory’, according to Judith Scully, ‘is 
that it would permit abortions even in the final weeks of pregnancy -  a result 
that the majority o f the American public probably would not support.’481 
Scully elaborates the point as follows:
McDonagh appears to argue that a woman’s right to withdraw her 
consent to pregnancy can be exercised at any time, even in the ninth 
month o f pregnancy. This conclusion seems extreme, and it fails to 
adequately address the fact that, at some point in time, a fetus becomes 
viable and no longer needs to rely on a woman’s body for survival. If a 
fetus is a person and it has a right to life, then, at the point at which it
479 Ibid., passim
480 Pa, op. cit. at 88-89
481 Scully, op. cit. at 147
166
becomes viable, it would seem appropriate to weigh its right to life 
against the continuing intrusion upon the woman’s bodily 
integrity.. .Thus, at the point of viability, it seems reasonable to limit a 
pregnant woman’s ability to decide to terminate a pregnancy because 
she no longer consents to being pregnant.482
There are a couple o f problems with this argument. First, although McDonagh 
treats the foetus as a ‘legal person’, she does so only in a negative sense, and 
does not ascribe to it all o f the incidents of legal personality usually applied to 
human beings, such as a right to life. The problems inherent in her ‘cipherous’ 
notion of foetal personality are discussed under heading 4.4.1.4. Given that 
she does not recognise the foetus as a person in the strong sense of having a 
right to life, then, it is fair to assume that McDonagh would not accept any 
need to weigh the competing rights o f foetus and mother at the point of 
viability.
Another problem is that, even if  we were to accept that the foetus has a 
right to live, and that this right is not limited by its dependence upon the body 
of the pregnant woman after the point o f viability, in order to grant it 
independent existence it must first be delivered, either vaginally or by 
caesarean section. If, on McDonagh’s model, a woman cannot be forced to 
undergo the intrusion of pregnancy against her will, then surely by the same 
logic she cannot be forced to undergo the intrusions o f serious surgery or 
childbirth unwillingly? If  a woman chooses abortion post-viability it will be 
problematic to try to force her to undergo birth or caesarean delivery instead; 
the procedures are different and her right to consent to medical treatment 
surely means that she can not be compelled to undergo one procedure instead 
of another.
A potential counterargument is that, in the United States, the foetus is 
emerging as a ‘second patient’ in medical law, raising the issue of balancing 
the woman’s refusal to consent to a caesarean against the foetus’s right to life 
as a serious possibility. This is something that my own proposed model of 
pregnancy (which I call the ‘property model’ and which will be developed in
482 Ibid. at 147-148
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the following chapter) resolves. In the UK, the problem does not arise because 
several important cases have clarified the area, putting beyond any doubt the 
right o f the competent pregnant woman to consent or refuse consent to 
medical treatment, meaning that a competent patient cannot be compelled to 
undergo a caesarean section against her will.483
4.4.4.2. Women’s well-being
Judith Scully argues that:
By framing abortion as an act o f war, McDonagh suggests that a 
woman’s primary health concern should be elimination of the fetal 
attack, not her overall well-being. Within the self-defense framework, 
what right does a woman have to demand competent health care? In 
our attempts to advance the abortion debate, we must not lose sight of 
the fact that abortion is a medical procedure that is supposed to further 
the health interests of the woman 484
In other words, McDonagh’s focus on repelling the foetal ‘attack’ rather than 
on the welfare of women generally, McDonagh’s analysis ignores the need to 
secure state provision of safe abortions and good-quality backup services such 
as pre-abortion counselling and aftercare. Scully points out that the ‘consent 
model’ is incapable of discouraging certain things which are dangerous for 
women, such as unfettered access to abortion and repeated abortions , and 
criticises it on the basis that it overlooks ‘the risk that women might use 
abortion as a regular form of contraception when indeed it should be used
485only as a last resort.’
This particular criticism of the consent model is probably unwarranted. 
It is not the job o f jurisprudence to educate women about their reproductive 
health, and Scully herself admits that the law should not be used to limit the
483 The leading case is St G eorge’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S (see supra note 62)
484 Scully, op. cit. at 149
485 Ibid. at 148
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number of abortions a woman may have.486 Health education programmes 
aimed at encouraging women to practise contraception or abstinence rather 
than relying on abortion as a means o f dealing with unwanted pregnancies are 
of course vital; however, there is no reason to suppose that the adoption by the 
courts of a consent model rather than the orthodox conflict model would be 
inimical to the success o f such programmes. McDonagh’s model certainly 
provides legal justification for abortion whether it be the first or fifth abortion 
a woman seeks; however, it is a fallacy to suggest that because the law 
permits greater access to abortion that women who are receptive to health 
education will not choose to avoid unwanted pregnancies in other ways. Just 
because women have a legal right to abortion does not mean that they will 
simply throw caution to the wind, become pregnant numerous times and seek 
repeated abortions; there are overwhelming health reasons (and for many 
women, strong moral reasons) not to do so, and these reasons are likely to be 
at least as influential to women planning their reproductive lives as the legal 
rights they possess. As Scully notes, legal theory will inevitably (and very 
rightly) be complemented by measures designed to shape cultural attitudes 
and patterns of behaviour, since ‘[cjommunity advocacy and public education
487are the keys to all successful social movements.’
The health factors involved in pregnancy, and the medical advice 
which is given accordingly, will be the same whatever model the courts adopt; 
as such, public bodies’ and healthcare professionals’ duties to provide 
information and advice on reproductive health are not threatened by the 
prominence of one academic theory o f pregnancy or another. The purpose of 
legal models o f pregnancy is primarily to provide better ways for lawyers and 
lawmakers to understand and adjudicate maternal/foetal issues; such models 
are addressed in the first place to legal academics, judges and practitioners 
who are concerned with issues of legal coherence, clarity, and justification. 
They seek to provide frameworks for judicial decision-making, not for 
decision-making by women faced with unwanted pregnancies.
When deciding whether or not to seek an abortion, a pregnant women 
is likely to be concerned with her own health, perhaps the health of the foetus,
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid. at 149
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her future prospects of motherhood, possibly her relationship with her partner 
and her extended family, her existing children, her financial situation, her 
career, and many other factors. When legislatures decide what abortion laws 
to have, or when judges decide how to dispose o f a particular case involving 
matemal/foetal issues, it would be paternalistic o f them to concern themselves 
with these factors in the same way. Public policy considerations are likely to 
play a part in their deliberations, but it would be inappropriate for a judge to 
decide a case on the basis that he thought a woman was simply wrong to 
choose an abortion in her circumstances. The issues and responsibilities of 
judges and the issues and responsibilities which pregnant women must 
contend with are quite different. Because o f this, it is perfectly possible to 
endorse a legal model which permits late abortions and repeated abortions so 
long as those educating and counselling women warn them o f the dangers of 
taking full advantage of these legal rights.
4.4.43. Masculinisation o f  the foetus
Despite McDonagh’s assurances that her model avoids ‘dehumanising’ the 
foetus, the very way her model operates, and her use of language, combine to 
masculinise the foetus, regardless o f its actual biological gender. As noted 
above, McDonagh has analogised wrongful pregnancy to the crime of rape, 
thus analogising the foetus to the rapist -  the paradigmatic perpetrator of 
masculine violence on women.488 Elsewhere, she compares the foetus to a 
‘slavemaster’ 489
While she masculinises the foetus, however, she simultaneously 
feminises pregnancy. One aim o f McDonagh’s thesis is to redefine pregnancy 
as a relationship between a woman and a foetus -  a relationship in which the 
male progenitor exists, at best, as a shadowy figure, either purely historical 
(the ‘genetic parent’) or in a kind o f suspended animation until the birth of the 
child, when ‘social parenthood’ can attach to him. This banishment of the 
masculine is evident in her discussion of how pregnancy begins, where 
McDonagh refers to the precursor o f the foetus (prior to implantation) as the
488 See supra, notes 346, 358
489 See supra, notes 365, 366
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‘fertilised ovum’, choosing this term over ‘product of conception’, 
‘conceptus’, ‘cytoblast’, ‘zygote’ or any o f the other ungendered terms 
available to her. Of all the alternatives, ‘fertilised ovum’ is the most effective 
in de-masculating the event of conception and the beginnings of life. 
Pregnancy begins, on McDonagh’s model, quite literally on feminine terms.
There is a palpable tension in the juxtaposition of the feminine 
terminology o f ‘fertilised ovum’ with the masculine terminology of 
penetration, invasion and injury used to describe the behaviour o f this entity. 
In its behaviour, the foetus is decidedly masculine, performing the 
stereotypically patriarchal role of colonising, terrorising and depleting a 
woman. The language McDonagh employs in these parts of her analysis echo 
the idea of the foetus-as-monster, which appears elsewhere in the feminist 
canon.
In a fascinating essay, Ernest Larsen discusses Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein as a metaphor for pregnancy.490 At the centre of the narrative, he 
tells us, is a ‘man-created monster’,491 the ‘incarnation o f phallic violence’.492 
Larsen writes:
the tale exteriorizes pregnancy, making it into a momentous, exacting 
and, as described, incredibly disgusting feat that occurs in the 
laboratory of the young manly natural philosopher Frankenstein rather 
than in the natural laboratory o f the womb.
Larsen claims that Shelley is making a conscious link between ‘fetality’ and 
‘fatality’:
Mary Shelley...can be credited with creating (giving birth to) the 
image o f the fetus as monster, the fetus as revivified corpse, the fetus 
as a pile o f used body parts 493
490 Ernest Larsen, ‘The Fetal Monster’, in Lynn M. Morgan and Meredith W. Michaels (eds.) 
Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1999)
491 Ibid. at 237
492 Ibid. at 238
493 Ibid. at 238-239
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He goes on to describe the 1931 film o f the novel as ‘fetal horror’, and quotes 
Garrett Hardin’s reference, in his 1974 book Mandatory Motherhood, to uses 
o f foetal imagery by the pro-life movement:
‘Suppose the six-foot-tall projected picture o f a twenty-four-week-old 
embryo came to life, stepped down off the screen, and walked toward 
ou would probably run screaming from the room. At that size the 
creature would look less like ahuman being than it would like the Man 
from Mars constructed for a horror movie.’ Hardin connects the 
monstrosity o f pro-life fetal representation to horror movies.494
Having discussed Frankenstein and other Hollywood films in which women 
give birth to monsters, Larsen remarks:
The popularity of such images of the fetus as monster seems a 
repeated confirmation of what fatality might often feel like -  an 
invasive experience of the monstrous -  to the pregnant subject. 
Pregnancy, in such representations, subjugates the thematics of horror, 
contains the fantasy, nurtures it. That which is unknown or 
unknowable, unnamed or unnameable, unstable, but ever more 
insistent, hidden from sight yet imperiously present to the body, is that 
thrilling territory o f fear that marks out the site of horror. And all these 
qualities mark the fetus, every fe tus , as a potential monster.. .Fetality 
contains horror, the expressive extremity of feeling that horror films
495sanction.
Larsen concludes by reassuring the reader, lightheartedly, that ‘the fetus -  in 
the overwhelming number o f cases -  is not a monster. In the overwhelming 
number of cases it first has to be delivered into the world and then grow up to 
become one.’496 Although Larsen seeks here to distance himself from the 
claim that ‘fetality’ equals monstrosity by stating that this is not so ‘in the
494 Ibid. at 239, citing Garrett Hardin, Mandatory Motherhood: The True Meaning o f  “Right 
to L ife’’ (Houghton Mifflin Co, 1974)
495 Ibid. at 240-241
496 Ibid. at 249
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overwhelming number of cases’, he implicitly acknowledges that in some 
cases, the foetus is monstrous. This is hardly the kind of sentiment that 
requires no further justification, and while the rest of Larsen’s essay contains 
plenty of evidence that many representations o f the foetus contain elements of 
the monstrous, nowhere does he provide any adequate explanation of why the 
foetus is so represented. He comes close a couple o f times: first, when he 
traces the origins o f Mary Shelley’s horrific ‘metaphor for pregnancy’ to 
events in her own family history such as death in childbirth and infant 
mortality and to the general dangers inherent in pregnancy at the time when 
she lived and wrote; the other point at which an explanation seems to be close 
is when Larsen suggests that Hollywood representations of pregnancy (and its 
aftermath) as horrific might reflect ‘what fatality might often feel like.. .to the 
pregnant subject’.
At any rate, Larsen’s concluding minimisation of foetal monstrosity is 
unconvincing given that elsewhere he has claimed that ‘the fetus, every fetus , 
[is] a potential monster’ and speculates that pregnancy ‘might often feel like 
[Hollywood horror narratives].. .to the pregnant subject’ (my emphasis).
McDonagh’s model, and Larsen’s discussion, reveal that 
‘personification’ of the foetus as a ‘separate entity’ with personhood or 
person-like characteristics does not always work to the foetus’s advantage. 
Ascribing person-like attributes to foetuses and embryos does not necessarily 
entail that they will be treated like bom persons and afforded greater legal 
protection than is currently the case. On the contrary, they may be regarded as 
malign agents of injury -  as ‘monsters’, even -  to be repelled using deadly 
force. Claiming that the foetus ought to be regarded as a legal person may, in 
the end, turn out to be a bad strategic choice for opponents of abortion.
4.5. Conclusions
McDonagh’s ‘consent model’ provides an ‘innovative and provocative.. .new 
way of thinking about women, pregnancy, and abortion rights’497, and several 
elements in her approach represent valuable contributions to the literature on
497 Scully, op. cit. at 143
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legal interventions in pregnancy. In particular, her emphasis on relationships 
rather than intrinsic moral status is to be welcomed, as it represents a 
significant shift in thinking which seems to offer legal theory an escape-route 
from the familiar intractable debates about the metaphysics of personhood and 
moral status.
Unfortunately, as promising as this approach seems at first, it fails on 
account of major flaws in the way McDonagh employs such concepts as self- 
defence, causation and consent. Judith Scully has remarked that ‘McDonagh’s 
analysis...leaves many questions unanswered’.498 In this chapter I have 
addressed these holes in her thesis, and demonstrated that upon further 
scrutiny the inadequacies o f the consent model become even more apparent. 
Significantly, the failure o f McDonagh’s attempt to discover a ‘purely legal’ 
way of understanding foetal personhood demonstrates that legal notions of 
personhood are too ‘thin’ and cipherous to provide solutions to maternal / 
foetal issues. This means that, if  we insist on framing such issues as conflicts 
of rights and interests, courts will be forced to fall back on the metaphysics of 
personhood. As was demonstrated in chapter two, even this ‘full-blooded’ 
version of personhood is incapable o f serving as a criterion for moral status in 
borderline cases, and accordingly, it is incapable of answering the most 
fundamental questions about the nature and status o f the foetus.
In the next chapter, I build on two positive features o f the consent 
model — the focus away from the nature o f the foetus, and the emphasis on the 
relationships involved in pregnancy -  to construct another alternative to the 
orthodox ‘conflict model’. I will show that my preferred model, which is 
based on property, retains the advantages of the consent model and possesses 
other advantages besides, while solving the problems inherent in the conflict 
model much more effectively than the consent model can. Unlike the consent 
model, the ‘property model’ is not a refinement of the conflict model; it is an 
altogether more radical way o f thinking about pregnancy and maternal/foetal 
issues. Most importantly, the property model does not suffer from the 
problems which, ultimately, defeat the consent-based approach.
498 Ibid. at 131
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5. The Property Model of Pregnancy
‘If, legally speaking, the foetus is not a person, is it property?’499
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I elaborate what I consider to be a promising alternative to the 
problematic ‘conflict model’ of pregnancy: a model o f adjudication based on 
an understanding of pregnancy as a property relationship. As I demonstrated 
in chapter one, the conflict model is unsatisfactory. As I explained in chapters 
two and three, the problems associated with it are largely due to its 
dependence on contested ethical concepts: in particular, the concept of 
personhood, which underpins the conflict model, is incapable of functioning 
as a determinant of moral status in hard or borderline cases (of which the 
foetus is perhaps the paradigmatic example); moreover, ‘personhood’ 
inevitably involves questions of sentience, and the questions o f when, if  ever, 
the foetus becomes sentient, and to what extent, are far from settled.
In chapter four I examined the most comprehensive attempt to 
reinvigorate debate about maternal / foetal issues: Eileen McDonagh’s 
‘consent model’ of pregnancy and abortion rights, which claims to ‘break the 
abortion deadlock’, essentially by refining the conflict model and reframing 
the relevant conflict as one that takes place between legal persons. Having 
concluded that the ‘consent model’ fails, ultimately, to resolve the problems 
inherent in the traditional version of the ‘conflict model’ — and in fact creates 
many totally new problems -  I argue, in this chapter, for the complete 
abandonment o f the conflict model in all its guises, and the adoption of a new 
‘property model’ o f pregnancy. The property model, I shall argue, has several 
distinct advantages over traditional or orthodox ways o f debating and 
adjudicating pregnancy: it explains and justifies features which currently 
appear as inconsistencies or contradictions in the current law, and provides
499 Wells and Morgan, op. cit. at 438
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possible solutions to contested issues such as surrogacy, the ‘rights’ of fathers 
in decision-making about pregnancy, and the role o f the state in setting limits 
on abortion.
The first stage o f my argument here has to be to ask whether it even 
makes any sense to speak of pregnancy as a property relationship, and of 
embryos and foetuses as objects of property relationships. Intuitively, it may 
seem like an absurd or even an offensive idea. However, courts in the United 
Kingdom have maintained consistently that personhood attaches at birth, and 
accordingly, they have refused to ascribe legal personality to foetuses or 
embryos. In a variety o f disparate cases, courts have affirmed that under UK 
law, the foetus has no separate legal existence.500 In addition, the Report of 
the Wamock Committee, published in 1984, states that ‘[the] human embryo 
per se has no legal status. It is not, under law in the United Kingdom, 
accorded the same status as a child or an adult, and the law does not treat the 
human embryo as having a right to life.’501 This being the case, we are entitled 
to ask, with Wells and Morgan: if  embryos and foetuses are not persons in 
law, what are they? Are they ‘things’? And if  they are things, can they be 
owned?
5.2. What is property?
For those who subscribe to the person / property binary, as I do for the 
purposes of this discussion, it is possible to define property negatively, as the 
absence of personhood. On this view, if  it has been settled that an entity is not 
a person, as is the case with the embryo and foetus under United Kingdom 
law, then according to the binary, it can be an object o f  property relations. 
This is so because the person / property binary recognises only two categories 
of entity: those which are persons, and can form property relations with other 
persons in respect of ‘mere things’; and those entities which are not persons 
and can therefore be objects o f  property relations between persons.
500 Such cases include: St G eorge’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S  (see supra note 62) / Paton v 
Trustees o f  the BPAS [1979] 1 QB 276; C v S  [1988] 1 QB 135; Re F  (in utero) [1988] Fam 
122; Burton v Islington Health Authority [1992] 3 All ER 833; De M artell v Merton and 
Sutton HA [1992] 3 All ER 820 and D e Martell v Merton and Sutton HA 3 All ER 833 CA.
501 Mary Wamock, A Question o f  Life: The Wamock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) para. 11.16
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Many attempts have also been made to construct positive definitions of 
property, however, and it is important to pay attention to them here, for two 
reasons. First, because, as will be shown, the person / property binary is not 
universally accepted; second, because other jurisdictions -  notably in the 
United States - have been willing to ascribe personhood, albeit in a limited 
form, to the foetus. Accordingly, it is insufficient to define the foetus as 
property simply because it lacks legal personhood; what is needed here is a 
demonstration that the foetus possesses the positive features o f property, 
where these can be discerned, so that two things may be accomplished: first, 
any attempt to ascribe personhood or quasi-personhood to the foetus can be 
shown to be erroneous; and second, the foetus-as-property can be asserted in a 
manner convincing to those who reject the person / property binary.
5.2.1. Definitions of property
Property is a notoriously mercurial concept; in the words o f J. W. Harris, ‘any 
general notion of property is notoriously elusive’ . There is no exhaustive 
list of criteria and no scientific formula for determining whether or not 
something counts as property. As Laura Underkuffler remarks: ‘Property 
reflects the ways in which we resolve conflicting claims, visions, values, and 
histories. Yet, despite this important role, there is remarkably little exploration 
of what property -  as a socially and legally constructed idea -  really is.’503 
Nevertheless, Harris says, ‘all o f us (philosophers, lawyers and ordinary folk) 
seem to share an intuitive sense o f what property is.’504 Indeed, legal scholars 
generally agree that the term ‘property’ refers not to objects themselves, but to 
the network of legal and social relationships which surround them:
The idea that property is ‘things’ is .. .easily discredited by lawyers and 
philosophers for its awkwardness and incompleteness...although the 
idea o f property as ‘things’ commands great cultural and rhetorical
502 J. W. Harris, ‘Who Owns M y Body?’ Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies Vol. 16 (1) (1996)
55 at 57
503 Laura S. Underkuffler, The Idea o f  Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 
at 11
504 J. W. Harris, op. cit. at 58
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power, it fails to reflect the rich meanings of property in social 
discourse and law.505
Citing a famous theorist o f property, Underkuffler continues:
In his famous essay, ‘The Meaning o f Property’, C.B. Macpherson 
states that ‘in law and in the writers, property is ...rights, rights in or to 
things.’ The American Law Institute has adopted this approach, stating 
in its Restatement that property denotes ‘legal relations between 
persons with respect to .. .thing[s]’.506
We have ‘an intuitive notion that property is somehow “thing-based”’507. By 
understanding property as relations between persons in respect of things, we 
satisfy this intuition without committing ourselves to the ‘awkward’ definition 
of property as things. Rather, property consists in relationships about
• cno
things. Yet more support for the view of property as relationships, rather 
than things, comes from other contemporary legal scholars. Kathleen Guzman 
writes that: ‘Legally, property is not a tangible thing but rather a series of 
enforceable rights to use, possess, enjoy, exclude, dispose, and destroy that 
thing. While ownership is usually thought to embody all o f these rights, any 
one of them, standing alone, is property.’509 Ngaire Naffine agrees, defining 
property as follows:
Briefly, property describes a legal relationship between persons in 
respect o f  an object, rather than the relation between a subject and the 
objects possessed as properties of the person. The invocation of a 
property right entails the proprietor’s exercising control over a thing, 
the object o f property, against the rest o f the world which is thereby 
excluded from use. Property thus defines the limits of my sphere of
505 Ibid. at 11-12
506 Ibid. at 12
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid.
509 Kathleen R. Guzman, ‘Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Transfer o f Wealth’ 31 U. C. Davis L. Rev. (1997) 193 at 212-213
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influence over the world; it defines the borders of my control over 
things and so marks the degree o f my social and legal power.510
Naffine’s definition introduces another point o f  convergence in legal writing 
about property: perhaps because of the lack o f a scientific formula for 
deciding whether or not a particular situation counts as an example of 
property, most writers tend to define property not in terms o f what it is, but in 
terms of what it does, the social and political functions it performs. Jennifer 
Nedelsky has described the role of property as being to delineate a bounded 
sphere, ‘autonomy’, into which the state cannot enter.511 Similarly, Charles 
Reich describes property as drawing ‘a circle around the activities of each 
private individual...by creating zones within which the majority has to yield 
to the owner.’512 Alice Tay writes that ‘property is that which a man has a 
right to use and enjoy without interference; it is what makes him a person and 
guarantees his independence and security.’513 When I come to discuss the 
advantages of the property model of pregnancy in greater detail, this political 
function of property will be relevant, since adopting the property model will 
mean giving property to women during pregnancy -  a context in which 
women often suffer from a lack o f political and social power.
The view o f property as relationships has perhaps its most familiar 
expression in the claim that property is a ‘bundle o f rights’. Brian Ocepek 
writes that ‘property is usually thought to consist o f a “bundle of rights” that a 
person or persons have in a certain object.’514 The decision in the United 
States case of Moore v Regents o f  the University o f  California515 supports the 
view of property as a ‘bundle o f rights’. The Moore court adopted the 
definition of property contained in the Encyclopedia o f  American 
Jurisprudence:
510 Ngaire Naffine, ‘The Legal Structure o f  Self-Ownership: Or The Self-Possessed Man and 
the Woman Possessed’ Journal o f  Law and Society 25(2) (1998) 193 at 197
511 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ in A. 
Hutchinson and L. Green (eds.) Law and the Community: The End o f  Individualism?
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 230
512 Charles Reich, ‘The N ew  Property’ (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733 at 771
513 Alice Tay, ‘Law, the Citizen and the State’ in E. Kamenka, R. Brown and A. Tay (eds.)
Law and Society: The Crisis in Legal Ideals (London: Edward Arnold, 1978) at 10
514 Brian M. Ocepek, ‘Heating Up the Debate Over Frozen Embryos’ 4 Journal o f  Pharmacy 
and Law  (1995) 199 at 217
515 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1409, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498 (1988)
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In its strict legal sense ‘property’ signifies that dominion or indefinite 
right o f  use, control and disposition which one may lawfully exercise 
over particular things or objects; thus ‘property’ is nothing more than a 
collection of rights.516
For the purposes of the present discussion it is important to note, at this stage, 
that a property-based analysis concentrates on relationships instead of asking, 
‘what is this entity’? The implications of this for theorising and adjudicating 
maternal / foetal issues are far-reaching: if it is, indeed, possible to apply a 
property model to pregnancy, this would allow us to focus away from 
questions of intrinsic status and look instead at the relationships surrounding 
the embryo or foetus in utero. This would represent a significant 
breakthrough, since it would allow the law to avoid interminable debates 
about the intrinsic nature of the foetus and its moral status and to focus instead 
on relationships. Regulation of relationships between persons is, after all, the 
‘stuff o f law’, unlike questions of moral status, which are the stuff of 
metaphysics.
O f course, ethical and philosophical discussion about the nature o f the 
foetus and the moral status which ought to ascribe to it will continue in 
parallel with legal debate and adjudication of the relationships surrounding 
pregnancy; the property model of pregnancy is not intended as an alternative 
to, or an end to, moral debate. The advantage of the property model is simply 
that it would allow courts to do the work of adjudication in the absence of 
moral consensus. Since discussions of maternal / foetal issues are 
characterised by lack of moral consensus, and promise to remain so for the 
foreseeable future, the necessity of being able to resolve individual cases 
without such consensus must surely be clear. Robert Lee and Derek Morgan 
point out that to believe such fundamental moral issues can be solved ‘betrays 
a misunderstanding of what moral disagreement is about, as much as it does 
about the political process of legislating life or regulating reproduction.’517 As 
Lee and Morgan have observed, ‘there comes a time when fundamental moral
516 202 Cal. App 3d at 1415, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504; citing 63A Am. Jur. 2nd, Property, § 1
517 Ibid. at 23
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disagreement collides with public and professional demands for certainty or 
consistency’.518 The need to adjudicate despite moral controversy is thus a 
very real and immediate need, and, it is submitted, one that can be met by 
adopting the property model of pregnancy.
We are now in a position to ask whether embryos and foetuses are the 
kinds of ‘things’ which can be the objects of property relationships. Clearly, 
they are not legal persons, so at least the possibility o f property arises. 
However, as acknowledged above, the mere lack of personhood is too meagre 
a basis for claiming that an entity can be an object of property, both because 
many writers dispute the idea that persons and property are the only two 
categories into which entities can be organised, and because a much stronger 
case can be made by having regard to legal sources and finding positive 
evidence in support of the notion of property-in-the-foetus.
O f course, my thesis is primarily concerned with pregnancy, and its 
primary claim is that foetuses in utero can be objects of property relations. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its lack of intuitive appeal, this notion has had 
no airing in the legal literature to date: I have found no reference to property 
in the foetus in utero, either in case law or in academic commentary. This 
being the case, my examination begins with a look at legal decisions involving 
ex utero (frozen) embryos, noticing an emerging jurisprudence of property in 
that area and asking whether it can be translated or extrapolated into the 
pregnancy context.
5.3. Property in the frozen embryo
Before going on to ask whether embryos and foetuses are ‘things’ capable of 
ownership, however, it is necessary to note that not all scholars accept the 
person / property binary. Immanuel Kant distinguished, famously, between 
two sorts of entity -  persons, and those entities which have ‘only a relative 
value as means, and are consequently called things’ (which could be objects
518 Robert G. Lee and Derek Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulating the 
Reproductive Revolution, (London: Blackstone Press, 2001) at 24
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of property)519 - and many contemporary writers uphold the notion that all 
entities can be filed under one or other o f these two categories. Particularly in 
literature relating to pregnancy, writers often refer to the ‘mixed status’ of the 
foetus as neither a person nor a ‘mere thing’. One o f the most widespread 
justifications for ‘mixed status’ is the claim that embryos and foetuses are 
‘potential persons’, and thus are entitled to greater moral consideration than 
other entities which have no possibility of attaining personhood. Marie Fox, 
one commentator who challenges the dualistic distinction between persons 
and property, regards the ‘mixed status’ approach to frozen embryos as ‘an 
emerging international consensus on the legal status of the embryo.’
In Fox’s view, ‘mixed status’ approaches are misleading and will 
inevitably be unhelpful since they attempt to define the embryo by reference 
to two ‘ill-fitting’ categories, personhood and property. Her solution is to 
abandon attempts to liken embryos either to persons or to property, focusing 
instead on what they are ‘really’ like. According to Fox, the closest metaphor 
for embryos created outside the body of a woman would be a ‘cyborg 
metaphor’ since, like the cyborg, the ex utero, cryo-preserved embryo is an 
organic entity which is dependent, for its survival/ development, either upon 
technology or upon the body of a woman. Another commentator who rejects 
the property / person binary is Hugh McLachlan. He writes: ‘People and 
things cannot be classified exhaustively as either “persons” or 
“property” ...Many things are neither persons nor property.’521 Like Fox, 
McLachlan favours abandoning the language o f personhood and property 
altogether in attempting to determine how we ought to respond, legally, to 
such entities:
519 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: K ant’s Groundwork o f  the Metaphysics o f  Morals, trans. 
H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1948) at 91
520 Marie Fox, ‘Pre-Persons, Commodities or Cyborgs: The Legal Construction and 
representation o f the Embryo’ 8 Health Care Analysis (2000) 171 at 181. Fox observes that 
the ‘mixed status’ approach reflects the approach taken by the Wamock Committee, and is 
itself reflected in the Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and the Dignity o f the 
Human Being With regard to the application o f Biology and Biomedicine ( ‘the Bioethics 
Convention’), adopted by the Council o f Europe in 1996.
521 Hugh McLachlan, ‘Persons and Their Bodies: How We Should Think About Human 
Embryos’ 10 Health Care Analysis (2002) 155 at 157
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I am not sure what sense, if  any, it makes to talk of a status between 
property and personhood...‘person’ and ‘property’ are not, so to 
speak, conceptually contiguous. They do not merge: they are different 
types o f  categories from each other; they are not, as it were, at either 
ends o f the same spectrum.522
Instead o f straining to accommodate embryos somewhere within the 
‘spectrum’ o f personhood and property, McLachlan insists that we should 
acknowledge and respond to what an embryo ‘actually is’: a ‘partially
523developed human body’. Thus, for McLachlan, the salient question is not 
‘are embryos and foetuses persons or property?’, but rather, ‘what rights and 
duties have we in respect o f partially-formed human bodies?’
Much about McLachlan’s approach is puzzling. For example, why 
does he choose to define an embryo as a ‘partially developed human body’, 
rather than as a ‘partially developed human being?’ Surely by such logic an 
adult would be defined as a ‘fully developed human body’? Can we not 
assume that all aspects o f the being are partially developed at the embryonic 
stage, and if  not, why not?
Another puzzling feature of McLachlan’s analysis comes toward the 
end, where he states that ‘an embryo is neither a person nor (unequivocally) 
property. It could become (unequivocally) property if our legal conventions 
and interpretations o f them changed. It could not become a person.,524* This 
implies that, unlike Fox (who rejects the idea o f the embryo-as-property on 
the basis that the category ‘property’ is intrinsically incapable of 
accommodating the embryo satisfactorily), McLachlan’s only reason for 
rejecting the proposition that embryos can be property is the fact that the law 
does not currently recognise them as such. If ‘our legal conventions and 
interpretations o f them’ were to change so that the law did speak of embryos 
in terms o f property, McLachlan indicates here that this would be sufficient 
for embryos to ‘become’ property. His rejection of embryos-as-persons is 
clearly much more principled, however, since an embryo ‘could not become a
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid. at 159
524 Ibid. at 163
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person’, and (on the basis of his silence on the matter) this is presumably true 
irrespective o f any legal turnaround on the issue of embryonic or foetal 
personhood.
Obviously, since a change to ‘our legal conventions and interpretations 
of them’ is precisely what I am proposing in this thesis, and since, if  my 
proposed change were to be well-received by the courts, McLachlan’s ‘binary 
scepticism’ would dissolve, I should probably prefer his approach to that of 
Marie Fox. Self-interest aside, however, Fox’s analysis is much stronger; it is 
prescriptive, where McLachlan’s appears to be mainly descriptive, and her 
proposed alternative to property / personhood (the ‘cyborg metaphor’) is more 
coherent than McLachlan’s suggestion that we treat embryos as ‘partially 
developed human bodies’.
All things considered, then, Marie Fox provides a much stronger 
rejection o f the person / property binary. As exciting as Fox’s cyborg 
metaphor is, however, her analysis is confined to frozen embryos and it is 
unclear what (if anything) it would mean for the adjudication of maternal / 
foetal issues. Moreover, for the purposes of my argument here, it is 
unnecessary to seek out a ‘third way’ of classifying and dealing with embryos 
and foetuses. Writers like Fox, who reject the person / property binary, do so 
because they take the view that neither arm of the binary can accommodate 
the foetus satisfactorily. My own view, which I shall develop throughout the 
course of this chapter, is that a classification of the foetus as an object of 
property need not be legally problematic. As such, one of my claims in this 
chapter is that, whether we view entities as separable into two categories, or 
into more, the foetus fits readily under the heading ‘object o f property’, at 
least for legal purposes.
Support for the view that frozen embryos can be regarded as property 
comes from a variety of authoritative sources: advisory bodies, judicial 
decisions, and academic commentary.
5.3.1. Advisory bodies
In the United Kingdom, the Wamock Committee, whose report formed the 
basis for legal regulation of assisted reproduction, recommended that the
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couple who store an embryo should have use and disposal rights in respect of
c 'y  c
it, and was also prepared to countenance licenses permitting the sale of 
gametes and embryos. In the United States, an American Fertility Society 
ethical statement specifically provides that ‘concepti are the property of the 
donors’.527
As such, it can be said that the concept of property rights in frozen 
embryos is accepted by ethicists both in Britain and in America. The 
American Fertility Society acknowledges this explicitly. The Wamock 
Committee went out of its way to try to deny that its recommendations 
supported property-in-the-embryo, recommending ‘that legislation be enacted 
to ensure there is no right of ownership in a human embryo’528 but as 
Kennedy and Grubb have commented: ‘What is ownership if it is not the right 
to control, including to dispose of by sale, or otherwise?’529. This sentiment is 
echoed by Brian Ocepek when he says that ‘[property] principles can be 
applied to frozen embryos, since certain persons -  namely the donors -  can 
assert rights to use and enjoy the embryos.530
5.3.2. Case law
So far, all o f the case law which considers the application o f property 
principles to frozen embryos has come from the United States. Even in the 
US, however, only one case, York v Jones,531 has held, explicitly, that frozen 
embryos are a type of property.
The judge [in York v Jones] looked upon the relationship between the 
couple and the [IVF clinic] as a bailor/ bailee relationship, and further 
referred to the contract between the couple and the institute which 
consistently referred to the pre-zygote as the property of the
525 Wamock, op. cit. zXparas 10:11-12
526 Ibid., para. 13:13
527 Ethics Committee o f the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations o f  the New 
Reproductive Technologies (1990)
528 Wamock, op. cit., at para. 10.11
529 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, M edical Law: Texts and Materials (London: 
Butterworths, 1989) at 682
530 Ocepek, op. cit., at 217
531 717 F. Supp. 421 (1989)
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couple...Although the judge in this case did not face the question of 
whether one spouse has a greater property interest in the pre-zygote 
than another, this case is judicial precedent for the view that frozen 
embryos are to be treated as property for the resolution of disputes.532
Although York v Jones is a landmark case, the decision was made fairly 
straightforward by the existence of a contract between the parties which 
referred to property rights. As such, the judgment in this case was neither 
constructed out o f jurisprudential principles nor inspired by any policy 
reasons for construing frozen embryos as property:
The court looked to the contract between the parties, which recognized 
the couples “proprietary” rights in the embryos created with their 
gametes. Because the clinic defined its rights in the contract that it 
drafted, the couple owned the embryos and were entitled to possession 
of them for any purpose.533
So on what basis was the contract held to create property rights in the frozen 
embryo? Brian Ocepek tells us that the court found the following provisions 
to infer that the clinic recognized the Yorks’ property rights in the embryo: 
‘first, the Yorks had primary responsibility to decide the disposition o f the 
embryo; second, the embryo would not be released from storage without the 
Yorks’ written consent; and third, in the event of a divorce, the legal 
ownership of the embryo would be determined in a property settlement.’534 
The court in the case of Kass v Kass535 declared that ‘it had no cause to 
consider the precise legal status of the embryos, because it found that the 
agreement between the parties as to the disposition of the embryos in the
532 Michelle F. Sublett ‘Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat 
Them?’ 38 Cleveland State Law Review  (1990) 585 at 598
533 Marla Clark, ‘Potential Parenthood: The Ownership o f  Frozen Embryos’ 43 Res Gestae 
(1999) 24 at 28
534 Ocepek, op. cit., at 209
535 673 N. Y. S. 2d 350 (1998)
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event of divorce controlled.’536 Here, as in York v Jones, a written agreement 
precluded the need for jurisprudential analysis of the soundness, not to 
mention the desirability, of treating frozen embryos as property.
Another case, Del Zio v Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center may 
also be seen to support the notion that frozen embryos are property. In this 
case, a treatment facility destroyed a frozen embryo before it could be 
implanted. The couple sued for conversion and for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The court in this case did not rule on the issue of whether 
the frozen embryo was property, but Ocepek has argued that the judge’s 
willingness to instruct the jury on the issue of conversion, which could not 
arise except in the context of property, can be taken to imply that the court 
assumed that the frozen embryo could be regarded as property in the legal 
sense:
The significance o f the [Del Zio] case lies in the fact that the court 
allowed the Del Zios to bring the [conversion] claim in the first place. 
It may be inferred, from the fact that it allowed a property-based tort 
claim to be brought in a case dealing with a frozen embryo, that the 
federal district court in Del Zio considered the embryo to be personal 
property.. .thus, in Del Zio we have some inkling of how a court might 
approach the subject of frozen embryos, even though the Del Zio court 
did not expressly state that embryos are property.538
In yet another US case, that of Davis v Davis539, the embryos under dispute 
were treated as objects of property by the Tennessee Court o f Appeals, 
although this was overturned by the state’s Supreme Court in the final appeal. 
Almost all possibilities -  persons, property, or something in between - were 
considered during the various stages of the legal process:
536 Clark, op. cit., at 26
537 No. 74-3588, slip op. (S. D. N. Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (as summarised in Lori. B. Andrews, 
‘The Legal Status o f the Embryo’ 32 Loyola Law Review  (1986) 357 at 367-8
538 Ocepek, op. cit., at 207
539 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir.)
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In settling the parties’ dispute, the courts were faced with the 
fundamental question of what status should be accorded the frozen 
embryos. ..[Mrs Davis] argued that...the embryos were ‘children’, the 
custody of whom should be decided by reference to the ‘best interest 
o f  the child’ standard. The trial court agreed and determined that the 
best interest lied (sic) in [Mrs. Davis’s] attempts to bear them, rather 
than in [Mr Davis’s] wishes that they be destroyed. The Tennessee 
Court o f Appeals reversed...analyzing the dispute as one over 
competing property interests. The Tennessee Supreme Court.. .rejected 
the analysis o f both of the lower courts and instead held that the 
embryos occupied an intermediate category between property and 
personhood that ‘entitled them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.’540
The Supreme Court in this case adopted a ‘mixed status’ approach to frozen 
embryos:
According to the court, frozen embryos are not persons or property, 
rather they ‘occupy an interim category that entitles them to special 
respect because o f their potential for human life.’ Therefore the Davis’ 
did not have a true property interest in the embryos, but more of an 
interest ‘in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have 
decision-making authority concerning disposition’ of the embryos.541
Brian Ocepek has accused this decision to classify the embryos neither as 
persons nor as property, but as something in between, o f ‘clouding the 
picture’.542 He complains: ‘[The courts] in effectively stating what a frozen 
embryo is not, have failed to state what a frozen embryo is. In a very real 
sense then, the debate is still unresolved, and if nothing else, is more
540 Clark, op. cit. at 25
541 Ocepek, op. cit. at 211-212
542 Ibid. at 202
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convoluted than ever.’543 Marla Clark agrees that ‘no clear approach to 
determining interests in frozen embryos has emerged from the handful of 
cases that have been decided thus far.’544
So how would courts in the United Kingdom be likely to respond to 
the idea o f frozen embryos as property? Andrew Grubb has claimed that:
When a court is seized of a case...[it] would have no choice but to 
treat an extra-corporeal embryo as either a person or a chattel. The 
likely outcome is that it would be held to be a chattel. Such law as 
exists points in this direction and the pragmatism of the common law 
would see that to treat an extra-corporeal embryo as a chattel is more 
consistent with common sense than for it to be given the rights of a
545person.
Note that here Grubb seems to be accepting that the person / property binary 
holds good for legal purposes, even if it fails to reflect and capture the 
complexities inherent in attempts to determine the moral status of the foetus.
Other British commentators have echoed Grubb’s view that courts in 
this country would be likely to treat frozen embryos as ‘chattels’. 
Commenting on the recent British ‘frozen embryos’ cases o f Evans & 
Hadley,546 Professor J.K. Mason has advocated the adoption o f a property 
framework for the disposal of frozen embryos.547 He writes:
There are, in fact, good pragmatic reasons why it is positively right to 
vest the woman with a form of property rights in her embryo. In the 
first place, she has done much more to produce the embryo than has 
the man -  IVF treatment provides no easy road for the would-be
543 Ibid. at 213
544 Clark, op. cit., at 29
545 Andrew Grubb, ‘The Legal Status o f  the Frozen Human Embryo’ in A. Grubb (ed.), 
Challenges in M edical Care (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1991) at 72
546 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd; Hadley v Midland Fertility Services Ltd; [2003] EWHC 
2161 (Fam)
547 J.K. Mason, ‘Analysis: Discord and Disposal o f Embryos’ Edinburgh Law Review  Vol. 8 
(2004) pp 84-93
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mother. Secondly, the woman is solely responsible for the hoped-for
c ^ o
metamorphosis from embryo to fetus to neonate.
This remark will be analysed more fully under subsequent headings within 
this chapter, since (i) it seems also to support property rights in embryos and 
foetuses in utero, and (ii) it appears to take labour as the source of property 
rights in embryos and foetuses whether they be inside or outside the body. At 
this stage o f the argument, however, it suffices to note that Professor Mason 
supports the view that frozen embryos ought to be regarded as objects of 
property rights.
5.3.3. Academic argument
Many academic commentators have also recommended a property-based 
approach to frozen embryos. Brian Ocepek tells us that ‘supporters of the 
embryo-as-property theory believe that the mere potential for life is not 
enough to justify “personalizing” a frozen embryo.’549 But more than this, 
many believe that case law and legal theory provide positive reasons for 
treating frozen embryos as property.
In Moore, the court noted that ‘the rights of dominion over one’s own 
body, and the interests one has therein, are recognized in many cases. These 
rights and interests are so akin to property interests that it would be a 
subterfuge to call them something else.’550 Of course, Moore concerned 
bodily tissue which had been taken and exploited for commercial purposes. 
However, Michelle Sublett argues that:
The same type [of] reasoning may be applied to frozen embryos. The 
genetic material which creates an embryo is no less the property of the
548 Ibid. at 91
549 Ocepek, op. cit., at 203
550 See supra, note 515 at 505
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owners than the cells in Moore which made possible the creation of a 
‘Cell-line’, a product from Moore’s tissue.551
Support for this view comes from Kermit Roosevelt when he writes that:
The transferability of reproductive material is particularly well 
established. The sale of sperm and eggs is commonplace, and it 
appears never to have been suggested that such transactions have no 
legal effect.552
Michelle Sublett argues that this property right in ‘reproductive material’ can 
be extrapolated so that frozen embryos ought to be regarded as the marital 
property o f the couple whose gametes created it:
A m ale’s sperm is unquestionably his own personal property. 
Likewise, a female’s egg is her own personal property.. .none would 
question an individual’s right to dispose of his or her own gamete. 
Because the sperm and egg have united to become one, the resulting 
concepti cannot be said to be the personal property of either the male 
or the female, but rather the marital property o f both.553
On this analysis, frozen embryos qualify as marital property because ‘an 
embryo is not acquired by gift, inheritance or purchase, but rather created by 
the effort o f both spouses during marriage. The Uniform Marital Property Act 
provides that all property acquired during marriage other than by gift, 
inheritance, or other exceptions is marital property.’554 The legal basis for 
treating embryos as marital property, Sublett argues, is the common law 
doctrine o f commingling:
551 Sublett op. cit. at 600
552 Roosevelt, ‘The Newest property: reproductive Technologies and the Concept of  
Parenthood’ 39 Santa Clara Law Review  (1998) 79 at 84
553 Sublett, op. cit., at 596
554 Ibid.
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The doctrine of commingling, borrowed from community property and 
used in marital property cases, can be applied here. The doctrine states 
that ‘separate property becomes marital property if  inextricably 
mingled with marital property or with the separate property of another 
spouse.’ Therefore it can be argued that when the egg and sperm unite, 
they are no less the property of the gamete owners, but rather since 
they are inseparable without resorting to destruction, they become 
marital property instead of personal property. The problem with 
treating frozen embryos as marital property comes into existence when 
the marital property is to be distributed.555
The ‘marital property’ approach is not entirely straightforward, however, as 
Sublett acknowledges when she writes that ‘if frozen embryos are to be 
treated as property, the court or legislature must develop some sort of 
guidelines for distributing this type o f property.’556 Another potential problem 
with frozen embryos as ‘marital property’ is implied by the Moore decision, 
as Ocepek notes:
The court’s decision [in Moore] seems to imply that a person loses his 
property interest in a thing once it is transformed into something else. 
It is this type o f reasoning that presents a potential flaw in the embryo- 
as-property theory. It may reasonably be inferred from the court’s 
decision in Moore that a woman who donates her ova, material over 
which she clearly has a property right, loses that right once her ova 
joins with the m an’s sperm and creates a totally new organism -  the 
embryo.557
This leads Ocepek to conclude that ‘the embryo-as-property theory is not 
without its own share of weaknesses... this side of the debate assumes that the 
donors o f the gametes necessarily have ownership rights in the embryo they
555 Ibid. at 596-597
556 Ibid. at 597
557 Ocepek, op. cit., at 211
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helped to create. However this is not always a given, as such ownership rights 
are sometimes difficult to prove and even if  proven, may be subject to 
competing third party ownership interests.’558
For example, frozen embryos may not have been created using the 
gametes o f the couple who are parties to treatment. The embryo may include 
the gametes o f one member of the couple, and gametes donated by an 
anonymous source. Otherwise, the embryo itself may have been donated, and 
neither ‘party to treatment’ may have made any genetic contribution to it. So 
there is plenty o f scope for challenging the view that property rights in a 
frozen embryo flow logically from property rights in the gametes used in its 
creation. In instances where embryos are created using the gametes of the 
parties to treatment, it may be argued that the property rights of the parties 
have two sources: the contract for provision of services, and the property they 
have in their gametes transferred to the embryo by the common law doctrine 
of commingling.
The problem with this is that if  we recognise genetic contribution as 
any factor in property rights in frozen embryos, donors could also, potentially, 
claim property in frozen embryos created using their donated gametes. 
However, this fear is unfounded; donation is gifting, and when a person makes 
a gift they relinquish any property claims they may otherwise have had. 
Accordingly, it may be a mistake to regard property in the frozen embryo as 
‘marital property’, or as being grounded, in some way, in the relationship 
between the frozen embryo and the gametes which created it; rather, property 
rights in the frozen embryo ought to be regarded as flowing from the contracts 
which govern provision o f assisted reproduction services. If this were the 
case:
[t]he embryo’s genetic contributors, the institution in which it was 
stored, or the intended recipients could assert control over the property 
and could own either or both legal and equitable title to the embryo 
depending on the theory of ownership proffered. The owner could then
S5*lbid.
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convey the property through donative transfer or sale regulated by 
basic gift, contract and code principles.559
It is important to note here that the California Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Moore did not hold that no-one could own the intellectual property products 
derived from M oore’s bodily tissue because it was not property; the court held 
merely that he did not own them. As such, the Moore judgment may threaten 
the notion that the embryo is necessarily the property of the gamete donors, or 
that property-in-the-embryo is derived from genetic contribution, but it does 
not threaten the idea that the embryo can be property per se, and owned by 
someone.
There are strong practical reasons to seek an alternative to treating 
frozen embryos as persons; as Ocepek warns, ‘adopting the embryo-as-person 
theory means that the court will have to dispose of the embryo through a child 
custody proceeding.’560
If frozen embryos were the subject of a custody battle, the court would 
be faced with the same type of analysis as if  an infant child was 
involved. But with frozen embryos the court would be dealing with the 
unborn, and it would have no choice but to weigh the wishes of the 
donors most heavily in making its best interest determination. The 
embryo’s biological status as a child-to-be and incapable of any 
expression reveals the pitfall inherent in attempting a custody 
proceeding over an embryo. Therefore, adopting an embryo-as-person 
theory when a divorce is involved in frozen embryo litigation is not an 
advisable approach for any court.561
Where an infant is involved -  and by extension, an embryo too -  the ‘child’ is 
too young to speak as to his or her own ‘best interest’, so the court must
559 Guzman op. cit. at 206
560 Ocepek, op. cit., at 215
561 Ibid. at 216
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decide best interest by having regard to the parents’ character, lifestyle, 
fitness, and so on. Obviously, where a frozen embryo is concerned, the 
‘parent’ who wishes to destroy the embryo will not gain custody on the basis 
o f  these criteria. The issue at stake in disputes regarding the disposal of frozen 
embryos is usually the issue of whether to become a parent; this means that it 
would be erroneous to assume parenthood as a framework for deciding such 
cases. But would a property-based approach be any less problematic? Ocepek 
acknowledges that:
Clearly there will be some difficulty for the court in applying the 
principles o f a property settlement to frozen embryo 
litigation...Obviously the embryo cannot be ‘split’ equally between 
the parties. So how is the court to distribute it? If the parties both want 
control o f  the embryos, one solution would be to do what the 
Tennessee Supreme Court did in Davis -  weigh the relative interests 
that each party has in the embryos and give them to whichever party 
offers the more legitimate or beneficial interests.562
However, he argues, ‘the potential problems associated with applying the 
embryo-as-property theory and a marital property settlement to frozen embryo 
litigation pale in comparison to the alternative. If a court attempted to apply 
the embryo-as-person theory and a custody determination to frozen embryos, 
it would be faced with an even more difficult problem: constitutional 
rights.’563 Ocepek concludes that ‘resolving the debate over the legal status of 
the embryo in favor o f  a property theory would, at least in the context of a 
divorce, make the court’s task somewhat easier. It would allow the court to 
dispose o f the embryos in a marital property settlement -  a more practical 
device for handling embryos than a child custody determination.’564 It is
562 Ibid. at 220
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid. at 221
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perhaps for this reason that Roosevelt describes property rights as ‘ the hidden 
variable of family law’.565
Another advantage of the property-based approach is that property is 
relational in nature -  it focuses on relationships surrounding an object rather 
than the intrinsic nature and status of the entity itself. As Guzman observes: 
‘if  the embryo is property...[issues] would focus not on the embryo but on 
others’ status thereto -  who has paramount rights relative to whom.’566 This is 
a major advantage where foetuses and embryos are concerned, because it is 
their contested moral and legal status which makes adjudication so difficult.
For all o f  the above reasons, many commentators conclude, with 
Ocepek, that ‘the debate over the status of frozen embryos should be resolved 
in favor o f the embryo-as-property theory. The legal analysis commonly used 
to determine whether something constitutes property is broad enough and 
flexible enough to include a frozen embryo.’567 Roosevelt, for example, 
claims that ‘with respect to very early embryos...the need for recognition of 
property rights seems just as great as with respect to sperm and eggs.’568
Ocepek is convinced that ‘property has the elasticity to incorporate the 
reproductive products o f progenitors who use IVF.’569 Frozen embryos are 
property, according to Ocepek, ‘because they are not human life, only the 
potential for human life...Furthermore, frozen embryos are things in which 
certain individuals -  the donors of the gametes -  have rights of ownership and 
use. The only way these rights can be properly upheld is to treat the embryos 
according to the principles of property law.’570
John A. Robertson cautions that ‘applying terms such as “ownership” 
or “property” to early embryos risks misunderstanding. Such terms do not 
signify that embryos may be treated in all respects like other property. Rather, 
the terms merely designate who has authority to decide whether legally 
available options with early embryos will occur, such as creation, storage,
565 Roosevelt, op. cit., at 87
566 Guzman, op. cit., at 206
567 Ocepek, op. cit., at 216
568 Roosevelt, op. cit., at 85
569 Ocepek, op. cit., at 217
570 Ibid. at 218
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discard, donation, use in research, and placement in a uterus.’571 Nevertheless, 
he makes the crucial observation that, ‘although the bundle o f  property rights 
attached to one’s ownership o f an embryo may be more circumscribed than 
fo r  other things, it is an ownership or property interest nonetheless. ’572
5.4. Should being in the body make a difference?
Having noticed an emerging ‘jurisprudence o f property’ in the law’s treatment 
of embryos outside the body, the next stage is to ask whether embryos inside 
the body can also be objects of property. The key question here is: should 
being in the body make a difference? This question was raised, indirectly, in 
the comparatively recent cases o f Evans & Hadley, which, although it deals 
with the disposal of frozen embryos, has implications for the pregnancy 
context. The background of the case is as follows: two women, Natallie Evans 
and Lorraine Hadley, had undergone fertility treatment with their then- 
partners. In the course of the treatment, embryos had been frozen and kept in 
storage. The relationships between the women and their partners had 
subsequently broken down, but Evans and Hadley wished to have the embryos 
implanted anyway. For Natallie Evans, who had become infertile following 
treatment for cancer, the frozen embryos represented her only chance of 
becoming a genetic parent.
According to the statute regulating the field o f assisted conception, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act), embryos cannot be 
used (implanted or donated) or even stored without the consent of both 
‘parties to treatment’. 574 Both o f the male parties in this case refused to give 
their consent to implantation; they no longer wished to become parents with 
women who were now their ex-partners. The women challenged the statutory 
requirement for consent in the courts. With the law in the area so clear and 
unambiguous, then, what was the basis of the women’s case? Why did they 
believe that their challenge had a chance o f success?
571 John A. Robertson, ‘In the beginning: the legal status o f  early embryos’ 76 VA. L. REV.
437 (1990), at 454-455
572 Ibid., emphasis added.
573 See supra, note 546
574 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, schedule 3.
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There were several arguments brought in support of the women’s claim, but 
the most relevant and interesting from the point of view of the current analysis 
is the argument from discrimination. If  Evans and Hadley had been fertile 
women who had conceived the embryos naturally, within their bodies, they 
argued, their male partners would have no control over the destiny of the 
embryos, and certainly no veto akin to the veto granted them by the HFE Act. 
Because they were infertile, and had had to ‘conceive’ the embryos ex utero, 
their ex-partners had a determining say in whether or not the embryos would 
be implanted. The women argued, therefore, that their reproductive choice 
was being circumscribed, by statute, in a way that the reproductive choice of 
fertile women was not. The law was depriving them of the ordinary control 
women have over embryos on the basis o f their ‘disability’, infertility. The 
crux of the argument was that the women claimed that for legal purposes, they 
ought to be regarded as being similarly situated to fertile women who had 
conceived naturally. When the law treats similarly situated parties differently - 
for example, on the basis of a disability - this amounts to discrimination.
While expressing sympathy with the women’s desire to become 
parents, the High Court rejected their claim. It held that women with frozen 
embryos in storage were not situated similarly to women whose embryos were 
conceived and located within their bodies. In so holding, the court affirmed 
that being in the body does make a difference. While not expressly adopting 
the language of property, the court dealt with the issue of the use and control 
of frozen embryos, which is closely related to, if  not synonymous with, the 
issue of ownership. It held that, outside the body, this ‘ownership’ could be 
joint, with use of the embryos requiring authorisation from both parties to 
treatment (both ‘owners’). The decision was later upheld in the Court of 
Appeal.575 By implication, the court seemed to be recognising that the law 
vested control o f embryos inside the body solely in the pregnant woman 
herself. Although it did not say explicitly that frozen embryos were joint 
property and embryos in utero the sole property of the pregnant women, the 
court’s reasoning supports this conclusion nonetheless. It upholds both the 
‘male veto’ over the use and disposal o f frozen embryos, and the fact that in
575 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd. and others [2004] 3 All ER 1025 (CA)
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pregnancy, only the pregnant woman herself enjoys any of the rights of 
control and possession normally associated with ownership. As such, the 
judgment in Evans & Hadley answers the key question -  ‘should being in the 
body make a difference?’ -  in the affirmative, and hints at precisely what kind 
o f difference it ought to make.
5.5. Property in the embryo / foetus in utero
As the judgment in Evans & Hadley suggests, the difference that being in the 
body makes is that embryos inside the body can be controlled, ‘owned’, only 
by the pregnant woman herself, whereas ownership of embryos outside the 
body is open to other parties. The HFE Act, which regulates assisted 
conception, essentially makes each of the parties to fertility treatment ‘joint 
owners’ o f the frozen embryo, although of course it does not use that 
terminology. Theoretically, frozen embryos may also be owned by clinics, or 
bequeathed in wills; both o f these scenarios can be found in case-law in the 
United States. Once inside the body, however, any interests that third parties 
may have in the destiny or welfare of embryos or foetuses cannot translate 
into property rights. This is so because of the serious implications the 
existence o f such property rights would have for the personhood of pregnant 
women.
O f course, many parties may have strong interests in respect of 
embryos in utero: potential fathers may have strong interests either positively 
(if they are keen for the pregnancy to result in the birth of a healthy child) or 
negatively (if they are keen to avoid fatherhood); members of extended 
families may have similar interests; doctors who treat pregnant women may 
regard the embryo or foetus, to a greater or lesser extent, as a ‘second patient’; 
and it might also be said that the state has an interest in the welfare or fate of 
its ‘future citizens’. However, none of these interests can be accorded the 
status o f property rights without undermining the personhood of the woman 
within whose body the embryo or foetus is located. If someone other than the 
pregnant woman were to be recognised as the owner (or joint owner) of a 
foetus or embryo in utero, this could only be meaningful if such a person were 
able to exercise their property rights. Since the unborn entity can only be
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accessed through her body, exercise of property rights by others would 
necessitate a right of trespass on the body o f the pregnant woman, and would 
be likely to involve restrictions on her right to consent, and to refuse to 
consent, to medical treatment. This would represent a dramatic limitation on 
women’s autonomy and bodily integrity sufficiently severe to constitute a loss 
of full legal personhood.
In response to this, we may ask: what if  a pregnant woman was to 
seek, voluntarily, to confer property rights in ‘her’ foetus on others? Can she 
alienate her property-in-the-foetus despite its location within her body? 
Surrogacy is perhaps the context in which such a question is most likely to 
arise, since in surrogacy a woman carries a foetus which is destined to become 
the child of a party or parties other than herself. Liezl van Zyl and Anton van 
Niekerk write, disapprovingly, that ‘to deny that the surrogate is the mother of 
the child amounts to viewing the relationship as one o f ownership.’ By way 
of clarification, they continue:
The prenatal separation of biological and moral relationships places 
the surrogate in a highly ambiguous relationship with the fetus. As a 
woman who has a right to bodily integrity, she has a right to an 
abortion, but as a surrogate, she would have no right to determine the 
destiny of the fetus.577
An understanding o f pregnancy as a property relationship in which only the 
pregnant woman herself may ‘own’ the foetus helps to explain this apparent 
tension. When a woman agrees to act as a surrogate for a commissioning party 
or couple, she agrees to recognise that party or couple as the rightful parents 
of the child and to hand the child over to them once it has been bom. In law, 
however, surrogacy arrangements are unenforceable, and if the courts are 
asked to decide whether a child bom subsequently to a surrogate pregnancy 
ought to remain with its gestational mother or be placed in the care o f the 
commissioning party or parties, the decision will be made not on the basis of
576 Liezl van Zyl and Anton van Niekerk, ‘Interpretations, Perspectives and Intentions in 
Surrogate Motherhood’, Journal o f  Medical Ethics 2000 (26) 404-409, at 406
577 Ibid. at 407
200
the terms of the surrogacy contract, but according to the best interests of the 
child. So what about during pregnancy? Does the fact that a pregnancy is a 
surrogate one give the commissioning parent(s) any right to control the 
behaviour o f the pregnant woman, to prevent her from terminating the 
pregnancy, or indeed to compel her to terminate it?
The Surrogacy Review, the culmination o f the last major review into 
the law regarding surrogate motherhood, was published in 1998.578 The 
review, while recommending a new ‘Surrogacy Act’ under which surrogacy 
arrangements would remain legally unenforceable, is ambivalent with regard 
to issues of antenatal conduct. It leaves unclear the issue o f commissioning 
parents’ rights regarding the behaviour o f surrogate mothers during 
pregnancy, such as smoking or attendance at antenatal clinics or classes. 
Ought they to be able to insist that surrogates take certain positive steps 
during pregnancy, or make prohibitions, in order to promote foetal well­
being? Ought they be able to insist on a caesarean delivery against the will of 
the surrogate, or override her refusal to consent to treatments ranging from 
medication to reduce blood pressure to foetal surgery? Most o f us would wish, 
instinctively, to deny that anyone should be able to overrule the right o f a 
woman to make such decisions for herself, even where she is carrying a child 
that is destined for someone else. A property model of pregnancy allows us to 
deny it, and to do so on a stronger basis than mere instinct alone. On the 
property model, the reason why such external control over pregnancy is 
impermissible is because the foetus in utero is the property of the pregnant 
woman alone.
On birth, of course, legal personhood attaches and the child, qua 
person, is the property o f no-one. Before birth, the foetus is a legal non-person 
and can be an object o f property relations; however, the only possible owner 
can be the pregnant woman herself. To endow any other party or parties with 
ownership (for example, the commissioning couple in a surrogacy 
arrangement) would be to permit a woman to contract out of some of her most 
fundamental human rights, including the right to refuse medical treatment, the 
right to make choices about her own health and lifestyle within the legal limits
578 M. Brazier, A. Campbell and S. Golombok, Surrogacy: Review fo r  Health Ministers o f  
Current Arrangements fo r  Payments and Regulation (CM 4068), HMSO, 1998.
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that apply to other competent adults, and the right to terminate her pregnancy. 
We do not allow competent adults to contract out of their ‘personhood rights’: 
people are not permitted, by law, to sell themselves into slavery or 
prostitution, or to sell their vital organs (although they may donate them if 
doing so would not cause their own death). When framed in this way, it 
becomes obvious why only the pregnant woman herself can be regarded as the 
owner o f the foetus she carries: to recognise any other owner would entail a 
denial o f the personhood of the woman, and while the law allows competent 
adult citizens many freedoms, the freedom to render oneself less than a full 
person by contracting out of one’s fundamental rights is not among them.
Thus, the property model of pregnancy explains why surrogacy 
contracts are unenforceable and why commissioning parents in surrogacy may 
not insist that surrogates terminate pregnancies, remain pregnant against their 
will, follow particular diets, quit smoking or drinking, attend clinics or 
classes, undergo medical tests, or submit to medical interventions. The model 
also illuminates a new area of concern in the surrogacy debate. So far, concern 
has centred on the potential for exploitation o f poor women and the 
undesirability of commodifying children, women’s bodies (as ‘wombs for 
rent’) and their reproductive labour. The property model highlights another 
danger associated with surrogacy: the danger that surrogacy encourages the 
alienation of personhood through the incremental handover o f personhood- 
constituting rights and freedoms. An explicit recognition that the pregnant 
woman is the sole owner of the foetus she carries would reduce this danger by 
removing the possibility of property-in-the-foetus as a means by which 
external parties might control women during pregnancy.
5.6. The source of the property right
Here, I wish not only to argue that embryos and foetuses in utero are objects 
o f property relations, but also to make the further claim that, inside the body, 
embryos and foetuses can be owned only by the pregnant woman herself. It 
will be necessary, therefore, to support this claim by demonstrating why 
pregnant women are the sole owners of embryonic and foetal property inside 
the body. In other words, I will need to discover the source o f the right and
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justify vesting it in pregnant women and no-one else. Below, I explore a 
variety o f possible justifications, their advantages and disadvantages.
5.6.1. Genetic contribution
For some theorists, the property rights that ‘parents’ have in frozen embryos 
derive from the genetic contribution they have made in creating the embryos. 
One version o f this view is espoused by Michelle Sublett, who argues that 
frozen embryos ought to be regarded as ‘marital property’, since ‘[a]n embryo 
is not acquired by gift, inheritance or purchase, but is created by the effort of
S7Qboth spouses during marriage.’ The rationale behind this view is given as 
follows:
A male’s sperm is unquestionably his own personal property. 
Likewise, a female’s egg is her own personal property.. .none would 
question an individual’s right to dispose of his or her own gamete. 
Because the sperm and egg have united to become one, the resulting 
concepti cannot be said to be the personal property of either the male
580or the female, but rather the marital property of both.
This is so, according to Sublett, because o f the applicability of the common 
law doctrine o f commingling:
The doctrine states that separate property becomes marital property if 
inextricable mingled with marital property or with the separate 
property o f another spouse. Therefore it can be argued that when the 
egg and sperm unite, they are no less the property of the gamete 
owners, but rather since they are inseparable without resorting to 
destruction, they become marital property instead of personal
. 581property.
579 Sublett, op. cit. at 595
s%0 Ibid. at 596
581 Ibid. at 596-597
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There are a couple of immediate difficulties with this way of justifying 
property rights in frozen embryos. Most obviously, not all embryos are 
created by spouses within marriage, so the common law doctrine of 
commingling, which applies only to marital property, would have effect only 
in a limited number of cases. What I require here is a justification that applies 
to all embryos equally, not only to those created by married couples. 
However, this observation calls into doubt only the extent o f the applicability 
o f the doctrine of commingling; it does not strike at the validity of linking 
ownership to genetic contribution, which is Sublett’s more important claim. 
Nevertheless, this link may be attacked on other grounds. First, contrary to 
what Sublett states, embryos can be acquired by gift (donation), or can be 
created using donated gametes. In some pregnancies resulting from IVF 
treatment, women carry embryos and foetuses which have been created using 
donated eggs, and in some the embryos themselves have been donated, so that 
there is no genetic contribution from the pregnant woman herself.
Thus, to link ownership to genetic contribution would be to give 
ownership rights in embryos to the donors o f the eggs and / or sperm used to 
create them. Accordingly, doubt would exist over whether, when a couple 
donate a surplus embryo, property rights vest in the donor couple or in the 
ultimate recipients who intend to use (implant) the embryo. This may lead to 
legal and moral confusion where, for example, a couple have created an 
embryo using donated sperm, and the embryo is in storage. Suppose that the 
circumstances of Evans & Hadley were to be replicated -  the woman wishes 
to proceed with implantation, but the man refuses his consent. As we have 
seen, under the current law, the consent o f each party is required before the 
embryo can be ‘used’, and this would be so even if  one o f the ‘parties to 
treatment’ under the HFE Act had not contributed gametes to the embryo, 
since it is parties to treatment, and not genetic contributors, who currently 
have rights in respect o f assisted reproduction. Were a model of ownership 
based on genetic contribution to be adopted, joint ownership would vest in the 
woman and the sperm donor (not the man who is a party to treatment); 
providing, therefore, that the sperm donor consented, the woman could 
proceed to implantation without the consent of her former partner, even
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though the embryo was originally created for use by the partners who sought 
‘treatment together’.
A second, related point is that on this model o f justification it is clearly 
both o f the genetic contributors who acquire property rights in the embryo or 
embryos created using their gametes. I have already argued that one of the 
effects o f the judgment in Evans & Hadley is to establish joint ownership of 
the frozen embryo outside the body, so it may seem as if, on this point at least, 
a model of justification based on genetic contribution would not alter the 
status quo. This may be true with regard to embryos outside the body; 
however, my main claim in this chapter is that embryos inside the body are 
also objects of property. If property-in-the-embryo is taken to stem from 
genetic contribution, then both genetic ‘parents’ would have property rights in 
respect o f embryos inside as well as outside the body. Obviously, this result 
would be extremely dangerous from the point of view o f women’s rights to 
privacy and self-determination. A male genetic contributor may, on the basis 
of his joint property rights, attempt to prevent her from seeking to terminate 
the pregnancy in which he has a property interest; he may also seek to have 
medical treatment imposed on a pregnant woman against her will (to 
safeguard his property), or even to impose positive duties on her to promote 
the health of the foetus-as-property. This is why I have observed, under 
heading 5.6. above, that any justification for property-in-the-foetus in utero 
will only be acceptable if  it vests the property rights in the pregnant woman 
alone. On this criterion, the justification from genetic contribution fails.
Yet another difficulty with the argument from genetic contribution is 
that it depends on controversial notions o f property-in-the-body and property- 
in-the-self (‘self-ownership’). These are discussed in detail under heading
5.6.2. below582, where it will become apparent that there are important 
philosophical and ideological reasons to resist the notion that persons own 
their bodies. Although it is unnecessary for me to endorse either the pro- or 
anti- self-ownership position for the purposes of my thesis, the very 
controversality o f such notions means that it will be preferable for my
582 Although there are complex and subtle differences between the proposition that I own my 
self and the proposition that I own my body, I have, for convenience and clarity, dealt with all 
such notions under the heading o f ‘property in the se lf .
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property model o f pregnancy to avoid dependence on the idea of self­
ownership; the model will be stronger if  it can appeal both to those who 
accept the notion and those who reject it.
5.6.2. Propertv-in-the-self
The ‘genetic contribution’ view of property in the embryo claims that people 
have property in the embryos that their gametes are used to create because 
they have property in the gametes themselves. As Sublett has already been 
quoted as saying, ‘[a] male’s sperm is unquestionably his own personal 
property. Likewise, a female’s egg is her own personal property...none would 
question an individual’s right to dispose o f his or her own gamete’.583 But 
indeed people do question it. The idea that we own our gametes depends, in 
turn, on the belief that we own our own bodies, and this is a far from 
uncontroversial position. I will begin by outlining the concept of self­
ownership, and go on to explain the two main objections to the concept: one 
philosophical, one ideological.
5.6.2.1. The background to the concept
Ngaire Naffine writes that:
The concept of the person as self-proprietor has a secure place within 
our modem liberal political theory and liberal jurisprudence. It has 
become a convenient way o f highlighting the freedoms enjoyed by the 
modem individual, a sort o f legal shorthand, a rhetorical device, which 
serves to accentuate the fullness of the rights enjoyed by persons in
584relation to themselves and to others.
But mere convenience is not the only, or even the main reason, that the 
concept has such a ‘secure place’, as Naffine puts it, in our legal theory. Its 
centrality can also be attributed to the perception that the notion of property-
583 See supra, note 553
584 Naffine, op. cit., at 193-194
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in-the-self is in some way fundamental to other ideas that we consider to be 
important.
An example is the concept o f autonomy, which enjoys undeniable 
prominence in Western thought, largely thanks to the writings o f Kant in the 
eighteenth century. In the legal context, autonomy is key to many central 
concepts such as liberty, privacy and individual rights. Naffine describes 
property-in-the-self as ‘a potent symbol of human autonomy as it emerges 
within the contractual society.’585 She goes on to explain that this is because:
The claim of property in oneself is an assertion o f self-possession and 
self-control, of a fundamental right to exclude others from one’s very 
being. It is a means of individuating my person, o f establishing a limit 
between the one and the other; between mine and thine; between me
j  586and you.
In other words, as individuals within civil society, we relate to one another as 
autonomous agents, or as Naffine expresses it, ‘bounded selves’587. Our 
freedom, paradoxically, involves the recognition of boundaries marking where 
I and my interests end and you and your interests begin. These boundaries, 
according to Naffine, are property  boundaries.588 In this way, self-ownership 
can be understood as the basis on which individuals interact with one another 
autonomously.
Another example is the concept of personhood, discussed in great 
detail in chapter three of this thesis. Naffine tells us that ‘Blackstone believed 
that a person’s integrity depended on a legally enforceable right to police the 
boundaries of the body. Full personhood was equated with the effective 
exercise of a property right in one’s body.’589 On this view, property-in-the- 
self (or at least, in the body -  the difference will be discussed more fully 
under the following heading) is essential to full personhood, since many of 
what may be termed ‘personhood-relevant qualities’, such as autonomy, the
585 Ibid. at 200
586 Ibid. at 197-198
587 Ibid. at 205
588 Ibid.
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capacity to self-determine, and so on, depend upon the ability to ensure one’s 
physical integrity by excluding others from our bodies. This position chimes 
quite clearly with the arguments offered by Eileen McDonagh in support of 
her ‘consent model’ o f pregnancy590, in which she claims that the power to 
exclude a foetus who intrudes upon the body o f a woman without her consent 
is essential to women’s possession of full legal personhood.
A final example is the concept of property itself. John Frow has 
claimed that our Western view of property ‘is based on self-possession, a 
primordial property right in the self which grounds all other property 
rights’.591 If all property rights have their roots in the right o f self-ownership, 
if  property-in-the-self is indeed the ‘mother o f all property rights’, then it is 
easy to see why it holds such sway in legal and political theory, despite the 
objections to which I will now turn.
5.6.2.2. The philosophical objection: dualism
According to this objection, the idea o f property-in-the-self is founded on the 
‘fiction.. .that mind can be separated from flesh.’592 As Naffine observes:
self-ownership is usually not intended to denote the entire person 
reflexively owning the entire person.. .[rjather there is presumed to be 
an internal division o f the person, two different and distinct parts 
which represent the owner and the owned. Richard Ameson, for 
example, expounds the Lockean concept o f self-ownership thus: 
‘Owning himself, each person is free to do with his body whatever he 
chooses so long as he does not cause or threaten any harm to non­
consenting others.’ 593
As such, self-ownership ‘relies on a dichotomization o f our selves into subject 
and object [or]...into mind and body. In short, it relies on a form o f Cartesian
590 Discussed in detail in chapter four o f  this thesis.
591 Naffine, op. cit. at 199
592 Ibid. at 202
593 Ibid. at 201
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dualism.’594 This is evident in the writing o f some o f the main theorists on 
property-in-the-self
John Christman observes that ‘insofar as my body moves or acts, I  
should be the one who has the ultimate say over what it does and 
where it goes.’...In Christman’s account, the body is reduced to an ‘it’. 
-  a thing (the very move that worried Kant)...J.W . Harris seems also 
to equate the idea of self-ownership with body ownership...His 
concluding remark that ‘nobody owns my body, not even me’ 
...instates an incorporeal ‘me’ as the potential ethereal owner, and the 
mundane body as the object of ownership.595
This dualism worries critics for two main reasons. First, the insistence on the 
separability of mind and body means that ‘[t]he body is not the subject person 
-  because that is the mind -  but rather it is an object which belongs to that 
subject. The body is therefore alienated and fetishized...It is baser, it is 
mundane, it is inferior, and it is natural. And yet it is a necessary condition of 
the person.’596 The second cause for concern can be summarized by saying 
that if mind and body can be separated, and body ‘owned’ by the mind, then 
potentially, it can be owned by others, with seriously illiberal consequences. I 
turn now to consider this ‘ideological objection’.
5.6.2.3. The ideological objection: illiberalism
To its critics, the idea o f property-in-the-self is dangerous because it entails, 
as a matter of definitional necessity, that the ‘se lf  is capable o f ownership. 
Naffine writes:
Some liberal theorists have also been alert to the negative connotations 
of property-in-self. Kant found the idea particularly troubling (and so
594 Ibid. at 202
595 Ibid. at 201
596 Ibid. at 202
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rejected it) because it suggested to him a commodification of the
person, the reduction of the human being to thing’.597
While advocates o f self-ownership see this possibility as an opportunity to 
enshrine the self as master of his (or less commonly, her) own destiny, critics 
fear that if  we accept in principle the concept o f the self as an object of 
ownership, this may have the undesirable additional effect of justifying 
slavery, possessive marriage (coverture), and other scenarios o f ownership 
where the self, or the body, is owned by someone other than the subject him
or herself. Naffine observes this when she comments that:
The idea of property-in-self is, to many, still suggestive of an 
unsavoury and illiberal past when persons could be slaves. As 
Margaret Davies has remarked, if  persons can objectify their selves
CQO
they become susceptible to objectification by others.
Because of this association, she claims, ‘to suggest that property-in-self is a 
means of expressing human autonomy is, paradoxically, also to threaten 
liberty.’599 She continues: ‘Property-in-self in private life may be poorly 
theorized in the legal and political literature for the very reason that its 
implications are distinctly illiberal...the story o f contract, with its self- 
contained, autonomous central character, is still a story o f men premised on 
the denial of women’s property in themselves.’600
5.6.2.4. Reasons to reject the justification from 'property-in-the-self
Above, I have identified, briefly, two general grounds on which the concept 
of property-in-the-self has been criticised. From the point of view of my 
present argument, and my advocacy of the property model of pregnancy, 
however, there is a more specific reason why I wish to avoid sourcing the 
property right o f a pregnant woman in her foetus in any notion that she owns
597 Ibid. at 199
598 Ibid. at 200
599 Ibid. at 200
600 Ibid. at 212
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her own body, or her self. Without needing necessarily to denounce the notion 
of property-in-the-self on either of the grounds described above, nonetheless it 
is better that my proposed property model does not entail, or depend upon, 
this notion.
The conflict model has its foundations in the view that the pregnant 
woman and the foetus she carries are separate entities, each having moral 
status and rights. This produces the familiar ‘maternal / foetal conflict’, the 
‘clash of absolutes’. Other theorists prefer what John Seymour has called the 
‘body-part model’, which holds that the foetus is not a separate entity, but 
rather a part of the body o f the pregnant woman. In this context self­
ownership can be used to explain why the pregnant woman, as the owner of 
her own body, also owns the foetus, as a part o f that body. It could be 
claimed, therefore, that my present thesis is redundant or unnecessary since 
property-in-the-foetus can be established via the notions o f the foetus-as-body 
part, and property-in-the-self.
Such a justification is problematic, however. As demonstrated above, 
the notion of property-in-the-self is controversial, with distinctly illiberal 
overtones. Historically, it has not served women well, as Naffine observes. 
Moreover, any attempt to justify property-in-the-foetus on the basis of 
property-in-the-self will presuppose the validity o f the ‘body-part model’. The 
appeal of the body-part model is that it offers a way o f avoiding the conflict 
picture generated by separate entities models. It has been heavily criticised, 
however, as being contrary to common sense.601 Moreover, unless we accept 
that persons, including pregnant women, own their own bodies (and we have 
seen that many commentators deny that this is so), the body-part model does 
not necessarily confer abortion rights on women.
My property model o f pregnancy is certainly a ‘separate entities 
model’, yet it does not give rise to issues of maternal / foetal conflict. This is 
because, unlike other separate entities models, mine does not claim that 
woman and foetus are separate persons or that they each possess interests and 
/ or rights. My property model regards the foetus as a separate entity, but a 
legal ‘thing’, not a legal person; as an object o f property relations. As such,
601 Seymour, op. cit. at 191-194
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my model avoids the absurdity of the body-part model and the controversy 
associated with the concept of property-in-the-self; it also avoids the illusive 
‘conflict’ engendered by separate-entities models which frame pregnancy as a 
clash between two morally-considerable entities with potentially opposing 
rights and interests. The respective merits and drawbacks of the separate 
entities, body-part and intermediate ‘not-one-but-not-two’ models will be 
scrutinised under heading 5.7.
5.6.3. Labour
An alternative to the view that we own our bodies themselves is the view that, 
although we do not necessarily own our bodies, we own the labour o f our 
bodies, the work they do. A proponent o f one such theory, John Christman, 
has stated that ‘[a] powerful way o f expressing the principle o f individual 
liberty is to claim that every individual has full “property rights” over her 
body, skills and labour.’602 Applying the labour theory of property to 
reproduction, Donna Dickenson writes that:
Stem-cell technologies highlight the ‘use-value’ which women 
produce in the reproductive labours o f superovulation, egg extraction, 
and the work of early pregnancy and abortion. It is abundantly clear 
that these pregnancy-derived tissues have value, and enormous value. 
What is shown by the commodification o f bodily products such as 
stem cells is that there is no firm divide, as Marx thought there was, 
between the use-values produced through social means of production 
and the absence o f use-values in reproduction.603
Dickenson argues that, because ‘[we] do not generally own that which we 
have not laboured to create’604, we do not possess property in our bodies (as 
we have not created them). However, she notes:
602 John Christman, ‘Self-Ownership, Equality and the Structure o f Property Rights’ (1991)
19 Political Theory 28 at 28
603 Donna Dickenson, Dickenson, D., ‘Property and Women’s Alienation From Their Own 
Reproductive Labour’ Bioethics 15(3) (2001) 205 at 215
604 Ibid.
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Women do labour to create the bodies o f their fetuses in pregnancy 
and childbirth. The labour which women put into superovulation, egg 
extraction and early pregnancy qualifies as labour which confers a 
property right in a Lockean model...a feminist Marxist 
analysis...likewise supports women’s property rights in the forms of 
embryonic tissue which they have laboured to create.605
This despite the fact that ‘early capitalism segregated women from market 
values, establishing an “unpolluted realm” of domestic labour by “creating the 
necessary fiction that women’s labour produced no use-values.’”606 J.K. 
Mason appears to support this ‘labour’ justification o f property in the frozen 
embryo in his comment on the Evans & Hadley case.
There are, in fact, good pragmatic reasons why it is positively right to 
vest the woman with a form of property rights in her embryo. In the 
first place, she has done much more to produce the embryo than has 
the man — IVF treatment provides no easy road for the would-be 
mother. Secondly, the woman is solely responsible for the hoped-for 
metamorphosis from embryo to fetus to neonate.
If we are prepared to accept that women own foetal and embryonic tissue 
because of the reproductive labour they have invested in creating it, then the 
foetus or embryo in utero must also be the property of the pregnant woman; 
on this analysis, she has not created it any less because it is in utero or ‘alive’ 
-  she can plausibly be regarded as having a property interest in the foetus or 
embryo until it achieves legal personhood (on birth), since only the presence 
o f personhood (the legal status which precludes its being the property of 
another) can extinguish the property interest of the woman.
However, although Mason argues that the ‘labour’ view justifies 
vesting property rights in embryos in women alone, I would suggest,
605 Ibid. at 215-216
606 Ibid. at 217
607 Mason, op. cit. at 91
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respectfully, that this is insufficient to justify the kind of strong, exclusive 
property right that I wish to establish here. This is because although the labour 
input from the woman has been substantially greater than that of the male 
progenitor, he has, nonetheless, contributed some o f his labour to the 
production o f the embryo / foetus. As such, he may, on the labour view, be 
able to assert some property claim on the basis o f his contribution, and this 
claim, although it would be significantly less than (and would in all 
probability be defeated by) the far more substantial property claim of the 
woman, would confuse the issue unnecessarily. To acknowledge any property 
right whatsoever on the part of the man would represent a weakening of the 
immunity which pregnant women currently enjoy from legally-endorsed 
interference in pregnancy by potential fathers. This being so, my property 
model requires to justify the sole ownership o f the foetus by the pregnant 
woman without reference either to genetic contribution or to labour.
5.6.4. Property-for-personhood
Another possible justification for endowing pregnant women with sole 
ownership o f their embryos and foetuses is found in Margaret Radin’s theory 
o f ‘property-for-personhood’. Property-for-personhood sources property 
rights not in self-ownership, but in the fact that the recognition of property 
rights in certain things is necessary for full personhood. ‘The essence of 
[Radin’s] theory’, according to Jeanne Schroeder, ‘is that we identify so 
closely with certain objects o f personal property that we cannot distinguish 
our property from our selfhood. Consequently, human flourishing requires the 
recognition o f certain legal rights that protect these objects of personal 
property’.608 Radin explains:
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of 
themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood 
because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing
608 Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, ‘Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery o f Personal 
Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body’ 79 Minnesota Law Review  55 (November 1994) at 
56
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personal entities in the world. They may be as different as people are 
different, but some common examples might be a wedding ring, a 
portrait, an heirloom, or a house...an object is closely related to one’s 
personhood if  its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the 
object’s replacement. If so, that particular object is bound up with the 
holder.609
Naffine echoes this when she writes that property is so important for 
personhood that ‘certain categories of property can bridge the gap, or blur the 
boundary, between the self and the world, between what is inside and outside, 
between what is subject and object.’610 Radin contrasts ‘property-for- 
personhood’ with the sort of property we have when we hold goods that are 
‘perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value’.611 The 
archetypal example of an object held for ‘purely instrumental reasons’ is 
money, which we almost always hold only because o f its exchange value.612 
Radin continues:
Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ 
in some constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue o f this 
connection the person should be accorded broad liberty with respect to 
control over that ‘thing’. But here liberty follows from property for 
personhood; personhood is the basic concept, not liberty.613
So according to Radin, recognising property-for-personhood enables us to 
understand why certain forms of property are treated by theorists as being 
‘stronger’ or more important than others, and as giving rise to stronger moral 
claims and more stringent legal protections.
Radin concludes that at least some conventional property interests in 
society ought to be recognized and preserved as personal, and that where we
609 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’, 34 Stanford Law Review  (1982) 957 at 
959
610 Naffine, op. cit., at 199
611 Radin, op. cit., at 959
612 Ibid. at 960
613 Ibid. at 960
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can ascertain that a given property right is personal, there is a prima facie case 
that that right should be protected to some extent against invasion by 
government and against cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims 
of other people.614 This is precisely the kind of property right in the foetus 
that my property model o f pregnancy wishes to vest in pregnant women. So 
can the foetus feasibly be regarded as property-for-personhood? I have argued 
earlier, under headings 5.3., 5.4. and 5.5., that there are good reasons to accept 
that embryos and foetuses, whether inside or outside the body, can be 
regarded as property. If  we accept this as a starting point, we can proceed to 
ask whether they are the kind of property which is so bound up with the 
identity o f the owner that they ‘cannot be distinguished from (her) selfhood’, 
meriting the kind o f strong protection from interference by government and 
others that Radin envisages.
There is a subtle, but fundamental, problem with all of this. While 
property-for-personhood provides a strong justification for the strength o f the 
property right in the foetus, it does not clarify why the right ought to vest 
exclusively with the pregnant woman who carries it. So, bearing in mind that, 
if  we can establish that property rights in the foetus ought to vest exclusively 
in the pregnant woman, we can, by reference to Radin’s concept of property- 
for-personhood, regard them as an extremely robust instance of property, I 
turn now to consider J.W. Harris’s theory of property and personhood and to 
ask whether this is capable o f justifying why only pregnant women should be 
regarded as the owners o f the foetuses.
5.6.5. J.W. Harris on property and personhood
Harris offers several different justifications for what he calls ‘natural property 
rights’. Two o f these are relevant to property-in-the-foetus: the ‘personhood 
constituting ’ justification, and the justification from privacy.
614 Ibid. at 1014-1015
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5.6.5.1. ‘Personhood constituting ’property
Harris tells us that ‘[wjhere someone constitutes his personhood, in part, by 
incorporating a thing into himself, he ought to be regarded as the owner of 
that thing.’615 The similarity with Radin’s property-for-personhood is clear, 
and indeed Harris quotes Radin’s statement that ‘once we admit that a person 
can be bound up with an external “thing” in some constitutive sense, we can 
argue that by virtue o f this connection the person should be accorded broad 
liberty with respect to control over that “thing”.’616 Despite the similarity, 
however, note that Harris is engaged in justifying the locus o f the property 
right whereas Radin’s theory (in my view) is capable o f justifying only the 
strength o f the right.
Harris continues, ‘[a] successful invocation of the personhood- 
constituting argument would not yield full-blooded ownership. In particular, it 
appears incompatible with freedom to transmit.’617 Again, the relevance to 
property-in-the-foetus is clear. The fact that the personhood-constituting 
justification would yield a property right in the foetus which is ‘incomplete’ in 
the sense that it does not include the right to transmit should not be regarded 
as a disadvantage, since: (i) in discussing the nature of property, I have 
already pointed out that there is no formula for determining what is and is not 
an instance of property, so that to qualify as ‘property’, a particular 
relationship need not necessarily exhibit all o f the incidents we commonly 
associate with property618, and (ii) I will argue later that in the context of 
pregnancy, to regard the foetus as an object of non-transmissible property is 
perfectly in keeping with principles of individual liberty generally, and in 
particular with the way in which courts in the United Kingdom have recently 
been adjudicating cases o f ‘maternal / foetal conflict’.
Harris tells us that ‘the phenomenon o f personhood-constituting 
through incorporation of external resources does exist. If  an artificial organ is
615 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) at 220
616 See supra, note 613
617 Harris, op. cit., at 221
618 See infra, under heading 5.2.1.
217
implanted into someone’s body, it becomes part of him.’619 Once again, the 
relevance to the pregnancy context is clear. However, although I have claimed 
(and will go on to elaborate on the claim) that the ‘incompleteness’ of 
property under the personhood-constituting justification need not make this a 
less attractive route to justifying property-in-the-foetus, nevertheless this 
consideration leads Harris, ultimately, to prefer other ways o f justifying 
property rights:
[T]he personhood-constituting argument for a natural property right, 
when it can be plausibly invoked, does support a just claim to a 
limited, non-transferable ownership interest. Its authentic scope is, 
however, extremely limited. Furthermore, when it applies the privacy 
argument...will invariably apply as well. Personhood-constituting is 
hence in practice a redundant as well as a rare phenomenon.620
It is to Harris’s explanation of the justification based on privacy that I turn 
now.
5.6.5.2. Property fo r  privacy
Harris states that ‘[w]here a person’s privacy can be effectively guaranteed 
only if  he is granted an open-ended set of use-privileges and control-powers 
over some resource to which he is intimately connected, he ought to be 
regarded as owner of that resource.’621 In the context of pregnancy, it is easy 
to see that the privacy of the pregnant woman ‘can only be effectively 
guaranteed’ if  she is granted such privileges and powers in respect of the 
foetus within her body. The landmark case o f Roe v Wade established privacy 
as the basis of abortion rights in the United States, and ever since, privacy has 
been regarded as the animating value in adjudicating maternal / foetal issues. 
Given the centrality accorded to privacy in the maternal / foetal context, and 
the close connection between privacy and property noted by Harris above, it is
619 Harris, op. cit., at 222
620 Ibid. at 223
621 Ibid. at 224
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perhaps surprising that such matters have not hitherto been framed in terms of 
property -  although there have undoubtedly been strong political and 
rhetorical reasons for avoiding references to pregnancy as a property 
relationship, particularly given the heat o f the abortion debate in America. 
Nevertheless, it is the central claim of this thesis that it is both possible and 
useful to understand pregnancy in property terms, and the strength of the link 
between property and privacy -  perhaps the most familiar theoretical 
justification for abortion rights -  would seem to support this claim.
Harris clearly prefers the privacy-based justification to the 
personhood-constituting one when he writes that ‘[pjrivacy is an important 
property-specific justice reason to be taken into account in property- 
institutional design. Its importance drowns any significance which might be 
attached to metaphysical notions of personhood-constituting.’622 Because of 
the familiarity and success that arguments based on privacy have had in the 
matemal/foetal context, justifications which invoke privacy will perhaps be 
more accessible and of more obvious practical value than ‘personhood- 
constituting’ justifications of property-in-the-foetus. This notwithstanding, 
however, I see no reason why the two modes o f justification should not be 
taken together, since they both provide persuasive reasons for establishing the 
pregnant woman as the exclusive locus o f property-in-the-foetus. Having thus 
justified the pregnant woman’s exclusive property right, it is possible to use 
Radin’s theory of property-for-personhood to explain the strength o f that 
right.
5.7. Advantages of the property model
The property model o f pregnancy proposed here avoids the inconsistency of 
the conflict model. The conflict model cannot explain satisfactorily why a 
woman is permitted to terminate a pregnancy until the twenty-fourth week 
whereas a third party may be liable under criminal and / or civil law for 
causing the death of (or injuring) a foetus of the same gestational age.
622 Ibid. at 228
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According to the property model, this can be explained by the fact that the 
foetus is the property of the pregnant woman, so that while she is permitted to 
dispose of it, no-one else is entitled to damage or destroy it. If  they do so, they 
are liable to pay her compensation. Under the property model, the most 
pressing inconsistency is the restriction on the right to terminate pregnancy. If 
a foetus is understood as the property o f the pregnant woman, there is no 
justification for restricting her freedom to dispose o f it.
A related advantage is the ability o f the property model to recognise 
the foetus as something of value. As such, cases where compensation is 
awarded for foetal death or injury can be understood as attempts by the law to 
compensate women for the loss of their valued foetal property. As many 
commentators note, the courts currently struggle with the intuition that the 
foetus is ‘not nothing’, is something that matters, within the framework of a 
model which focuses on the potential ‘conflict’ between woman and foetus. 
The conflict model struggles to recognise the value o f the foetus because of 
the implications such value may have for women’s rights and freedom within 
a system where the interests of one are being balanced against those of the 
other. The property model acknowledges that the foetus has value, but since it 
is valued as property and not for its potential as human life, the valuing of the 
foetus within the property model poses no threat to the legal (or social) 
position of pregnant women.
A focus on relationships rather than intrinsic nature, on law rather than 
metaphysics, is yet another advantage o f the property model. Because 
property is concerned with relationships, this allows us to focus away from 
interminable wrangling about the ‘true nature’ of the embryo or foetus and 
toward the relationships surrounding it. Instead of asking, ‘what is this 
entity?’, the property model asks, rather, ‘what relationships exist in respect of 
this entity?’.
The property model also provides answers to another problematic 
question arising from pregnancy: the question of whether the foetus is a body- 
part, a separate entity or something in between. The conflict model treats the 
pregnant woman and the foetus as separate entities with competing interests. 
The shortcomings o f the conflict model have led some commentators to reject 
the idea o f woman and foetus as ‘separate entities’, hoping thereby to discover
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a better, less ‘conflicted’ way of thinking about and adjudicating pregnancy. 
But what are the alternatives? One is to claim that the foetus is nothing more 
than a part of the pregnant woman’s body. An example of the body-part 
model can be found in the work of Barbara Katz Rothman, when she writes of 
‘the baby not planted within the mother, but flesh o f her flesh, part of her’.623 
Liam Clarke also adopts the body-part model. He claims that, while a woman 
is pregnant, ‘her personhood.. .necessarily involves the fetus such that it is 
part of who she then is.’624 This forms the basis for his notion o f the 
‘fetus/mother’625 and his insistence that, prior to birth, ‘issues and problems
pertaining to the fetus/mother may.. .be discussed only in the context of their
626unity.’ Obviously, the foetus is located within, connected to and dependent 
upon the body of the pregnant woman, but does this really make it a body- 
part?
In my view, the body-part model can be rejected because, as John 
Seymour observes, ‘[it] cannot be reconciled with the physiological facts.’ 
First, the DNA profile of the foetus is different from that o f the mother -  if it 
were indeed a body-part, it would be the only body-part to have anomalous 
DNA. Moreover, as Catharine MacKinnon has noted, ‘[f]etal dependence 
upon the pregnant woman does not make the fetus a part o f her any more than 
fully dependent adults are parts o f those on whom they are dependent. The 
fetus is a unique kind o f whole that, after a certain point, can live or die 
without the mother.’628 A related point is that, if  the foetus is taken to be a 
body-part, this entails that the woman who gives birth or undergoes a 
termination is ‘less than whole’, ‘diminished’ somehow by the absence o f the 
foetus. Indeed, perhaps all women who are not pregnant could be said to be 
‘incomplete’, or Tacking a foetus’ in the same way that someone lacking 
another body part would be incomplete. This is surely absurd: as MacKinnon 
points out, ‘[t]he woman’s physical relation to her fetus is expected to end and
623 Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a 
Patriarchal Society (New York, 1989) at 61
624 Clarke, op. cit. note 213 at 40
625 Ibid. at 39
626 Ibid.
627 Seymour, op. cit. at 191
628 Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’ (1991) Yale Law 
Journal 1281 at 1315
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does; when it does, her body still has all o f its parts. She is whole with or 
without i t . . .’. 629 Courts in the United Kingdom have rejected the body-part 
model explicitly.630
The other alternative would be to claim that the foetus is neither a 
body-part nor a separate entity, but something else -  ‘not-one-but-not-two’, in 
the words of John Seymour. The key feature of such approach, according to 
Seymour, is ‘its emphasis on the shared needs and interdependence of the 
woman and her fetus’.631 Seymour acknowledges that ‘[t]here is no simple 
way of explaining the resulting model’, but points out that it ‘stresses the 
uniqueness of pregnancy’. 632 Is this what we need from a new legal paradigm 
of pregnancy? One of the main liberal criticisms o f academic comment on 
pregnancy is the tendency of writers to emphasise how ‘unique’ the pregnancy 
condition is, and how difficult it is to find appropriate analogies from which to 
begin reasoning about how the law ought to deal with it. As Robin West has 
commented:
Equal regard -  the heart o f liberalism -  requires that pregnant women 
be treated similarly to those with whom they are similarly situated. 
The imperative o f equal treatment at the heart o f liberal legalism 
animates the need to locate those to whom she is similarly situated and
633therefore, the search for analogous conditions.
Whatever we think of liberalism as a political philosophy, surely we would 
wish the law to ‘treat like cases alike’? Models which emphasise the 
‘uniqueness’ of pregnancy threaten to ‘strand’ pregnant women out of reach 
of the protection of the law by depriving them and their advocates of 
analogies. Although it is difficult, given the vagueness of the ‘not-one-but- 
not-two’ approach, to imagine precisely what following such an approach 
would entail, it is fair to imagine, given the approach’s stress on the
629 Ibid. at 1314
630 See the cases o f  Attorney G eneral’s Reference (No. 3 o f 1994) [1998] AC 245 and St. 
G eorge’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S  (see supra note 62)
631 Seymour, op. cit. at 190
632 Ibid.
633 West, op. cit. at 2125
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uniqueness o f pregnancy, that to follow it would be detrimental to the legal 
status of pregnant women.
The property model avoids the illiberalism of the ‘not-one-but-not-two’ 
approach, its indeterminacy, and the impracticality which would inevitably 
hamper any attempt to translate the latter into a coherent adjudicative 
framework. It also avoids the absurdity of the body-part model, since it 
recognises the foetus and the pregnant woman as two distinct entities. Unlike 
the conflict model, which ascribes competing interests to each of them, 
however, the property model avoids the problems of conflict inherent in other 
‘separate entity’ models by defining the foetus as a separate entity without 
interests. It is separate from the mother in the same way that any piece of 
property is separate from (but related to) its owner.
A final advantage is that the property model avoids justifying the 
property right o f  a pregnant woman in her foetus on the basis of the 
controversial notion o f ‘property in the se lf, with all its dualistic and illiberal 
implications (discussed above). Because I have sourced the pregnant woman’s 
right o f property-in-the-foetus in J. W. Harris’s notions of ‘personhood- 
constituting property’ and ‘property for privacy’, there is no need to make the 
contentious claims that: (a) a woman owns her own body; and (b) that the 
foetus is a part o f  the body which she owns.
Although the property model has these advantages over the conflict 
and consent based models, it will undoubtedly have its critics, and I now 
consider what some o f the main criticisms may be.
5.8. Some criticisms anticipated
5.8.1. Moral repugnance
Perhaps the most obvious objection to my property model would be to ask 
why the courts should adopt an analysis which so many people would 
consider to be morally-repugnant. My response to this would be to argue that 
a view is morally-repugnant only if it offends some collective moral 
understanding. As the controversies surrounding such topics as abortion, 
embryo experimentation, surrogacy and maternal/foetal conflict in the medical
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context reveal, we do not have any shared moral sense which could be 
offended by the notion of the foetus as property - although, of course, there 
may be many individuals who will feel offended by it. Moreover, as the 
discussion in chapters two and three shows, it is highly unlikely that any 
moral consensus over the issue of foetal moral status will emerge.
But an even stronger response than this may be made. Even if it were 
to be assumed that we do have some sort of shared moral sense that the foetus 
is morally-considerable, it would be a great mistake to suppose that an 
approach based on personhood would lead to conclusions which were any 
more favourable to that view than the conclusions o f the property-based 
approach proposed here. Personhood theories like Kant’s - interpreted strictly 
- would categorise all infants, young children and adults with severe mental 
disability as non-persons. A personhood theorist like Peter Singer would also 
exclude infants and the severely mentally-disabled from the category of 
‘person’, while including some non human animals. Is this any more ‘in line’ 
with our moral intuitions?
As I have shown in my discussion of McDonagh’s model and my 
references to writers such as Hartouni, Larsen and others, models which focus 
on questions about the moral status o f embryos and foetuses can also arrive at 
constructions wherein the foetus is a monster, an aggressor, even a ‘rapist’. Is 
demonising the foetus necessarily better than reifying it, simply because the 
demonised foetus is regarded as an ‘individual’? In my view, the heat of the 
personhood / rights debate, and the accompanying sense that it is an ‘us or 
them’ contest between women and foetuses, can lead to conclusions which are 
potentially even more repugnant than the conclusion that the foetus is a 
‘thing’, an object o f property.
To the extent that the law does not currently recognise the foetus as a 
‘person’, it is already ‘a thing’ in law, despite the lengths to which judges and 
academics go to tell us what a special and unique ‘thing’ it is. The law already 
permits the destruction o f embryos in the course of scientific research, and the 
destruction of embryos and foetuses in legal terminations of pregnancy. 
Would a property-based model really have such a detrimental effect on their 
moral and legal status? Is it really more repugnant to experiment on embryos 
and abort foetuses because they are ‘things’ than because they are ‘special
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(but not special enough) non-persons’? For all these reasons, I would wish to 
resist the conclusion that moral intuition necessarily leads us to prefer the 
current paradigm o f personhood and rights over the property paradigm I 
propose here.
5.8.2. Incompatibility with the experience of real women?
There will be those who argue that my property model o f pregnancy is as 
much at odds with women’s ‘ordinary’ experience o f pregnancy as 
McDonagh’s foetus-as-aggressor model. Against this criticism I would argue 
that we cannot talk meaningfully about ‘women’s ordinary experience of 
pregnancy’, since it makes sense to suppose that each woman has her own 
individual experience. In the case of a wanted pregnancy, it is accepted that 
the majority of women experience a ‘bonding’ with the foetus. But a property 
model does not preclude this, any more than the current conflict model does. 
Very few women conceive o f their wanted pregnancies as clashes of interest 
between themselves and their future children, so the fact that they do not 
generally envisage pregnancy as conferring a property right in respect of the 
foetus should not be regarded as a reason to reject the property model. Rather, 
the model should be resisted only if  it makes no legal sense, or fails to 
improve upon the status quo. I have argued that it does make legal sense and 
improve upon the conflict model. The current conflict model, by contrast, is 
both a legal nonsense -  ‘where is the legal conflict?’ -  and a source of 
incoherence. The ability to present an accurate picture of wanted pregnancy is 
not a priority for adjudicative models of this kind because, as I have already 
suggested, there is unlikely to be one common experience of wanted 
pregnancy.
5.8.3. Rights o f trespass?
A second concern about property-in-the-foetus might be the fear that someone 
other than the pregnant woman herself could have property rights in the foetus 
which allow them to trespass on the body of the woman. As I have already 
suggested, my view o f property-in-the-foetus would not recognise any party
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other than the pregnant woman as having property rights in respect of the 
foetus in utero. Although other parties -  potential fathers, members of the 
extended family, doctors, and even the state -  may have strong interests in the 
welfare of embryos and foetuses in utero, these interests cannot translate into 
property rights. This is because the personhood rights o f  the pregnant woman 
herself act as a trump to defeat any interests that others may have.
Why does personhood act as a trump over property? Put simply, in law 
personhood always is a trumping concern. The clearest example o f this is the 
principle that persons themselves cannot be owned; institutions such as 
slavery and possessive marriage which treated persons as objects of property 
relations are now recognised as anathema precisely because it is accepted that 
the categories of ‘person’ and ‘property’ are mutually exclusive. As full legal 
persons, pregnant women are entitled to rights o f privacy and bodily integrity, 
such as the right to refuse medical treatment. I f  third parties were to hold 
property rights in respect of embryos and foetuses in utero, these ‘personhood 
rights’ of pregnant women would be placed in serious jeopardy, to the extent 
that the personhood of women might even be regarded as being ‘suspended’ 
for the duration of pregnancy. At any rate, pregnant women would certainly 
not be able to exercise their personhood as fully as non-pregnant women. In 
the United Kingdom at least, courts have recognised that this would be 
unacceptable, and the decision in Re MB  comes close to saying precisely 
that.634
Although I have argued that personhood is inadequate as a criterion for 
determining moral status, I have emphasised that it is nonetheless possible to 
recognise clear cases o f moral and legal personhood which are no less 
compelling because the concept is o f little use at the margins o f life. As such, 
it is not contradictory to invoke the personhood o f the woman as a protection 
against the potential property-claims of others. I have already mentioned 
surrogacy in passing. A property-based analysis o f pregnancy would explain 
why surrogacy contracts are unenforceable, and why the couple who have 
commissioned the surrogacy cannot coerce the surrogate during pregnancy.
634 See supra, note 60 at 436-438
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As such, the property-based analysis protects women’s bodily integrity rather 
than threatening it.
5.8.4. The foetus as a patient in medical law?
The recent trend in medical law in the United States to treat the foetus as a 
‘second patient’ highlights a related danger with the property-based approach. 
New technology has enabled clinicians to have a greater understanding of 
foetal development and has given them the ability to intervene more and more 
for the clinical benefit of the foetus. In America, many commentators are 
increasingly concerned about the willingness of state authorities to impose 
treatment upon pregnant women against their will, ‘for the benefit’ of the 
foetus.635
This is one area of law in which the property-based approach is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the foetus-as-property model could be 
used to refute the notion that the foetus is in any sense a “patient” and thereby 
prevent clinicians from trespassing upon the woman’s body (or to provide an 
alternative basis for the conclusions in Re MB636 and St George’s Healthcare 
NH S Trust v -S637 that a woman may reasonably refuse treatment to benefit the 
foetus). But what about the pregnant woman who actively seeks medical 
intervention to benefit her foetus? If the law regards the foetus as property 
which is valuable only to her, its owner, why should it sanction the use of 
scarce public resources in order to protect her private property interest when 
the NHS is unable even to meet all the needs of born people? Does the 
property-based analysis commit us to the conclusion that foetal surgery - or 
any ante-natal care other than that designed to promote the health of the 
mother herself - be carried out privately, at the mother’s expense? This would 
obviously penalise poor pregnant women, which seems a highly undesirable 
outcome.
This difficulty is not as easily rebutted as all o f the following ones, and 
I think it requires further examination. First, it could be claimed that the
635 See supra, note 79
636 See supra, note 60
637 See supra, note 62
227
‘public good’ interest in preventing people from being bom  with disabilities 
can justify the use of scarce resources on foetal surgery / treatment. Of course 
there is another way of preventing children from being bom  with disabilities, 
namely a system of compulsory screening with compulsory abortion in those 
cases where foetal abnormality is found. But this also uses up resources (on 
screening and abortion) and much more importantly, in my view, it would 
involve coercing woman into having abortions in those cases where the 
existence of foetal abnormality did not cause the woman herself to wish the 
pregnancy to be terminated. Such a massive intrusion would of course be 
abhorrent to the majority of people, and would contravene the clear precedent 
regarding the right o f a pregnant woman to refuse to consent to treatment.
O f course, a counterargument could be made along the lines that it 
would be unreasonable for a woman to wish to give birth to a child that she 
knows will be disabled, and that the law only allows scope for the reasonable 
refusal o f consent. But this would be a very dangerous development; it would 
entail the value-judgment that the life of a disabled person is not worth living 
by implying that to wish such a person into existence is ‘unreasonable’. It also 
fails to take account o f the refusal of some parents to trust absolutely in the 
technology and expertise which has produced the diagnosis of disability. For a 
woman who refuses her consent to an abortion on the basis that she is not 
entirely convinced o f the absolute certainty that her child will be bom 
disabled, to treat this as an unreasonable ground for withholding consent is to 
deny patients the right to disagree with medical opinion and still remain 
‘reasonable’.
Furthermore, many women have some degree of moral objection to 
abortion, and Re MB  clearly recognises the right of patients to withhold their 
consent for moral reasons, or indeed, for no reasons at all. Such is the scope of 
patient autonomy as recognised in Re MB that the spectre of forced abortion 
can be dismissed as a horror-scenario which the law, as it stands, would not 
countenance. But I am suggesting that the law alters its adjudicative 
framework; so the correct question is not whether a court proceeding on the 
basis o f the analysis in Re MB would ever allow forced abortion; rather, the
638 On the present analysis, it would also represent a violation o f  the pregnant woman’s strong 
right o f  property  in the foetus.
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question ought to be how a court applying my property model would regard 
Re MB -  would such a court reach the same conclusion? In other words, 
would the patient-autonomy of pregnant women still be protected such that 
forced abortion would still be illegal?
My view is that a property-based account o f the matemal/foetal 
relationship would have no detrimental effect upon pregnant women’s 
autonomy as patients. Rather, it would enhance their autonomy by providing a 
basis for apportioning more weight to women’s wishes, and less weight to the 
views and professional prejudices of the medical establishment.639 This is so, 
in my opinion, because if  abortion involves the disposal of unwanted property 
rather than a ‘clash o f [moral] absolutes’, there is less scope for medical 
personnel to argue with the decision of a woman either to dispose of her 
property, or to retain possession of it.
It may be claimed that, if  abortion is nothing more than the disposal of 
unwanted property, then there is no obligation for the state to provide and 
fund abortions in NHS hospitals. However, any such suggestion can be 
rebutted strongly by pointing out that the state already takes responsibility for 
providing us with means to dispose of our unwanted property safely and 
hygienically, because, if  it were the responsibility of each individual citizen to 
dispose o f his or her own refuse, this would lead to an insanitary environment 
and eventually disease. On a property model of pregnancy, the obligation of 
the state to provide state funded abortions in NHS hospitals would be 
grounded in the need to avoid the consequences of not doing so: backstreet or 
DIY abortions and widespread injury and infection. The public good 
considerations weighing in favour of state-funded hospital abortions would 
thus be overwhelming.
639 I do not mean here to use the term ‘prejudices’ in a pejorative sense; I note simply that all 
professions have a ‘culture’, a ‘way o f  doing things’ which may affect the attitudes and modes 
o f  reasoning o f  members o f  those professions in a way that works to undermine the personal 
autonomy o f  those they serve. However, see Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control (Pluto Press, 
1997) for the view  that the systematic medicalisation o f  abortion has robbed women o f  
reproductive power because the medical profession is inherently ‘male’; this could certainly 
be one way in which professional prejudices threaten the decisional autonomy o f  pregnant 
women.
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5.8.5. Propertv-in-the-bodv?
Another potential problem with the notion of foetal property is the notion that 
the property interest flows from the property we are said to have in our own 
bodies. As discussed above, many theorists dispute this idea. For many 
philosophers, the idea o f self-ownership involves an unacceptable dualism 
between the part o f  the self that does the owning, and the part that is owned. 
The implication is that the mind is the person doing the owning, and the body 
is a mere thing that is owned. This is worrying to some people because it 
raises the issue o f slavery and appears to threaten liberty. Moreover, some 
feminist writers point out that historically, self-ownership has operated so as 
to exclude women; their bodies have always been at the disposal of men, 
serving masculine interests and the goals of patriarchal societies.640
This ideological dispute need not be fatal to the notion of foetal 
property. As has already been demonstrated, property in the foetus need not 
stem from property in the body. My model founds the pregnant woman’s 
exclusive right o f ownership in the foetus she carries in the fact that such 
ownership is necessary to her privacy (as explained by J.W. Harris) and 
therefore to the meaningful exercise o f her personhood.
5.8.6. The nature o f  property
Another response to my view of pregnancy might be to point out that 
philosophically, property is just as contentious and indeterminate a concept as 
personhood. Why, then, would a paradigm shift from personhood to property 
be of any assistance to the courts in determining the outcomes of hard cases? I 
hope I have shown that a property analysis is more helpful. The very fact that 
it allows courts to stop attempting to determine the moral status of the foetus 
is helpful in itself. Although both concepts - personhood and property - have 
both legal and moral implications, the courts should find it easier to deal with
640 See, for example, Donna Dickenson, Property, Women and Politics (Polity Press, 1997) 
and Ngaire Naffine, op. cit. at note 511
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property claims. Although the term ‘person’ has a legal meaning, it is ‘wholly 
formal’641 in the sense that it has no normative content; it ‘does not provide us 
with a definition o f a person from which to derive solutions to practical 
problems.’642 As such, it is invariably to the moral philosophy of personhood 
that the courts are forced to turn in hard cases.
A recent example can be found in the case of the conjoined twins Jodie 
and Mary, where the court acknowledged both twins to be ‘persons’ in the 
eyes of the law, but concluded that this finding did not aid their deliberations. 
In that case Lord Justice Ward was moved to remark, with a hint of 
frustration, that ‘this is a court of law, not of morals’.643 Deliberations about 
personhood force the courts into uncharted and often uncomfortable territory. 
By contrast, the law of property would allow courts to dispose o f cases 
involving pregnancy without the need for such moral discomfort.644 It would 
be relatively easy to regard pregnancy as an instance of property by looking at 
its features and deciding, in Waldron’s words, whether it has enough of the 
‘stuff of ownership’ about it.645
A different, but related question asks ‘why property?’ In other words, 
a property framework may be workable, may even be helpful, but why should 
we choose to adjudicate pregnancy in terms of property rather than in terms of 
any o f the other legal categories available? Pondering the issues arising from 
the capacity of new reproductive technologies (‘NRTs’) to allow various 
stages of potential human life to exist outside the body o f a woman, Jennifer 
Nedelsky wonders: ‘Should we treat these forms of potential life as property, 
invoking the law o f property to handle the inevitable disputes and policy 
choices that the NRTs will give rise to?’646 Nedelsky says that ‘no one 
concept, such as property...is intrinsically appropriate or inappropriate’647, 
observing that ‘[t]he choice of legal category is essentially a strategic
641 Richard Tur, ‘The “Person” in Law’ in Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds.) Persons 
and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) at 121
642 Ibid. at 129
643 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 at 969
644 Although for some judges, academics and lay people the very notion o f  framing pregnancy 
in terms o f  property may be sufficient to engender moral discomfort.
645 Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ 5(3) Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies (1985) 
313 at 314
646 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal 
Categories’ Canadian Journal o f Law and Jurisprudence 16(2) (1993) 343 at 344
647 Ibid.
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choice’648. In other words, we should choose the legal categories that will best 
promote ‘the norms and objectives which we think are primary.’649
So which norms and objectives should we prioritise when choosing a 
legal category for adjudicating pregnancy? Nedelsky offers some suggestions 
when she writes:
[Ljegal rights structure basic relationships in our society. In choosing 
or designing legal concepts for dealing with the problems posed by 
potential life, I think the relationships we must have in mind are these:
1. Relationships of respect and appreciation for children...
2. Relationships o f respect for women and honouring of their 
reproductive capacities and labour.
3. Relations of equality, between people of all classes and 
backgrounds as well as between men and women.650
I do not wish to disagree with the relationships Nedelsky prioritises here; 
indeed, I would contend that none of these goals is undermined by the 
property model of pregnancy which I propose. The property model does not 
commodify children, and need not erode respect for them or attention to their 
interests. This is so because the foetus, not the child, is commodified in the 
property model of pregnancy; the foetus-as-property is possible only because 
the law insists on the non-personhood of the foetuses, whereas the law is clear 
that bom children are persons. Even then, the foetus is ‘commodified’ only 
theoretically, since, as will shortly be discussed, I conceive of property-in-the- 
foetus as necessarily non-tramsferable.
With regard to Nedelsky’s second priority -  respect for women, their 
reproductive capacities and their labour -  the ‘symbolic power of property 
language’651 is well-knowm. Nedelsky herself acknowledges the view that 
‘women’s autonomy, power, and control vis a vis the medical establishment, 
might be enhanced., .by the position that all stages of potential life issuing
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
650 Ibid. at 355
651 Noel Whitty, Therese Murphy and Stephen Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human 
Rights Act Era (London: Butterwonths, 2001) at 299
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from her body are her property -  and remain so even when they are no longer 
in her body.’ This latter phrase indicates clearly that the possibility of 
property-in-the-foetus in utero is envisaged here.
Nedelsky also seems to accept that her third priority -  equality, 
particularly between the sexes -  would also be served by the choice of 
property as a legal category, when she writes that ‘this position might be seen 
to aid women in struggles over power and oppression with their male sexual 
partners -  both in regard to struggles specifically around reproduction and 
more generally.’653
I do not disagree with Nedelsky’s priorities then, but I would wish to 
add to them. Specifically, I would prioritise, along with the relationships 
Nedelsky identifies, the need for internal coherence within the legal system. 
This additional consideration weighs strongly in favour of the property model 
o f pregnancy. Whereas the current conflict model is beset by inconsistency, as 
chapter one has shown, the property model not only irons out many of the 
apparent ‘inconsistencies’ in the current law; it also provides a solid 
theoretical basis for future adjudicating, thereby ensuring that the law in the 
area will develop coherently in accordance with readily-identifiable legal 
principles. M oreover it is capable of providing a justification for existing 
decisions and intuitions about how maternal / foetal cases ought to be resolved 
-  something the conflict model continues to struggle with.
5.8.7. ‘Incomplete’ property?
Some may object that property-in-the-foetus is, at best, a highly unusual 
example o f property, since many of the incidents commonly associated with 
ownership cannot apply. For example, a woman cannot hire her foetus out, or 
dispose o f it by sale or gift during pregnancy. An immediate response to this 
is that there are always limitations on the exercise of our rights. As discussed 
above at 5.8.3., property rights in the embryo or foetus in utero cannot be held 
by third parties because this would undermine the full legal personhood of the 
pregnant woman. Similarly, the pregnant woman herself may not exercise her
652 Nedelsky, op. cit. at 347 -  although Nedelsky herself ultimately rejects this view.
653 Ibid.
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rights o f property in her foetus in such a way as to undermine her legal 
personhood. If  she were to attempt to sell the foetus in utero, for example, the 
law would treat the contract of sale as being invalid. Just as we may not 
lawfully sell our kidneys, or sell ourselves into slavery (or even, in many 
jurisdictions, hire out our bodies in prostitution), neither may we alienate the 
fundamental components o f our personhood, such as our privacy or the rights 
to refuse medical treatment or to terminate a pregnancy. We may purport to 
sign these rights or freedoms over to others, but the law will not uphold or 
endorse such ‘transactions’.
As such, the limitations on the exercise of the pregnant woman’s 
property rights in the foetus are no more fatal to the notion of the foetus-as- 
property than the laws on planning permission and waste disposal are fatal to 
ownership o f land. Ownership of the foetus does not require that the pregnant 
woman, as owner, is able to do whatever she pleases with her foetus, since the 
law always regulates ownership of property, limiting it by reference to 
‘trumping’ concerns, of which the personhood of the pregnant woman is 
treated here as being one.
Undoubtedly, many of the incidents normally associated with property 
are not present in the property model of pregnancy. However, recall the 
definition, contained in the Encyclopedia o f  American Jurisprudence and 
followed in the case of Moore v Regents o f  the University o f  California,654 of 
property as ‘nothing more than a collection of rights’. As Jeremy Waldron 
tells us, ‘[e]ach of the legal relations involved in [property] is not only 
distinct, but in principle separable, from each of the others... Because they are 
distinct and separable, the component relations may be taken apart and 
reconstituted in different combinations’ to give ‘newly constituted bundles’ 
which may also confer ownership.655
There are, however, powerful legal arguments against the idea of a 
property right which does not include the right of transfer (or ‘alienation’). In
fL G f .
the case o f National Provincial Bank Ltd. v Ainsworth, Lord Wilberforce 
stated that, before it can qualify as ‘property’, a right must be ‘definable,
654 See supra, note 515
655 Waldron, op. cit. at 315
656 [1965] AC 1175
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identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third 
parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability.’657 The requirement 
that property rights must be ‘capable of assumption by third parties’ amounts 
to a denial o f  the possibility o f non-transferable property rights. Following 
Lord Wilberforce’s dictum in Ainsworth, says Kevin Gray, ‘[n]on-transferable 
rights or rights which failed on transfer were simply not “property”’.658 Gray 
rebuts the idea that a right must be transferable before it can constitute 
property, arguing that such assumptions are the result o f ‘a legal culture 
dominated by transfer and conveyance’659 and that ‘[o]nly brief reflection is 
required in order to perceive the horrible circularity o f such hallmarks of 
“property” .’660
According to Gray, definitions of property should focus less on 
transferability and more on excludability. This is so because ‘“Property” is not 
about enjoyment o f  access but about control over access. “Property” is the 
power-relation constituted by the state’s endorsement o f private claims to 
regulate the access o f strangers to the benefits of particular resources.’661 As 
such, ‘the criterion o f “excludability” gets us much closer to the core of 
“property” than does the conventional legal emphasis on the assignability or 
enforceability o f benefits.’ It is possible, therefore, to describe as ‘property’ 
rights which may not be transferred or alienated, such as the rights o f a 
pregnant woman in respect of her foetus.
There is also disagreement among academics about whether or not it is 
desirable that all property rights be transferable. Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder 
explains that for one leading property theorist, some property rights should be 
inalienable:
In Market-Inalienability, Radin...argues, in effect, that the more an 
object is ‘personal’, the less legal recognition should be accorded its 
exchange value. That is, for those objects at the extreme, personal end
657 Ibid. at 1247G-1248A
658 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ Cambridge Law Journal 50(2) (1991) 252 at 293
659 Ibid.
660 Ibid.
661 Ibid. at 294
662 Ibid.
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o f  her personal/fungible property spectrum (i.e., body parts and female 
sexuality), the right of alienation should not only not be specifically 
enforced, but the law should affirmatively prohibit market 
alienation.663
By contrast, Donna Dickenson seems to argue, in her article ‘Property and 
W omen’s Alienation From Their Own Reproductive Labour’664, that 
segregating women’s reproductive labour from market values exploits women 
by robbing them o f property in the products of the labour of their bodies.
From my point o f view, both Dickenson’s and Radin’s approaches 
support the view that the products of women’s reproductive labour are 
‘property’; they merely disagree about the desirability of alienation. My 
interest here is in whether and to what extent women’s ‘reproductive rights’, 
and in particular the right to seek an abortion, can be regarded as rights of 
property-in-the-foetus, and neither Dickenson nor Radin seems to exclude that 
possibility. Whether property-in-the-foetus can be alienated by ‘gift’, on the 
market, in abortion, or merely kept and enjoyed by the woman herself ‘as a 
means to her own ends’, as described above, all of these are consistent with 
the exercise o f  a property right.
5.9. Conclusions
The property model o f pregnancy outlined in this chapter is perhaps 
surprisingly straightforward. Rather than treating the foetus as a body-part, it 
treats the woman and foetus as two distinct entities; however, unlike other 
‘separate entities’ models it does not treat each o f them as morally- 
considerable entities w ith interests and (potentially) rights. Following settled 
United Kingdom medical law cases, the foetus is regarded as a legal non­
person, and from this basis it is argued that there is nothing to prevent it being 
an object o f  property — particularly when cases involving frozen embryos are
663 Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, ‘Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery o f Personal 
Property as the Inviolate Fem inine Body’ 79 Minnesota Law Review  (1994) 55 at 89
664 Bioethics 15(3) (2001) 205
236
considered. If embryos outside the body can be objects of property, then what 
is to say that embryos inside the body -  which are morphologically and 
functionally indistinguishable from them -  cannot also be so treated? And if 
embryos can be objects of property in utero, then why not foetuses, since 
personhood, which precludes property, does not attach until birth?
In treating the foetus as a separate entity, but not a potential rights- 
bearer, the property model solves the inconsistency and contradiction of the 
conflict model, providing a basis for according women robust reproductive 
rights while simultaneously recognising the foetus as something distinctive 
and potentially-valuable. Moreover, as a relational model, the property-based 
approach avoids the interminability of the ‘intrinsic nature’ debates and 
satisfies the growing demand for a greater emphasis on ‘relationality’ in 
theorising and adjudicating pregnancy.
The property model also has the advantage of fitting with existing case 
law and employing familiar legal concepts. In the context of the model, 
pregnancy can be adjudicated on the basis of the familiar framework of 
property law; this represents an advantage over theories which hold pregnancy 
to be so unique or ‘without analogy’ that academics and judges must come up 
with ever more creative ways of talking about women and their foetuses.
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Conclusion
In the course o f this examination, three models of pregnancy have been 
discussed. In the opening chapter of this discussion, I argued that the orthodox 
‘conflict m odel’, which dominates current legal thinking and reasoning, fails 
to provide an adequate framework for adjudicating maternal / foetal issues. In 
the conflict model, such issues are framed as conflicts o f rights, and this 
forces us to examine and contrast the legal and moral status o f the entities 
involved -  woman and foetus -  and to weigh these against one another. Of 
course, the conflict model has intuitive appeal, not only because we are 
accustomed, by decades of its legal and social prevalence, to theorise 
maternal/ foetal issues in this way, but also because we are inclined to believe 
that resolutions to such issues must depend on finding the right moral answer 
-  on determining, accurately, the moral status of the entities concerned.
The problems with the conflict model are twofold: first, it leads to 
inconsistent results; second, it simply does not provide adequate justification 
for the rights it ascribes. This is partly because it is attempting to do the 
impossible — to discover a satisfactory answer to the fundamental and deeply- 
contested moral question of foetal status. As was demonstrated in the 
discussion in chapters two and three, two of the most influential approaches to 
determining moral status -  accounts based, respectively, on sentience and 
personhood -  fail to yield any definitive conclusions regarding the moral 
status o f the foetus. Sentience fails because of the state of our knowledge 
about foetal development, and because experts in the area disagree profoundly 
about at what stage of pregnancy -  if  at all -  the foetus becomes sentient. 
Personhood fails because it is too riddled with arbitrariness and contradiction 
to function as a meaningful account of moral status at all. As such, the 
characterisation o f the foetus as a ‘sentient non-person’ -  which is necessary 
to the conflict model -  is fundamentally flawed. The property model, by 
contrast, justifies existing law by reference to familiar legal principles and 
concepts, and as such it offers a preferable model for adjudicating pregnancy.
The consent model espoused by Eileen McDonagh is essentially a 
variation on the conflict model; it purports to avoid the ‘deadlock’ which
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characterises the traditional conflict model by accommodating foetal 
‘personhood’, but fails, ultimately, because it uses basic legal concepts 
(including the central concept of consent itself) in a way that is both confused 
and faulty. Moreover, the kind of ‘personhood’ it accommodates is a thin, 
cipherous, purely legal personhood which does nothing to avoid the deep 
ethical controversies involved in maternal / foetal issues.
The property model I set out in the final chapter offers a real 
alternative to framing and adjudicating pregnancy in terms of conflict between 
woman and foetus; however, it is important to note the limitations of the 
model. First, there is the problem of its application in the United States 
context. As I have demonstrated, in the U.K. the status of the foetus as a legal 
non-person is clear. Given this starting point, the project o f constructing a 
model wherein the foetus is an object of property relations is relatively 
straightforward. In the United States, the legal status of the foetus is less 
settled, particularly in medical law cases which purport to treat the foetus as a 
‘second patient’.
The second limitation which must be considered is the limited 
applicability o f my model in the legislative context. Unwanted pregnancies 
are very rarely the subject of adjudication, as most cases- the ‘enforced 
caesarian’ cases, actions for foetal injury, and so on -  concern wanted 
pregnancies. Unwanted pregnancy is generally dealt with by legislation. 
Although this thesis has primarily been about what model the courts ought to 
adopt, the property model undoubtedly also has legislative implications. The 
right o f a pregnant woman to property-in-the-foetus, as I have sourced and 
justified it, is equally strong throughout pregnancy. This means that, 
according to the property model, the present abortion laws in the United 
Kingdom are woefully inadequate, as they place unjustifiable and onerous 
restrictions on the right o f pregnant women to dispose o f (i.e. abort) their 
foetal property. However, it would be considerably more difficult to apply the 
property model in the legislative context, since legislation requires broad, 
usually cross-party support in both Houses of Parliament, and given the extent 
o f  fundamental moral disagreement on the abortion issue, this is unlikely to be 
forthcoming. Furthermore, many Members of Parliament would be reluctant, 
given the strongly-divided nature o f British public opinion on abortion, to
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associate themselves with legislation which enshrined such an absolutist 
position on the issue.
Where legislating on the issue of abortion is concerned, then, 
compromise is undoubtedly necessary. As such, any piece of legislation 
dealing with the issue cannot be expected to enshrine a recognition of the 
legal status o f the foetus so much as an uneasy trade-off between warring 
factions. That being the case, a ‘foetal property’ statute is probably 
impossible. The courts, however, are free to apply the property model to the 
cases before them, and that is why it is as a model of adjudication that the 
notion o f ‘the foetus as property’ is most valuable.
My thesis here has been both descriptive and prescriptive: my main 
claim is that a paradigm shift from personhood to property would reflect more 
accurately what is actually happening in the courts. But although I do not wish 
to say that this is necessarily a ‘good thing’ morally-speaking, I will go so far 
as to say that it not an outrageous or offensive thing, and that it is not a trend 
which we should resist on ethical grounds. In fact, I propose formalising it in 
a property model since that would lend coherence and justification to many 
legal decisions which presently appear inconsistent and contradictory. The 
moral debate can carry on in parallel, and if  the issue of whether or not the 
foetus is a person is resolved tomorrow, then the courts will o f course be free 
to abandon the property model of pregnancy altogether and implement the 
new moral consensus. What I claim, essentially, is that we should not allow 
the stalemate in the moral debate to inhibit or prevent the courts from making 
coherent decisions which are founded in recognised legal concepts. As such, 
the notion o f the foetus-as-property is not intended to replace thoroughgoing 
moral argument about the appropriate status of entities and the various rights 
and responsibilities o f the parties involved in beginning-of-life controversies; 
rather, it is intended to provide a modus operandi in the absence of moral 
consensus, one which enables the court faced with a case involving pregnant 
women and foetuses to function, in the words of Lord Justice Ward, as ‘a 
court o f law, not o f morals.’665
665 See supra, note 643
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